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Chair: James D. Morrow 
 
 
This dissertation offers a theoretical framework for understanding the choice of 
monitoring institutions made by nation states under international treaties and agreements. 
Some international agreements adopt centralized monitoring institutions such as 
inspection systems, while others rely on decentralized measures such as reporting 
requirements. To explain the variation, I offer a formal model wherein states can choose a 
monitoring institution from a menu of options: a) no information-gathering system, b) a 
self-administered reporting system, or c) a third-party verification system. Using this 
model, I identify the conditions under which states choose one monitoring system over 
the others. The model features relevant political, economic, and technological factors that 
contribute to the choice of monitoring institutions in order to provide a comprehensive 
and complete picture of regulatory decisions.  
 
 xi
I particularly focus on the political and economic conditions that influence the choice of 
monitoring institutions. One of the main research findings concerns the negative effect of 
asymmetric compliance environments. Whether the political and economic situation of a 
potential cooperation partner is favorable or unfavorable for compliance clearly impacts 
the preferences of other partners in their choice of monitoring institutions. The 
asymmetry in compliance environments creates a demand for information as well as the 
opportunity to establish a centralized monitoring institution, but it simultaneously 
generates sharp distributional conflicts among member states—conflicts that may in turn 
inhibit adoption of a centralized monitoring mechanism. The theory I develop in this 
regard revisits the central tenet of received cooperation theory about the informational 
role of international institutions and shows how and why international institutions may be 
constrained in performing their informational role. 
 
The theory of asymmetric compliance environments is tested with newly assembled 
datasets of three issue areas of post-WWII international cooperation: regional trade 
agreements, regional fisheries agreements and arms control agreements. Empirical 
findings indicate informational needs as well as distributional conflicts surrounding the 
design of monitoring systems across the three issue areas. With its theoretical and 
empirical content, this dissertation contributes to our understanding of the informational 
role and information-gathering dynamics of international organizations and the politics 










Introduction: Politics of Monitoring in International Cooperation     
 
Monitoring as a Political Issue 
 
The issue of monitoring and oversight is central to every political issue. For 
example, legislative bodies monitor bureaucrats, and bureaucrats oversee firms with 
various regulatory means. How to design an institution to achieve each stakeholder’s 
political/economic goals or to attain an idea of overall societal good is a fundamental 
question to students of political institutions. It is not an exaggeration to say that 
monitoring is central to the issues of everyday life as much as in regulatory politics. 
Parents want to monitor children, and employers supervise employees. All these 
instances of monitoring invariably involve information problems, power relationships, 
and questions of cost-effectiveness. Although every monitoring issue shares this general 
structure, each problem involves different dynamics as the stakeholders vary and as the 
nature of informational asymmetry differs.  
This dissertation concerns the design of monitoring institutions in international 
cooperation. It lays out the political problems and issues in the institutional design 
process, with a particular focus on the distributional conflicts that may arise due to the 
informational uncertainty about compliance environments – political and economic 
conditions that influence states’ compliance with international obligations. The effects of 
other determinants of monitoring systems, such as the types of error of a candidate 
monitoring system and the risks involved in the consequence of violations, are discussed 
in the theoretical framework where states choose a monitoring system (or no monitoring 
system) out of a menu of options.  
This dissertation research highlights the characteristics of international politics 
and lays bare the differences between the informational roles of domestic institutions and 
 2 
international ones. Despite the similarities in general structure, designing monitoring 
institutions on the international level is different from other monitoring problems in two 
major ways. First, one has to recognize that international institutions are established only 
with the consent of state parties. This means that the considerations of interactions about 
countries go into the decision-making and transparency may not be the first-best choice 
for the negotiating parties. Unlike child-parent relationships where parents devise 
monitoring arrangements by themselves and children become the subjects of monitoring, 
states both devise the monitoring arrangements and simultaneously operate the 
institutions to monitor themselves.1 The fundamental problem of self-regulation marks 
the key characteristic of the design of international monitoring systems.  
Second, as a related problem to the first, the design itself is a complicated political 
process that involves an ex ante understanding of uncertain future interactions. Unlike 
employer-employee relations where future relationships are controlled by enforceable 
contracts (backed by domestic judicial institutions) and conditioned salaries (employers 
design salaries efficiently), states are governed by much more precarious interactive 
environments, with a lot of uncertainty about others’ compliance, or even about their own 
future commitments due to fluctuating domestic political environments. The fact that the 
positions of individual nations arise from each country’s multi-layered domestic political 
environment is a particular characteristic of the international political environment. 
Therefore, the factors that affect the commitment to international obligations in turn 
influence what kinds of institutions countries support or oppose on the international level. 
These features – exact overlap in designers and users of institutions, and precarious 
cooperating environments – produce distinct features of monitoring institution design on 
the international level.  
Defining Monitoring Systems 
 
I define monitoring systems2 broadly in this dissertation. In a narrow sense, 
monitoring activity involves following the development of compliance behavior. In the 
                                                 
1 For an interesting case study of this problem in the context of French constitutional rule-making, see 
Elster (2006) 
2 I use “monitoring systems” and “supervisory mechanisms” interchangeably in this article to refer to 
oversight activities of international institutions.  “International control” also means the same thing in 
international law literature. 
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broader sense used in this analysis, monitoring systems include the comprehensive 
processes of gathering and evaluating compliance information. By compliance 
information, I mean the facts relevant to compliance behaviors as well as compliance 
environments of particular states. For example, the aggregate information on emissions 
data provided by the European Environmental Monitoring Programme (EMEP) under the 
Long Range Trans-boundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) would also produce compliance 
information, from which one can infer from with respect to compliance behaviors. 
According to this broad definition, monitoring provisions in international agreements 
would include dispute settlement provisions, institutional arrangements for decision-
making, and exchange of information. 
 
Monitoring in a Broader Institutional Context 
 
Monitoring institutions are important since they are intricately interwoven with 
other functions carried out by international institutions in areas such as treaty 
renegotiation, policy review, and policy-making. The issue of monitoring is related to 
other important discussions in international cooperation, such as compliance, delegation, 
dispute resolution, legalism, regime effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.  
Monitoring is related to the issues of compliance because the very goal of 
monitoring is to ensure compliance regardless of whether enforcement occurs or not. The 
politics of delegation is the central issue in the design of monitoring institutions as the 
outcome of the resulting negotiation among states is what we have in international 
treaties. Dispute resolution occurs as a consequence of monitoring as the collected 
information through monitoring or supervision often results in the initiation of dispute 
resolution procedures. Because of this nexus between monitoring processes and dispute 
resolution, we also see the connection with the trend of legalization as monitoring 
systems often serve as legalized institutions. Monitoring is also related to regime 
effectiveness. Without monitoring, regime evaluation is impossible and we cannot know 
whether the regime is effective or not. Lastly, accountability and transparency indirectly 
require monitoring systems – in order for international organizations to be accountable to 
principals (i.e. states) or in order for states to be accountable to their citizens with respect 
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to their international commitments, the compliance records and related performance 
should be collected, evaluated and assessed. In this way, transparency of decision-making 
process very much depends on how the monitoring could lead to provision of adequate 
information. Given this connection to delegation, compliance, legalization, and 
accountability, the design of monitoring broadly addresses the question about global 
governance – the sum of legal, social, economic, and political arrangements used to 
coordinate national policies.   
In the proposed definition of “collecting and analyzing compliance information,” 
monitoring activities encompass dispute settlement as well as diplomatic and 
communicative activities as schematically represented in Figure 1.1. For example, 
monitoring systems in preferential trade agreements (PTA) include 1) national focal 
points (ministries for trade or economy), 2) intergovernmental bodies such as joint 
committees or association councils, and 3) dispute settlement bodies (arbitration bodies 
or courts). Figure 1.1 also depicts the relationship between monitoring and other treaty 
functions. As monitoring function is embedded in a larger institutional context, 
substantial overlap exists between monitoring activities and dispute settlements.  
 
Figure 1.1  Schematic Presentation of Information Systems in International Cooperation 
   
Empirically it is difficult to separate monitoring systems from other treaty 
functions such as decision-making. Legislative bodies – usually a group of state 
representatives – utilize information to manage and re-negotiate agreements. In fisheries 
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Dissemination  
Performance evaluation (or 
review activities) on the 
implementation of treaty 
obligations 
 






activities, inspections, etc.) 
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agreements, for instance, a Commission decides on conservation measures based on the 
compiled data assisted by the Scientific Committee.3 In this sense, the decision-making is 
not totally separated from information-collection activities. Neither is the implementation 
stage easily separated from monitoring functions. In general, the majority of compliance 
information is collected in the process of implementation. Therefore, implementation 
itself has feedback effects on monitoring. Traditionally monitoring has been considered 
as a compliance mechanism -- a part of the implementation process and rightly so. The 
evaluation of compliance and regime environment aids decision-making processes and 
inevitably affects renegotiation processes.  
Among many features of monitoring – decision-making, delegation, and 
supervision, I specifically focus on the degree of centralization. Within the framework of 
rational design of international institutions (RDII) project, centralization is defined as 
whether institutional tasks are performed by a single focal entity or not. The concept 
encapsulates many aspects of decision-making and delegation, particularly what kind of 
informational power a decision-making body has and how much informational power is 
delegated to international organizations.  
 
Politics of Monitoring in International Cooperation: 
Research Question and Answer in Brief 
 
Based on the definitive characteristics of international cooperation environments, 
what emerge are rather weak monitoring institutions compared to domestic ones. We 
rarely observe centralized monitoring institutions, where centralization is characterized 
by high informational capacity, by delegated authority, and by subsequent formal 
legalization.4 Even the highly-regarded inspection systems provided by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are constrained by prior notification and approval by the 
inspected country.  
Many international agreements, instead of centralized monitoring institutions, 
present various kinds of monitoring mechanisms. For instance, fisheries agreements 
                                                 
3 Birnie and Boyle 2001 
4 My definition of centralization is consistent with the definition by Abbott and Snidal 1998; 9 – a concrete 
and stable organizational structure and an administrative apparatus managing collective activities. 
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include political commissions as well as scientific committees and less frequently, 
observer systems. Regional trade agreements present political consultative committees, 
inquiry points, ad hoc tribunals or standing courts. In arms control agreements, the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) does not have a monitoring system, while the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) has a stringent one, despite the fact that both deal 
with weapons of mass destruction. What explains this difference between the two 
conventions? More generally, what explains the design of monitoring mechanisms—
mechanisms that range from voluntary reporting requirements to third-party inspection 
systems—and the variation in states’ preferences for one kind of monitoring mechanism 
over others? 
How states devise monitoring institutions and what kind of incentives and 
disincentives go into their decision-making is crucial in understanding international 
political cooperation. This dissertation takes the design of monitoring institutions as its 
central focus. It broadly concerns how states resolve or decide to live with information 
problems in pursuing international cooperation. States, having prerogatives of autonomy 
in their domestic affairs, may choose not to share crucial information with other countries 
in international cooperation. On the other hand, exchange of information is sometimes 
essential in assuring commitment and solidifying trust in cooperative relationships.  
This balance between informational gains and adjustment costs5 is the main 
emphasis of this dissertation. I specifically argue that international institutions have the 
potential to provide informational efficiency – more information about compliance 
behaviors and environments, but that states would be resistant to the establishment of any 
international or supranational institutions if they have uncertainty about future 
compliance environments.  
 
Relations to Existing Literature 
 
Since the seminal work of Keohane and Axlerod (1984), recent scholarship in the 
field of international organization has focused closely on the question of the 
                                                 
5 The more popular term is “sovereignty costs” but the word sovereignty has many meanings and to get to 
the general idea of states having to change their domestic politics or impose constraints on their policies in 
order to comply with international agreements, I use the term “adjustment costs.” 
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informational role of international institutions.6 This focus has deep roots in the literature 
on international security affairs (arms control7 or peacekeeping8), environmental 
monitoring,9 and surveillance systems in human rights agreements.10 The scholarly 
attention on the role of international institutions, particularly its informational role, comes 
in part from the increasing role of international institutions shaping and partaking in the 
foreign policy decisions, as manifested in the run up to the first and second Gulf war. 
Johns (2007) considers the conditions under which biased bureaucrats are assigned to 
generate more information about state preferences. Fang (2006) and Chapman (2007) 
consider the conditions that lead to the decision to consult international institutions. The 
scholarly attention partly comes from the establishment of causal mechanisms as to how 
international institutions matter as opposed to whether international institutions matter.11  
The proposed puzzle – the rarity of strong information mechanisms despite their 
potential informational efficiency – has been indirectly addressed by many scholars. 
Although scholarly debates were not focused on monitoring institutions per se, but more 
broadly on the international institutions, we can draw related arguments with respect to 
monitoring institutions. Some scholars emphasize sovereignty costs to resolve the puzzle, 
but this view does not adequately explain the variation among monitoring institutions 
because the approach ignores potential benefits. Realists treat international institutions as 
epiphenomenal – secondary phenomena that merely reflect power relations,12 but again, 
this view fails to understand the existing variation in institutional designs. Both 
approaches merely emphasize why we do not observe strong international institutions but 
cannot account for why we sometimes observe strong monitoring institutions. The first 
approach focuses on sovereignty costs while the second view underlines the reflection of 
power on the international system.  
                                                 
6 See Chapman 2007, Fang 2006, and Thompson 2006 for the informational role of the United Nations 
Security Council, (these models take international institutions as given and examine what channels through 
which international institutions influence the leaders incentives), and Fortna 2004 for monitoring activities 
in peacekeeping operations.  
7 Duffy 1984 and Burns 1993 provide nice summaries of this large body of literature. 
8 Fortna 2004; Fortna and Martin 2006 
9 Haas et al. 1993; Weiss and Jacobson 1998; Ausbel and Victor 1998; Victor, Raustiala and Skolnikoff 
1998; and Mitchell et al. 2006  
10 Bayefsky 2002; Alston 2000. 
11 Martin and Simmons 2000. 
12 Forcefully argued by Mearsheimer 1995. 
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In contrast, I extend an institutionalist approach and offer an explanation based on 
an informational theory that highlights uncertainty in domestic compliance environments: 
domestic political environments pose uncertainty to future partners in cooperation, which 
creates distributional effects, consequently affecting monitoring institution design. In the 
model, the preferences over monitoring institutions are induced based on the states’ 
expectation about future cooperation. The theory provides a coherent framework in 
explaining the design of monitoring institutions, encompassing the variables previously 
emphasized: adjustment costs are part of costs involving commitment and delegation, and 
the power relationship is reflected by the economic and political compliance 
environments states are in. The model explains the costs as well as the benefits involved 
in creating international institutions while providing an explanation about the variation 
observed in empirical distribution of monitoring institutions in international agreements. 
In discussing the informational role of international institutions, this dissertation 
builds on to the literature on the rational design of international institutions.13 I analyze 
the antecedents of international supervisory mechanisms in the spirit of rational design 
projects, with a particular focus on the centralization of monitoring institutions. My 
analysis not only shows the applicability of the rational design framework but also 
advances our understanding of institutional complementarities, that is, how monitoring 
institutions interact with other institutional features. The consideration of how monitoring 
institutions are designed will provide insights into the limits and possibilities of the 
system.  
This research also speaks to the legalization literature14 by considering conditions 
under which monitoring institutions are formalized. My analysis highlights the 
international politics involved in the legalization process, that is, how states form 
preferences for different monitoring systems which then result in formal or informal 
institutions. This focus on distributional conflicts echoes the themes emphasized by 
Morrow (1994) and Fearon (1998) in their discussions on the distributional aspects of 
international cooperation and the question of “who-wants-what.” 
                                                 
13 Koremenos et al. 2001. 
14 Abbott and Snidal 2000. 
 9 
Lastly, the design of monitoring institutions is essentially a delegation problem 
regarding how much states want to entrust international organizations with a more or less 
autonomous informational capacity. The literature on delegation has recently made 
progress in defining the concept of international delegation, identifying the dynamics of 
the international delegation process, and examining the conditions under which 
delegation occurs.15 The main theme of the delegation literature is to point out how 
sovereignty-compromising this process is. This dissertation adds to the literature by 
demonstrating that sovereignty costs are not uniform across countries and that the costs 
depend on domestic political environments, which may or may not favor compliance with 
international agreements.  
While speaking to the major themes within the field of international 
organizations, such as delegation, institutional design, and legalization, and, at the same 
time, appealing to the general problem of monitoring in politics such as decentralization, 
this dissertation uncovers the politics of institutional design in international agreements 
and presents systematic empirical evidence on the process of institutional design as well 




My study is distinct in three ways. First, it makes a conceptual contribution in 
delineating the role of compliance environments – surrounding political, economic, and 
institutional contexts – on institutional design. Second, it lays out a theory of 
distributional conflicts in the design of monitoring institutions. Conflicts of interests may 
arise due to different compliance environments and attending uncertainty may lead to 
contractual failures. Third, the proposed theory is tested empirically with the newly 
assembled data in three issue areas of international cooperation – regional trade, fisheries 
management, and arms control. The comparative studies of three issue areas render 
support for the theory while revealing other interesting patterns about international 
cooperation. 
 
                                                 




“Compliance environments” is a key concept I develop in this dissertation, both 
theoretically and empirically. It is defined as political and economic conditions that 
influence compliance with international obligations and serves as a key factor that 
impacts the design of monitoring institutions on the international level. Depending on 
domestic and international political economic environments conducive (or inimical) to 
international cooperation, different parties may form different preferences toward the 
creation of international monitoring systems. The decision is made interactively and 
strategically: the state in question observes the compliance environments of the other 
potential partners, evaluates the future commitment levels, and decides which monitoring 





This dissertation contributes to the scholarship of international relations by 
specifying the key determinants of monitoring institutions and by showing the potential 
distributional conflicts that might arise in the process of creating international 
institutions. The theory of distributional conflicts identifies the positions of member 
countries in an international agreement with regard to institutionalization and examines 
potential conflicts of interests that might arise among them due to uncertainty or 
asymmetric compliance environments. 
Countries could benefit from international organizations that perform 
informational providers but the creation could be blocked by concerns about non-
compliance. The co-existence of informational gains and potential distributive losses 
during the design of monitoring institutions endogenously arises from a model where 
states are given a menu of options about various institutional choices, such as reporting, 
consultative mechanism, or arbitration panels. This model demonstrates conflicting 
incentives on the part of state parties in negotiation about establishing a centralized 
monitoring institution. 
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By considering the elements of regulatory environments both international and 
domestic, this dissertation makes two related claims about monitoring institutions in 
international relations. The first claim is that when international organizations 
autonomously control the information they gather with adequate monitoring capacity to 
inform compliance behaviors, everyone usually benefits in the long run, but state parties 
will agree to submit to the system only under specific political, technological, and 
economic conditions. In order for state parties to accept international monitoring 
arrangements, political and economic conditions must be favorable for compliance with 
international agreements among contractual parties. The technological or evaluative 
capacity of international institutions must be able to create and sustain a cooperative 
environment by distinguishing reliably between treaty-permitted and treaty-prohibited 
violations. Lastly, economic conditions must be conducive to the transfer of side 
payments, either as monetary compensation (e.g. foreign aid) or as a form of concession 
in other areas of inter-state cooperation, to establish an efficient monitoring system. If 
these conditions are not met, we are less likely to observe international institutions 
wielding informational power to promote cooperation, and these conditions may not be 
easily realizable because economic and technological requirements are often politicized 
during the process of delegating informational capacity to international organizations.  
The second main claim I make is about the sources of state preferences for 
particular international monitoring institutions over others. I argue that one of the key 
determinants behind a state’s choice of a monitoring system is the compliance 
environment it faces at home and abroad. Different domestic compliance environments in 
two or more states—and different levels of access to reliable information about these 
environments—strongly shape the preferences of states as to international regulatory 
control. The analysis that follows juxtaposes international regulatory environments and 
domestic ones and highlights the importance of domestic measures in enhancing the 
informational power of international institutions. This view bridges the gap between the 
two camps that have emerged in compliance literature—the managerial camp and the 
enforcement camp—with their respective focus on domestic and international regulatory 
environments.16 
                                                 
16 Represented by the works of Chayes and Chayes 1995 and Downs and Rocke 1998, respectively. 
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These two claims sharply qualify the prevailing mood of optimism about the 
informational role of international institutions. International institutions may in general 
facilitate information flow, but the kinds of information international institutions can 
convey is often quite restricted, often excluding crucial information about treaty 
compliance.17 The findings presented here raise grave doubts regarding the extent to 
which international institutions can realistically increase transparency in performing their 
informational role; they also focus our attention on the question of who wields the 
informational power in international cooperation. This work is not the first to point out 
the informational constraints faced by international institutions since empirical records 
pointing out the constraints abound.18 My contribution lies in describing how states 
design and at the same time limit the power of international institutions19 with a view to 
specifying the conditions under which international institutions may be allowed to wield 




The purpose of three empirical chapters is to illustrate the theoretical framework 
and to provide systematic evidence for the theory. I demonstrate the usefulness of the 
theoretical approach in the empirical investigation of three issue areas of international 
cooperation while specifying “compliance environments” for three issue areas of trade, 
fisheries management, and arms control. By doing so, I identify the sources of 
distributional conflicts and assess the political feasibility of monitoring institutions.  
The common structure of compliance environments and attending distributional 
conflicts highlighted in the theory chapter about the effect of informational asymmetry is 
discussed in the rich context of international trade, environment and security, with the 
                                                 
17 In rare cases, states may not want to know compliance information because they are not in a position to 
retaliate. 
18 See, for example, Weiss and Jacobson 1998 and Breitmeier, Young and Zürn 2006 for the limitations in 
reporting systems in environmental agreements. Also see Alston and Crawford 2000 in the context of 
human rights monitoring. 
19 Of course, I am not the first one to point out the weakness of the informational role of international 
institutions. See Dai 2001, 421 for her discussion of the managed role of international institutions. Also see 
Snidal and Thompson 2005 for their empirical claim that international institutions have little power in their 
informational capacity.  
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samples of regional trade agreements, fisheries agreements and arms control agreements, 
respectively. In regional trade agreements, compliance environments are characterized by 
occasional domestic protectionist pressures. In fisheries agreements, they can be 
measured by potential subsidies to fisheries industry. In arms control agreements, 
asymmetric compliance environments are generated by the level of domestic intelligence. 
The newly assembled data provide systematic support for the theory of 
distributional conflicts and show that, although the sources of compliance environments 
differ across three issue areas, the effect of asymmetry produces similar impacts on the 
choice of monitoring systems: when the asymmetry is severe, states tend not to choose 
centralized, legalistic, and highly delegated international monitoring systems. This 
empirical evidence of distributional conflicts over institutionalization makes us re-think 











A Theory of the Design of International Monitoring Institutions 
 
This section presents a theory of the design of monitoring institutions. The 
analysis involves a formal model that specifies political environments that define the 
choice of monitoring institutions and that induces the incentives for contractual parties to 
build monitoring institutions. I present political, economic, institutional, and 
technological conditions that make the delegation of informational capacity to 
international organizations, with a particular focus on the distributional consequences of 
delegation processes. By doing so, my analysis uncovers the conditions under which 
states collectively delegate informational power to international bodies.  
I show that situational factors in a country’s compliance environment, as well as 
internal agreement structures, affect the choice of monitoring institutions. Whether a 
country faces favorable or unfavorable political and/or economic environments ultimately 
conditions its preference for choosing an international monitoring body or not. I also 
show that the incorporation of flexible mechanisms into the structure of agreements can 
discourage overall institutional developments. Although the inclusion of flexibility in the 
form of allowing escapes helps states manage the risks, it narrows down the scope of 
agreement, with a consequence of presenting an obstacle to the initial development of 
monitoring institutions.  
Before presenting these findings, I first discuss key elements and concepts that 
operate as building blocks of the model that follows. Specifically, I discuss what kind of 
uncertainty hampers international cooperation and how international monitoring 




Undeterrable Violations and Insincere Opportunists 
 
The fundamental problem in international cooperation—to quote Keohane20—is 
how to distinguish “insincere opportunists” from inadvertent violators. The related 
problem is to distinguish insincere opportunism from inadvertent violations. 
Distinguishing events can be more pernicious than identifying violators due to the 
difficulty of judging every case whenever a violation occurs. The problem is acute 
because we have to take into account situational factors as well as the intentions of states. 
When a state temporarily opts out of its international obligations or withdraws from an 
agreement, it is often not clear whether the state in question is insincere or not. This kind 
of uncertainty motivates the theoretical model, and in what follows I examine the 
conditions under which international institutions can help solve this particular kind of 
informational problem in international cooperation.  
With regard to the kind of uncertainty introduced here, I develop the notion of 
undeterrable violation, which results from the kind of uncertainty or noise that is salient 
in the contemporary compliance environment. Two kinds of violations, deterrable and 
undeterrable, are differentiated because each case of violation has differential costs and 
benefits, thus potentially requiring different monitoring structures. Violations under 
favorable circumstances are not accepted internationally while violations under 
unfavorable or extenuating circumstances—violations considered inevitable or 
involuntary—are typically tolerated in the form of escape clauses or reservations. 
Violations of this kind are sometimes undeterrable because of the high costs of 
compliance on the part of the defector and the high costs of punishment on the part of 
cooperating partner. I therefore name these situations “undeterrable violations”21 and 
define them as stemming from circumstances where states face temporary political 
incentives not to cooperate and other states do not have the option to retaliate against the 
                                                 
20 Keohane 2002. 
21 I am not the first one to consider this case of undeterrable violations. Fearon 1998 for example uses the 
case in the crisis bargaining case. We can also find actual policy discussions about whether a country is 
deterrable or not in the policy arena. See Slocombe hearing, for example. Testimony of Honorable Walter 
Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense Policy, Department of Defense, Hearing before the Subcommittee 
on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, 
United States Senate one hundred fifth congress first session, February 12, 1997. Accessed at 
http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1997_h/s970212State 2.htm     
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corresponding defection. Allowing legitimate violations is a defining feature of 
international agreements in almost every issue area, be it in relation to a provision for 
potential use of certain weapons for retaliatory purposes in security agreements,22 or in 
relation to safeguards provisions in international trade agreements.  
What makes violations undeterrable? In theory, undeterrable violations can occur 
either opportunistically or inadvertently when a temporary violation is more profitable 
than the long-run gain from cooperation. In this situation, cooperation is so costly that a 
state may choose to violate. Many such scenarios are possible involving economic, 
political, and other kinds of pressures. First, a state’s leadership could face overriding 
political incentives either inadvertently or intentionally to violate the spirit of a treaty 
temporarily.  Even temporary incentives, particularly during election periods, may cause 
leaders to ignore international commitments for domestic gain. This point is noted in the 
theory of international trade as well as international finance. A battery of trade literature 
finds support for Grossman and Helpman’s theory of protectionism where leaders find an 
excuse for protectionism based on the interest group pressures they face. In the area of 
international finance, Tomz and Wright in their study of sovereign debts between 1820 
and 2000 find that inexcusable sovereign defaults have occurred with particular 
frequency during times of political upheaval.  
Second, violations may be undeterrable when states do not have control over 
private party behaviors. States may suffer huge costs in regulating private individuals.23 
When states have poor control over individuals regarding compliance behavior, it is not 
clear whether the violation itself is deterrable or not on the state level because of the 
difficulty of attributing the violation to the state in question.24 Practically, these putative 
situations of undeterrable defection are often taken into consideration in agreement texts25 
because states tend to hedge their bets rather than accept responsibility for acts of their 
individual citizens.  
                                                 
22 In the Geneva Protocol, states retained their potential use for retaliatory purposes against non-members 
which could potentially be states possessing biological and chemical weapons. 
23 For concrete examples of this kind of problem, see Morrow 2001. 
24 See the legal theory of state responsibility regarding this issue of violations “in a private capacity.” 
Exemplary references include Crawford 2002; Bodansky and Crook 2002.  
25 This phenomenon has been best studied in international trade literature. See Rosendorff and Milner 2001. 
Also see studies on reservation clauses in human rights agreements. For example, see Simmons 2006. 
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Undeterrable violations matter in international cooperation because they generate 
monitoring problems. As the above examples make clear, the first-order problems arise 
for member states when the prospect for opportunistic behavior arises. States could 
exploit areas of ambiguity to justify their defections and masquerade as compliers. The 
second-order problems are then created for the international community regarding the 
suitable response to the seeming defections. The international community could wrongly 
or prematurely accuse a country of a violation, or it could err by ignoring an egregious 
violation. The core problem is not necessarily that states cannot observe the compliance 
environments of other countries—states in most cases know whether another state is 
having difficulty during a transitional period—but that monitoring activities may be 
prone to such errors.   
 
Use of Flexibility Mechanisms as a Response to Undeterrable Violations 
 
In an increasingly legalized international environment, more and more 
international treaties make an effort to distinguish between inadvertent and intentional 
violations. States have an interest in building flexibility mechanisms into international 
agreements so that even if they are not cooperative, they can still be compliant.26 
Flexibility mechanisms include escapes from commitments such as withdrawal clauses, 
sunset provisions, reservations,27 or escape clauses.28 This allowance of flexibility in turn 
conditions how countries respond to each other when a potential violation is suspected. 
When an undeterrable violation occurs, the offended states may not have the capacity to 
retaliate due to the high cost of retaliation, or they may be unwilling to do so. With built-
                                                 
26 Note that I distinguish the concepts of cooperation and compliance. Compliance is a behavior that 
conforms to what is prescribed or proscribed in the agreed-upon international agreements. Cooperation is 
what is ultimately aspired to in the agreement. Based on these definitions, cooperative behaviors are more 
difficult to measure and observe since we depend on counterfactual scenarios of “what would have 
happened if the ultimate goal (e.g. climate change) were attained.” On the contrary, compliance behaviors 
would not be as difficult to measure as projecting the counterfactuals since the agreement texts serve as 
baseline points for prescribed and proscribed behaviors.  
27 The Vienna Convention on Treaties Art. 2(d) defines reservation as “a unilateral statement…made by a 
State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude 
or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that state.” States often 
file reservations to their commitments in times of national security or emergency situations.  
28 Flexibility mechanisms can also include renegotiation provisions as in Koremenos 2001. 
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in flexibility mechanisms, on the other hand, countries are afforded some control and 
leeway in observing international agreements.  
At the same time, however, flexibility mechanisms can create legal ambiguity as 
well as practical political difficulties for cooperation. Uncertainties with respect to 
international monitoring abound, including such problems as the sheer number of states 
that protect or conceal information regarding their domestic political and/or economic 
environments, and the number of private actors within states that are often 
unobservable.29 Questions frequently go unanswered about who violated an agreement, 
whether a violation ever occurred, and whether the violation is verifiable or not. Other 
scholars have already addressed these types of problems30 from a theoretical perspective, 
and the aim of this model is to focus instead on what is today arguably the foremost 
informational problem in the context of an increasingly legalized environment, namely, 
the question of what actually constitutes non-compliance.  
Treaty-permitted and treaty-prohibited activities are often difficult to distinguish 
because the environments and intentions surrounding violations are often indeterminate. 
Political intentions are often inscrutable and it is important to respond to the sources of a 
violation rather than to actions themselves. A country is not likely to retaliate with 
sanctions when another member country has suffered through harsh political or economic 
conditions. There are easy cases and hard cases: dire economic conditions and political 
upheaval are well publicized in this media-rich, globalized world, but when 
circumstances are murkier, deciding how to respond to the real cause of a suspected 
violation is often an insurmountable task.31 The following model incorporates this 
concern and considers its role in determining under what conditions the delegation of 
authority to international institutions is likely to occur. 
 
                                                 
29 States may be unsure of past history of play (which amounts to imperfect monitoring problems). 
30 See for example Benson and Soskice 2004 on the problem of non-verifiability. It is difficult to consider 
all the kinds of uncertainties in one model framework for analytical reasons.  
31 This aspect of cooperation has been duly recognized within the debate between enforcement and 
management schools. 
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A Model of Distributional Conflicts in the Design of Monitoring Institutions 
 
I use the repeated prisoner’s dilemma setting,32 which has been used to examine 
monitoring problems in cartels and other forms of long-run partnerships.33 In this model, 
states are forward-looking: they design monitoring institutions while being able to project 
the future in the face of uncertainty as to international cooperation.  
Suppose that two negotiating states (or two groups or coalitions in international 
negotiation) – STATE 1 and STATE 2 – face asymmetric compliance environments. STATE 
1 (row player) sometimes faces “Difficult Times” or unfavorable political and economic 
environments that discourage compliance with international agreements, while STATE 2 
(column player) enjoys “Normal Times” or favorable compliance environments that are 
conducive to compliance with international agreements.34 Further assume that STATE 1 
knows its own compliance environments but STATE 2 does not directly observe STATE 1’s 
compliance environments. In other words, it is STATE 1’s private information that 
difficult times occurred. In terms of the world as we know it today, one might think of 
STATE 1 as representing developing countries and closed societies that are more likely to 
suffer through political conditions that may not be conducive to compliance with 
international obligations, and whose policymaking processes are not transparent. STATE 2 
can be conveniently thought of as developed countries and open societies that probably 
face fewer constraints regarding compliance and whose political environments are known 
through public records and free media. However, one should note the fact that developed 
countries often face political constraints and can consequently be non-compliant, as well 
as the fact that open societies sometimes produce murky policies.  
                                                 
32 Other classes of models, such as principal-agent models and spatial models, have been used to study 
delegation problems. Each model emphasizes different aspects of delegation. The principal-agent model is 
used to highlight the potential divergence between the interests of states (principals) and international 
organizations (agents). Spatial models are more adequate in studying potential coalitions. I use the 
canonical PD to show the formation of preferences among negotiating states in the face of domestic 
uncertainty. 
33 See Green and Porter 1984, and the series of public/private monitoring problems described in Kandori 
2001. For a comprehensive review of perfect/imperfect, public/private monitoring, see Mailath and 
Samuelson 2006. 
34 In terms of empirical references, one can think of STATE 1 as representing developing countries that are 
more likely to suffer through political conditions that may not be conducive to compliance with 
international obligations, compared to developed countries. Alternatively, one can think of STATE 1 as a 
closed, secretive country that retains private information as to its domestic political situation.  
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 Figure 2.1 depicts the described game setup with asymmetric compliance 
environments and a one-sided uncertainty information structure. It presents a stage game 
which provides the strategic environment for two players and is infinitely repeated.  
 
Figure 2.1 Stage Game with Asymmetric Compliance Environments  
                   and Uncertainty about Normal and Difficult Times 
 
    Normal Times            Difficult Times 
        (1- ε)                                           (ε) 
   C                    D                                                         C                    D 
C 1, 1 - β, α  C 1, 1 - β, α 
D α, - β 0, 0  D 2α, - β 0, 0 
 
                  Where α>1, β>0, (α-β)/2<135 
 
The core cooperation problem for two players is to figure out the true state of the 
world based on the actions they take, where Difficult Times occur randomly and 
exogenously. Unfortunately, STATE 2 knows the distribution of negative occurrences of 
STATE 1’s undeterrable defections but does not know when they occurred. STATE 2 only 
observes the previous action of STATE 1 and has to infer STATE 1’s compliance 
environment based on publicly observable signals, namely, the actions of STATE 1, 
{C,D}. If a cooperative behavior (action C) is observed, STATE 2 would conclude that 
STATE 1 is experiencing Normal Times, but if a defection (action D) is observed, STATE 2 
has to decide whether STATE 1 was experiencing Normal or Difficult Times before it 
decides what its response will be in the next period.  
Many situations that arise in international cooperation resemble this setting, 
where cooperation levels (the actions of governments) are known, but the cooperation 
environments at the time of a violation are ambiguous or disputable. For example, in 
2001 we saw the United States impose a steel tariff (action), but other countries refrained 
from determining whether this action was politically motivated or not, that is, whether the 
United States was truly in Difficult Times and therefore under some constraint to invoke 
safeguards measures to restrict steel imports, or whether the political leadership had 
invoked the exception more opportunistically, under Normal Times. 
                                                 
35 This is to eliminate the incentive for alternating between C and D and to make reciprocal enforcement 
possible.  
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Difficult Times, abstractly modeled in Figure 2.1, encompasses any situation that 
makes a violation undeterrable. Difficult Times is modeled as a situation where 
cooperation is not feasible, even in a repeated setting, because retaliation does not restore 
cooperation.36 The cost of imposing cooperation is so huge that the violation is inherently 
undeterrable, as the name “undeterrable violation” suggests, and the best course of action 
for the cooperating partners is to let-bygones-be-bygones and not to punish the party who 
engaged in the undeterrable violation. These notions are formally reflected in the case 
specific conditions: δ > α-1 in Normal Times37 and δ < 2α-1 in Difficult Times.38 In 
other words, reciprocal enforcement is possible in Normal Times but impossible in 
Difficult Times. 
 The size of epsilon therefore reflects the degree of asymmetric environments 
between cooperating partners and can be interpreted as the amount of flexibility one party 
grants to the other party in international agreements. The level of flexibility generally 
follows the different compliance environments states are in. The special and differential 
treatment (SDI) under the global trade regime and differentiated commitments under the 
Kyoto Protocol are perhaps the most prominent examples of states granting some 
autonomy to other parties.  
Among other kinds of uncertainties, I focus on the uncertainty surrounding 
undeterrable violations for three reasons. Other scholarly works have dealt with other 
kinds of uncertainties such as misperception and mis-implementation.39 Second, 
uncertainty regarding undeterrable violations has become more prevalent as agreements 
have become more legalistic. Third and most importantly, the notion of undeterrable 
violations abstractly captures one of the most important sources of non-cooperation. The 
                                                 
36 This is assuming retaliation is a single-period punishment. If the punishment is sufficiently severe, 
parties could restore cooperation but it is not clear why parties would choose to suffer such a big loss in 
utility. 
37 If reciprocal punishments were to be enforceable given Situation A, it should be the case that cooperation 
should be more profitable than one-time defection, that is, 1+1·δ ≥ α+0, applying the principle of optimality 
in dynamic programming (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.108-10). The principle states that it is sufficient to 
check one-time deviation. δ indicates how much a player values the future. The larger the value of δ, the 
more a player appreciates future payoffs.  
38 Following the same logic above, if the reciprocity is not enforceable in Difficult Times, it should be the 
case that defection should be more profitable than cooperation, that is, 1+1·δ < 2α+0. In other words, 
defection is always better for STATE 2 under Difficult Times.  
39 Representative works are by Wu and Axelrod 1995 – where they consider different strategies to cope 
with noise, rather than the function of monitoring systems – and Bendor 1993. For a good review of noise 
in the prisoners’ dilemma, see Axelrod 2000. 
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recent trend to provide international treaties with more and more robust legal frameworks 
produces two conflicting effects.40 One is to provide bright-lines,41 and the other is to 
obfuscate issues and produce opportunists.42 One of the functions of monitoring is to sort 
out these effects. In addition, the built-in flexible clauses—such as withdrawal, escape or 
reservation clauses—create monitoring problems. While perfectly legitimate, 
withdrawals often operate as a pretext for violations, as the case of North Korea’s 
repeated violations of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty shows.   
My model builds on that of several previous authors, most directly that of 
Rosendorff (2005) and Svolik (2006).43 Rosendorff’s model is designed to show the 
trade-off between ridigity and stability, while Svolik’s model suggests design 
mechanisms to ward off the price of escapes. By contrast, my analysis focuses on the 
design stage of monitoring institutions and asks whether players have incentives to build 
institutions in the expectation of future cooperation, thereby addressing to the question of 
distributive politics in the institutional design process.   
In what follows I consider the conditions under which participating states delegate 
informational capacity to an international body. I compare an equilibrium under 
incomplete information with an equilibrium achieved with the involvement of an 
international monitoring body. For both cases, I use the Perfect Public Equilibrium 
(PPE)44 as a solution concept. 
 
Cooperation under No Information Systems (Incomplete Information Case) 
 
Consider a baseline case where states interact with no coordinating device, relying 
on private information only. Given his private knowledge about the situation, STATE 1’s 
                                                 
40 Keohane 2002.  
41 Morrow 2001. 
42 Schwartz and Sykes 2002.  
43 The model is similar to Rosendorff 2005 and Svolik 2006. Rosendorff’s model involves one-sided 
asymmetry of information but a symmetric payoff structure. Svolik’s model involves two-side uncertainty 
with a symmetric payoff structure in a mechanism design setting. My model involves asymmetric 
information and asymmetric payoffs. Instead of symmetric game, I present an asymmetric case to highlight 
distributional consequences.  
44 PPE represents sequential equilibria in public strategies. Public strategies are the strategies that only 
depend on the history of publicly observable signals. See Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin 1994 for this 
solution concept.   
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strategy is exactly the same as in the complete information case, which is to cooperate or 
defect under Normal Times and defect under Difficult Times no matter what. By contrast, 
STATE 2 can no longer condition his response on the nature of violations that occur 
because STATE 1 can opportunistically violate under Normal Times but still claim that it 
was experiencing Difficult Times. Given his lack of knowledge about the intention 
behind STATE 1’s violation, STATE 2 simply has to pool his strategy. One possible 
equilibrium that makes the cooperation possible under Normal Times would be for STATE 
2 to play C and continue cooperation unless a defection occurs. If a defection is observed, 
STATE 2 retaliates against any kind of defection for one round,45 regardless of whether the 
violation is opportunistic or undeterrable. In this cooperative equilibrium, STATE 1 plays 
C under Normal Times and D under Difficult Times. 
What about an off-the-equilibrium situation?46 If defection ever occurs under 
Normal Times, the party that detects the defection employs the strategy of D for one 
round. Throughout the implementation of the model scenarios, I assume one-round 
punishment.47 The punishment period hurts the overall efficiency of cooperation but is a 
necessary evil or cost to restore the cooperative equilibrium. In the single punishment 
phase, I let the defector (STATE 1 in my framework) defect while being punished. The 
defection of the previous defector in the punishment period makes substantive sense since 
many inevitably uncooperative environments are sticky and do not change easily. In the 
retaliation scheme I specified, it takes STATE 1 one period to adjust to cooperation, and 
STATE 2 permits some recovery time for STATE 1 while punishing. On STATE 2’s part, it is 
a punishing and forgiving strategy at the same time. I call this strategy a “condoning 
strategy,” since a partner to the violator overlooks the defection while retaliating. I use 
this strategy profile to obtain other institutional equilibria.48  
                                                 
45 This requirement for a one-period punishment scheme is to make sure that cooperation is not as 
unnecessarily difficult as it is with the use of grim trigger. 
46 I need to specify what players would do off-the-equilibrium path in order to support the equilibrium 
behavior. These off-the-equilibrium behaviors constitute conditions that make an equilibrium sustainable. 
47 This makes calculation of payoffs easier. If one-round punishment supports an equilibrium, two or more 
punishments effectively support such an equilibrium condition. However, the reverse would not be true. An 
equilibrium supported by many punishment rounds may not be supported with a single punishment period.  
48 Although “grim trigger” is conventionally used as a limiting case for cooperation (e.g. Fearon 1998; 
McGillivray and Smith 2000; Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson 2006) with the modeling intention to 
make it harder for cooperation to arise and therefore to give it a harder test, I think it is too restrictive an 
assumption that is far from reality. One can think of many rounds of punishment, but “grim trigger” is less 
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Cooperation/Equilibrium with Reporting Mechanism 
 
Many international agreements stipulate reporting requirements with varying 
degrees of frequency/periodicity and information content. In general, states are asked to 
report their compliance behavior voluntarily in a designated time-frame. Under what 
conditions would the voluntary reports convey any meaning? The consideration of this 
institution-less environment is important because this scenario provides a standard of 
comparison for other scenarios involving incomplete information, as well as for cases 
with an international monitoring body. 
In the baseline game presented in Figure 2.1, suppose that STATE 1 and STATE 2 
communicate every time a violation occurs. Further suppose that STATE 1, when it 
defects, would want to send an apologetic signal as a way to claim that non-compliance 
had happened under extenuating circumstances. It is able to send a signal either ‘n’ (a 
signal to indicate that Normal Times had actually happened) or ‘d’ (a signal to indicate 
that Difficult Times had actually happened) to let STATE 2, an uninformed party, know its 
true cooperation environment.  
The following strategies could be supported as equilibrium. STATE 1 sends the 
same signal ‘d’ all along and STATE 2 does not have any reason to believe the signal. 
Regardless of the accuracy and honesty of the signal, STATE 2 has to retaliate if a 
defection occurs. Therefore, learning from the signal does not occur, since the signal is 
not informative about STATE 1’s actual defection environment. After a defection period, 
STATE 1 goes back to cooperation while STATE 2 punishes STATE 1 for a single period. 
STATE 1 pays the defection cost and this cost gets both players back to a cooperative 
stage. (The proof of this equilibrium may be found in the Appendix) 
The implication of this reporting mechanism is that meaningful communication is 
impossible to establish given an asymmetrical information structure where an 
opportunistic defection under the PD payoff structure is not easily distinguished from an 
                                                                                                                                                 
likely to occur in international relations where sanctioning mechanisms are weak. Since cooperation is 
more difficult under one-round punishment than under the grim-trigger strategy, the conditions for 
cooperation under a single-punishment scheme are trivially satisfied under a grim-trigger strategy.  
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undeterrable violation.49 The game produces a babbling equilibrium where STATE 1’s 
signal is meaningless and therefore, STATE 2 does not update his belief. This result is 
consistent with the general result from cheap talk games.50  
The babbling equilibrium here does not necessarily denounce the value of all the 
reporting mechanisms built into the majority of international agreements. It is important 
to note that this seemingly pessimistic view of uninformative reporting mechanisms is the 
result of the assumptions attached to the model. Since the model concerns static 
equilibrium, every history is repeated without historical memory. The model clearly 
shows that without institutional memory or use of reputational dynamics51 in 
international cooperation, reporting could lose its value. The model therefore specifies 
the conditions under which reporting may and may not be valuable. In the appendix, I 
consider the case where costly signals can induce honest communication.  
 
Cooperation under an International Monitoring Body 
(Verification Agency Equilibrium) 
 
Cooperation dynamics change when an international monitoring party is involved. 
In this model, an international agency fills a broad role of providing compliance 
information, thus operating as a public correlating device.52 This international third party 
                                                 
49 Reporting may be valuable in issue areas where the incentive to defect is low (e.g. standardization), as 
Morrow (1994) showed. He found that the high probability of identical interests yields communicative 
equilibria where players reveal their true cooperation environment. In my model, by contrast, expected self-
gain hinders communicative equilibria, and truthful reporting never occurs. Therefore, the result of the 
reporting case can be compared with and supplemented to Morrow’s. His result is pertinent to issue areas 
where coordination and distribution problems are dominant; mine is more pertinent to deep cooperation 
cases where preferences are more aligned with the PD structure. 
50See Farrell and Rabin 1996. 
51 Dynamic elements would make a difference, as in many reputation models. Nevertheless, the model 
shows how difficult it is to rely on pure communication between states. Reporting mechanisms have dire 
consequences, especially when no institutional memory exists or reputational losses from violations are not 
great. As developed in reputation models, cheap talk sometimes carries some value in deterrence settings 
(Sartori 1998) and reputation itself could serve as an enforcement mechanism in trade-group relationships 
(Milgrom, North and Weingast 1990). To what extent reputation carries value in international cooperation 
settings is debatable. Recent works on the bilateral investment agreements (BITs) (Simmons and Elkins 
2004; Milner and Buthe 2004) empirically demonstrated that reputational factors influence decisions to 
join. In the area of human rights, there is some anecdotal evidence showing that states care about their 
reputations as they lobby to avert bad news from becoming international news. Nevertheless, the extent to 
which reputation is valued by states is understudied.    
52 The fundamental informational function is akin to Greif et al. 1994. The key difference from my setting 
is that I compare other information mechanisms and draw inferences about distributional consequences to 
predict the choice of monitoring institutions.  
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embodies several characteristics or features shared by most international bodies, 
including (1) an independent capacity to collect information, (2) the ability to form 
judgments, and (3) weak or zero enforcement power. Our theoretical endeavor here is to 
examine how cooperation occurs in this setting and to determine under what conditions 
states are willing to accept this kind of information mechanism.53 
The game with an international monitoring body proceeds with the following 
sequence of moves. STATE 1 and STATE 2 start playing an incomplete information game, 
as described above. If defection occurs, the agency is called upon to verify and inform 
STATE 2 whether the violation occurred under Normal Times or Difficult Times by 
sending the signals, n or d,54 corresponding to each situation. Under the uncertainty of 
undeterrable violations, two kinds of errors could occur, as summarized in Figure 2.2. 1-q 
and 1-r are the rates for false alarms and missed hits, respectively. The proposed 
international agency could cry wolf and mistakenly inform states that a violation was 
deterrable, when in fact it was undetterable; or the agency might fail to detect that a 
violation was deterrable and remain complacent. Two probabilities, q and r, then 
represent the accuracy level of the verification agency. The agency produces right 
judgments with probabilities q (the probability that the agency says ‘n’ when Normal 
Times occurred) and r (the probability that the agency says ‘d’ when the Difficult Times 
occurred).  
 
 Agency says ‘n’ Agency says ‘d’  
                 Normal Times q  1-q  
Difficult Times 1-r r   
         
Figure 2.2 Verification Accuracy and Types of Errors 
 
Qualitatively, verification errors can be technological or evaluative. Technology 
could produce erroneous evidence in determining the situation, and then errors could 
                                                 
53 Once an international monitoring body is established, it could act as a strategic actor. For this possibility, 
see Johns 2007.  
54 The signal is given right after the defection occurs and right before states make their decisions either to 
continue the cooperation or to punish in the next round. Note that I assume that players follow signals from 
the agency. If players do not follow agency signals with some probability, then the case is tantamount to a 
“no information systems” scenario. 
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stem from wrong or inconsistent judgment.55 The consideration of two kinds or levels of 
error is important in terms of assessing the conditions under which states will accept a 
proposed third-party mechanism, because the choice depends on the quality and 
reliability of information the monitoring body can provide. 
When considering the costs and benefits of an independent monitoring capability, 
negotiating states form expectations about the agency. A verification agency equilibrium 
occurs when states are willing to conform to the prescribed strategy (of initially 
cooperating and then resorting to a-single-period defection in case of treaty-prohibited 
violations), relying on the signal from the agency. Under this equilibrium, the agency 
balances the risk of possible errors in such a way as to sufficiently deter future 
opportunistic violations, and then allocates its remaining resources to aid the 
identification of politically difficult times. What level of accuracy must be reached for the 
agency equilibrium to be achieved, and which type of error is more tolerable? Lemma 1 
establishes the relative importance of monitoring accuracy. 
 
Lemma 1 (relative value of monitoring accuracy under verification 
equilibrium) Predicting violations under normal times (q) better induces 
cooperation than identifying difficult times (r) correctly.  
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
For the verification agency equilibrium to be stable, the agency must be able to 
identify normal violations with a moderate to high level of reliability. This is because a 
small drop in q could dramatically increase the required level of patience for 
cooperation,56 thereby severely discouraging potential participants from joining the 
                                                 
55 For a general discussion of such errors, see Guzman 2002, 315-319. In the context of the WTO, Smith 
and Garrett 2002 discuss the disparities in panel and appellate decisions, which could be interpreted as 
potential errors within the WTO dispute settlement procedures. Take the example of the Shrimp-Turtle and 
Tuna-Dolphin cases where the WTO dispute settlement body has sent out mixed and ambiguous signals 
with regard to the relationship between environment and trade (the ruling in Shrimp-Turtle was 
environment-friendly while Tuna-Dolphin favored trade principles). 
56 This is the key idea for the proof of Lemma 1. Technically, this is because a small increase in q could 


















∂ ** δδ  where *δ  is the upper bound of patience level required for verification 
equilibrium. 
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treaty. This also implies that increasing q is a more effective way of lowering the 
threshold patience level, since this tends to produce a more inclusive treaty with a more 
diverse set of member countries. Therefore, I conclude that increasing the level of q 
instead of r can strengthen the deterrent value of the verification agency, thereby 
stabilizing member participation in the treaty. 
The result also has an implication for the general design of the information 
systems of international organizations. In order to design a monitoring structure that is 
conducive to compliance, states might want to design the verification agency such that it 
effectively alerts other interested states of a particular state’s illegitimate violations under 
normal cooperation conditions. This might mean that the agency’s capacity to detect 
random shocks of undeterrable violations will be relatively sacrificed. This is not to argue 
that revealing the undeterrable violations is not important. As Downs and Rocke57 note in 
the case of arms controls, frequent false accusations without consideration that violations 
are sometimes innocuous may induce more non-cooperative behavior on the part of a 
reckless party. Both q and r matter in this respect, but the verification resources do not 
have to be focused on detecting special cases. Rather, the model demonstrates that 
priority should be given to detecting illegitimate violations first. A moderate degree of 
transparency, not necessarily full transparency, may be sufficient for future cooperation 
as long as the transparency is enough to reveal the true source of non-compliance.  
This equilibrium requires an appropriate balance between two types of 
verification accuracy, but inevitably, a trade-off exists between the two types. 
 
Remark 1 (monitoring capacity as a verification equilibrium condition)
 There exist trade-offs between types of monitoring accuracy, q and r. 
 
Proof. See Appendix. 
 
As the verification agency increases its capacity to detect normal situations, it 
unavoidably decreases its capacity to detect external shocks.58 Two types of verification 
accuracy have separate functions and work differently to ensure cooperation. r makes 
equilibrium valuable by alerting the parties to situations of undeterrable defections and 
                                                 
57 Downs and Rocke 1990, 23. 
58 This result is analogous to the statistical theory of Type I and II errors where the risk of rejecting a null 
hypothesis (when it is true) is traded off with the error of accepting a false null.  
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eliminating unnecessary punishments. In other words, alleviating the risk of false alarms 
contributes to the treaty’s efficiency by building credibility and eliciting more 
cooperation by avoiding unnecessary punishments. q operates mainly by making 
enforcement effective because it actually deters potential violations and makes a treaty 
effective. This is the case because STATE 2 can legitimately punish STATE 1 based on the 
signal from the agency if the agency confirms that STATE 1 was actually experiencing 
conditions favorable enough to cooperate. 
 
Comparing Institution-less and Institutional Equilibria 
 
I compare two equilibria—one arising in an institutional-less environment, and 
the other involving a third party monitoring agency. In comparing different equilibria, 
one can focus on various aspects of equilibrium conditions, such as joint utility 
maximization (e.g. Pareto-efficiency) and patience levels. Since my research goal is to 
examine how the delegation of monitoring function to an international institution 
involves distributional conflicts among negotiating states, I focus on the individual 
welfare gains across two equilibrium environments and examine how much a player’s 
welfare improves with the change in institutional arrangements. I intend to show the 
source of distributional conflicts and their effects on the design of monitoring 
arrangements by comparing the expected payoffs for each player in the situation under 
incomplete information with the payoffs in the scenario involving an information agency. 
I call the increase in payoffs “verification gains.” It measures how much an individual 
state gains in extra utility by having verification compared to the absence of any 
information systems. I define verification gains formally below. 
 
Definition 1 (verification-gains)  Verification-gains is a measure of the 
difference in utilities under an incomplete information scenario and a 
verification agency scenario (
IIVA VV − ). 
 
If the expected gain is negative (i.e. loss of welfare), a state is more likely to be 
against centralized monitoring with delegated informational functions to an international 
body. If the expected gain is positive, that state is more likely to support the 
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establishment of an international monitoring body. When one player expects to lose from 
having a verification agency, the state is more likely to oppose the idea of establishing an 
international body, which decreases the probability of reaching a joint decision of 
establishing an international monitoring body. 
Using this criterion, we can see how the divergence in verification gains between 
players is likely to result in the breakdown of an institutional setup, as illustrated in 




Figure 2.3  
Effect of Epsilon (Probability of Difficult Times occurring) 
Verification Gains for each state for the parameter values of r =.6, β=.3, α=1.5 and δ=.9 
 
 In Figure 2.3, I calculate the welfare of each player rather than examining the 
aggregate welfare, fixing other parameters, including patience level. For plausible 
parameter values, verification gain for each player is plotted against the change in the 
occurrence of Difficult Times for STATE 1. This graph has a conservative assumption that 
an international monitoring body is expected to have an adequate monitoring capability in 
terms of deterring normal violations and of correctly identifying exceptional 
circumstances.  
Even under the expectation about an adequate monitoring system, note how the 
relative payoffs diverge for both players. Although both players gain for most of the 
range of uncertainty with the presence of a verification agency, the informational gains 
differ for each player. For STATE 2, the agency is useful in aiding the distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate violations only up to a certain point (ε = 0.8 in this scenario) 
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and the verification gain becomes negative if STATE 1 is expected to go through many 
cases of undeterrable violations.  
STATE 1, on the other hand, has positive verification gains if verification 
equilibrium occurs. This is because the verification agency allowed occasional defections 
that go unpunished. As the informed party, STATE 1 benefits more than the uninformed 
party (STATE 2) by exploiting the opportunity provided by flexibility mechanisms that 
allow temporary defections without retaliation by STATE 2.  
These relative payoffs to STATE 1 and STATE 2 depend on the probability of 
undeterrable violations that occur to STATE 1 during its Difficult Times. Surprisingly, the 
party with no prior information about compliance environments of the other state, namely 
STATE 2, does not always gain by having a verification agency. STATE 2 as the 
uninformed party sees an informational gain, with a maximum gain when the uncertainty 
is the largest (i.e. when difficult times are undistinguishable from normal times), but what 
it gains from having a verification agency tapers off as the probability of shocks 
increases. This marginal decline in informational gain for the uninformed party stems 
from the unintended, negative side effect of flexibility mechanisms. In sum, flexibility 
mechanisms, in the extreme, can lower cooperation payoffs in the short run, although 
they carry the benefit of easily absorbing domestic or international political shocks. This 
condition is summarized in Proposition1. 
 
Proposition 1 (distributional conflicts due to allowance of flexibility, ε)  







VG , exists. 
 
Proof. See Appendix.  
 
Proposition 1 tells us that the degree of political disagreement over centralized 
monitoring institutions increases if the asymmetry level is high.59 A high asymmetry in 
compliance environments may discourage STATE 2 from adopting a centralized 
                                                 
59 One has to be careful about interpreting the result in empirical analyses. I suggest the possibility of 
centralization breaks down when the asymmetry increases because one or more party may disagree with the 
adoption of a centralized monitoring mechanism.  because there may be instances where preferences are 
not directly translated into negotiation outcomes. As Axelrod (1964) suggests, a conflict of interest leads to 
an active behavioral conflict when “other things are equal”  
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mechanism. At a certain point, a centralized monitoring loses its value of distinguishing 
deterrable and undeterrable violations. When it expects a lot of undeterrable violations, a 
monitoring body becomes a useless tool.  
The shape of the verification gains crucially depends on the defection risk (β) 
shouldered by STATE 2 as well as the defection gain reaped by STATE 1 (α). If the risk is 
large, its disutility for an international monitoring mechanism hits at a lower threshold 
than ε = 0.8 for STATE 2 (Figure 2.4A). Similarly, if the gain from undeterrable violations 
is not large, the gain from flexibility mechanisms is moderated for STATE 1 and the 
distributional conflicts disappear (Figure 2.4B). How prevalent this distributional problem 
turns out to be depends on α and β. If the defection risk is higher for STATE 2 and the 
defection gain for STATE 1 is large, distributional conflict is more likely and STATE 2 is 
likely to oppose the idea of having a verification system.  
 
 
      Figure 2.4A  Larger Defection Risk Scenario        Figure 2.4B   Lower Defection Gain Scenario 
 
For a wide range of parameter values, distributional conflicts exist where one 
player prefers verification and the other player prefers no monitoring institution. 
Proposition 1 establishes that STATE 2 may not want a verification system even if the 
system has the desirable effect of deterring violations under normal circumstances. This 
result has important implications for the design of monitoring systems because it implies 
that, for a certain number of countries, the benefits of an international monitoring 
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mechanism may not amount to a big enough incentive to favor such an arrangement when 
there is the expectation that other states will defect from their international obligations, 
either opportunistically or inadvertently. 
Figure 2.5 shows the distributional conflicts within the feasible payoff sets, V 
.  Both points of verification equilibrium payoffs (VVA at ε < ε* and VVA at ε > 
ε*, where ε* is the threshold of v2 changes from positive gains to negative gains) are 
Pareto-improving (i.e. farther out to the Pareto frontier) compared to the payoff sets 
under incomplete information (VII). However, STATE 2 is worse off when it has to allow 
STATE 1 much flexibility (i.e.  ε> ε*) even under a verification system with adequate 
monitoring capacity. 
 
Figure 2.5   Set of Feasible Payoffs and Distributional Conflicts 
 
The distributional conflict stemming from the asymmetric compliance 
environments and the allowance of occasional violations raises an important issue about 
the role of flexibility mechanisms in international agreements. States often set aside 
























at ε> ε* 
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their bets. Although flexibility may induce more members to participate, not only does it 
come with the price of reducing efficiency by reducing the level of cooperation60, but it 
also hinders institutional development by creating a disincentive for certain complier-type 
members (as Proposition 1 demonstrates). Flexibility may encourage broader 
participation, but it discourages deeper cooperation.61  
 


















Both are better-off 
STATE 2 better off; STATE 1 worse-off 









at ε> ε* 
 
 
Figure 2.6 specifies the regions for distributional conflicts. Upper-right trapezoid 
is the region where both parties gain; lower-right trapezoid is the region where STATE 2 
loses by having a verification mechanism; upper-left triangle is where STATE 1 loses 
whereas STATE 2 gains.  
                                                 
60 Rosendorff 2005. 
61 In model terms, this means a lower threshold for delta and consequently, the possibility of rejecting a 
third party monitoring. Gilligan 2004 provides conditions under which this tradeoff does not exist. 
 35 
The benefit region is larger for STATE 2: the informationally poor certainly 
benefits by having an international third party. Nevertheless, the informationally rich (the 
informed party, STATE 1 in the model) also benefits from it. Notice that the state with 
private information has an incentive to establish third-party monitoring. This means that 
a state that expects difficult times (a hard time cooperating) could favor third-party 
monitoring. This would be because the state expects to gain from a verification system by 
demonstrating its compliance and avoiding unnecessary punishments.  
This kind of example where the party with more information supports an 
international monitoring body is not difficult to find. In the international whaling regime, 
for example, Norway and Japan, traditionally whaling nations, advocated having an 
observer and inspection system during the negotiation of the Revised Management 
Scheme (RMS) in the late 1990s. One might have expected the two countries to oppose 
the idea of subjecting themselves to international monitoring, but their incentives were in 
fact two-fold.  As non-whaling countries claim, the whaling nations expected to end the 
moratorium imposed by the International Whaling Commission (IWC) in 1982 and 
resume whaling. Non-whaling nations argue that whaling nations suggested having 
monitoring mechanisms partly out of self-interest, to establish conditions for a 
resumption of whaling.  Indeed, Japan and Norway argued that they would be able to 
resume whaling under the quota system and that they would be able to demonstrate their 
compliance through the observer system. The fact that the bargaining to end the 
moratorium was linked to the installment of observer systems clearly shows us the divide 
between potential compliers and non-compliers. From the perspective of non-compliers, 
the flexibility or relaxation of enforcement may go hand-in-hand with stronger 
monitoring systems. On the part of potential compliers, in this case, non-whaling nations, 
informational delegation therefore often comes at a price. They may be able to establish 
delegated monitoring but have to allow more flexibility and consequently narrow down 
the scope of cooperation. If non-whaling nations wanted to adopt monitoring 
mechanisms, they would have to make concessions with regard to the moratorium.  
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Institutional Interactions: Flexibility and Centralization 
 
The discussion of monitoring schemes in the area of whaling nicely illustrates the 
tradeoff between flexibility and centralized monitoring. Japan and Russia, by advocating 
observer schemes was to trade off a stronger monitoring system for weak enforcement. 
Whaling nations wanted to enjoy flexible mechanisms, namely, a resumption of whaling, 
at the expense of subjecting themselves to centralized monitoring. They were willing to 
make concessions on the monitoring scheme front in order to gain flexibility. On the 
other hand, non-whaling nations pushed for a rigid agreement that would keep the 
moratorium in place, sacrificing a centralized monitoring setup that would include 
observer schemes. In the expectation of potentially undeterrable violations, non-whaling 
nations decided to maintain the status quo and the moratorium, although this path meant 
living with a lower level of supervision. 
As the model suggested and as the example of the whaling regime illustrates, only 
when enforcement is weak,62 and only when there are guarantees of flexibility 
mechanisms, are countries prone to undeterrable defection likely to submit themselves to 
monitoring and scrutiny. This dynamic may also have been at play when the United 
States agreed to the dispute settlement mechanism during the Uruguay Round, despite the 
likely prospect of Congressional opposition. The establishment of the dispute settlement 
body within the WTO was only possible with the guarantee of flexibility mechanisms 
(general exceptions, safeguards, countervailing duties, anti-dumping measures, etc.) that 
allow for political expediency. These examples indicate that in some situations we may 
observe a centralized monitoring mechanism take shape without any commitment to deep 
cooperation (i.e. more flexibility). Procedural centralization and institutional delegation 
may in fact be accompanied by a substantively lower level of cooperation than an 
institution with a weaker monitoring system.  
Flexibility mechanisms in the model have been defined to be the provisions that 
grant occasional legitimate violations without retaliation. Flexibility essentially 
undermines deeper cooperation by leaving some politically convenient situations 
                                                 
62 In the model, this means no punishment when Difficult Times happens – that is, totally respecting 
flexibility mechanisms. 
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unpunished. Flexibility has its good side, too, as Rosendorff (2005) formally shows: it 
could accommodate a wide variety of participants. In terms of the institutional design of 
monitoring arrangements, allowing flexibility mechanisms may induce a difficult party to 
cooperate by granting it a degree of control over its fate when it commits a violation, but 
at the same time, it has the effect of discouraging the other party from instituting a 
centralized monitoring mechanism. The consequences of giving a break and granting 
flexibility mechanisms may be great and may result in situations where international 
monitoring does not see the light of day, despite its efficiency. More flexibility gives the 
party experiencing an unfavorable situation ample incentive to institute monitoring 
mechanisms, but it also gives the other party an incentive not to favor monitoring when it 
expects to suffer through too many legitimate violations by the other party.  
 
The Informationally Rich and Poor 
 
The related point to Proposition 1—that a party with private information may 
have reasons to demand an international monitoring body—is counter-intuitive and 
carries policy implications. Even with the inherent distributional conflicts in designing 
monitoring systems, a party that expects many shocks may be persuaded to accept an 
international arrangement. This point is summarized below. 
 
Corollary 1 (flexibility and the preference for a monitoring body)  States 
with private information about compliance environments prefer an international 
monitoring body if sufficient flexibility is guaranteed.  
 
In verification equilibrium, even an informationally rich state (that is, a state with 
private information about its own compliance environments, STATE 1 in the model) 
prefers verification if it has guarantees of flexibility mechanisms and a sufficiently high 
patience level. By contrast, an informationally poor state (that is, a state that is in the dark 
about compliance environments other states face) may not prefer verification when 
flexibility mechanisms are guaranteed to an extreme degree. Corollary 1 emphasizes the 
nature of distributional conflicts over monitoring institutions and at the same time 
suggests the possibility of how the conflicts may be resolved. Even a party with an 
informational advantage, despite its potential informational rents to be extracted from 
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occasional exuberance, has incentives to establish centralized monitoring. The reason is 
that the benefit from verification—the adequate verification which is expected to deter 
future violations to a certain extent—outweighs the costs of being punished. This benefit 
is primarily from having flexibility mechanisms where the informationally rich party 
expects to be exonerated for its occasional defections. This may be a perverse incentive 
since a party is basically buying itself leeway to enjoy temporary political opportunities 
to satisfy its domestic political demands.63 Still, this is a driving incentive in the majority 
of international agreements.  
Conventional thinking would also tell us that states that are in the dark about 
others’ compliance environments (i.e. informationally poor states) are likely to prefer 
third-party monitoring that could provide more information. Corollary 1 shows, however, 
that informationally poor countries will prefer to be in the dark when the flexibility 
conditions attached to the agency is excessive. 
 
Possibility of Side Payments 
 
The examination of verification gains demonstrates the possibility of using 
transfers (or side payments) of one player’s future payoff to another player. In the context 
of the design of monitoring institutions, an example of side payments would include the 
transfer of civilian-use, nuclear energy technology linked to the bilateral safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).    
The respective preferences for monitoring institutions arising from Proposition 1 
also suggest the possibility of side payments in the design of monitoring institutions.  
 
Corollary 2 (Side payments)  STATE 1 has a surplus and could give STATE 2 
transfer payments to compensate STATE 2 for its welfare loss (
IIVA VV − ). If so, 
a verification agency can be established. 
 
Since STATE 1 in the equilibrium situation benefits from enjoying temporary, 
unpunished defections, it could choose to compensate STATE 2, thereby persuading it not 
                                                 
63 See Milner and Rosendorff 2001, and Bagwell and Staiger 2005 for the discussion in the context of 
global trade. 
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to reject the establishment of an international monitoring body. With regard to the 
amount of side payments, STATE 1 would be willing to pay as much as the welfare loss of 
STATE 2 to bring about a third party international body. For instance, STATE 1 can 
promise to devote its political resources to change its domestic legislation more in line 
with international agreements. STATE 1’s promise to reduce the frequency of undeterrable 
violations could operate as a transfer to STATE 2, since the negotiators of STATE 2 can 
mention to their domestic audience STATE 1’s resource deployment as the price STATE 1 
is paying in order to secure an international agreement with an international monitoring 
system and future cooperation.  
Note that this leaves ample possibility for the use of political rhetoric and other 
political maneuvers on the part of the informationally rich. For example, a country may 
object to monitoring institutions in order to get a better deal with regard to enforcement. 
Monitoring arrangements are subject to distributional conflict in such a way as to 
discourage the establishment of centralized institutions. This phenomenon can be 
observed in many negotiations concerning environmental agreements. Developing 
countries with a high rate of difficult times push the idea of additional funds to promote 
compliance.  
Side payment from STATE 2 to STATE 1 can also occur. STATE 2 can compensate 
STATE 1 using transfers that help reduce the frequency of undeterrable violations. When 
the proposed monitoring mechanism exhibits adequate deterrent capability, a country that 
expects frequent violations may not want to establish a verification mechanism. In this 
situation, other countries can compensate this party by providing aid that is linked to 
reducing the frequency of undeterrable violations. This aid, either in monetary form or in 
some other form, can induce other parties to accept a stringent monitoring mechanism. 
The Trade Building Capacity (TBC) program of the United States Trade Representative 
(USTR) does exactly this job. In bilateral agreements concluded recently, the United 
States provided incentives to partner countries to reduce the frequency of protectionist 
setbacks. This “aid for trade” initiative encourages countries to accept bilateral 
agreements that often include some form of monitoring arrangement.64 
                                                 
64 USTR 2007 
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In sum, two kinds of transfers exist, one from STATE 1 to STATE 2, and the other 
from STATE 2 to STATE 1. Which transfer is more likely again depends on the parameter 
values. If defection gain (α), defection risk (β), and the possibility of undeterrable 
violations (ε) is low (all conditions for less welfare loss from undeterrable violations), 
STATE 2 gains and a transfer from STATE 2 to STATE 1 is more likely. If the undeterrable 
violations benefit STATE 1 substantially, then STATE 1 should give side payments to 
STATE 1 in order to achieve cooperation with the support of an international monitoring 
body.   
 
Summing-up: Conditions for Delegation of Informational Capacity 
 
The above analysis reveals two main conditions for states to establish an 
international monitoring body. First, the level of flexibility admitted in the agreement 
should be lower than a certain threshold. Too much flexibility creates sharp distributional 
conflicts and makes international monitoring useless, while a moderate level of flexibility 
could satisfy all the parties involved and help them reach a verification equilibrium. 
Second, the quality of monitoring must be such that the proposed monitoring body has an 
adequate level of deterrent capability under normal cooperation situations. Both the level 
of flexibility allowed in the agreement and the technological/evaluative capability of the 
monitoring agency determine the likelihood that states will favor an international 
monitoring body.  
Receptiveness to the idea of an international monitoring body may differ from 
country to country, depending on what kind of political and economic conditions they 
face with respect to compliance with international agreements. Some negotiating states 
may be concerned about the lack of deterrent capability in a monitoring system and its 
expected failure to correctly identify punishable/actionable violations. The inadequacy of 
monitoring capability can be an obstacle to the establishment of monitoring institutions, 
destabilizing the potential equilibrium and requiring more stringent enforcement 
structures. Some countries that expect frequent difficult times may favor flexibility over 
centralized monitoring, and in actual international negotiations they may demand 
flexibility clauses in exchange for accepting a stringent monitoring mechanism. In 
 41 
response, these proposals may raise objections from other countries that fear the 
consequences of flexibility mechanisms. The international monitoring body is not 
beneficial when too much flexibility is allowed.  
Taken together, these requirements for creating international monitoring 
institutions have implications for distributional conflicts during the process of delegating 
informational powers. Divergent preferences of states can prevent centralized 
international institutions from emerging and I have analyzed the influence of 
distributional conflicts over monitoring design. I demonstrate that a state party with a less 
favorable domestic compliance environment has an incentive to agree to a centralized 
monitoring system, despite what may be its tendency toward frequent violations. I also 
show that the convergence of the asymmetric preferences on the choice of centralized 
monitoring occurs under very restrictive conditions.  
The theoretical prediction about distributional conflicts is consistent with what 
other pertinent theories predict. First, theories of regulation (and decentralization)65 as 
well as bargaining theories66 suggest that differences can often lead to less than desirable 
outcomes. When externalities are large, centralized mechanisms are more beneficial, but 
with differences in contextual environments that may shape the bargaining positions, 
decentralized mechanisms may result. Second, the two-level games approach67 has 
highlighted the strengthened bargaining position of the negotiator when he faces 
domestic opposition. The negotiator can cite domestic opposition as an argument for 
obtaining a more moderate level of delegation in designing a monitoring mechanism. 
From other countries’ point of view, this negotiation strategy would, of course, pose an 
obstacle to concluding a treaty with a meaningful monitoring institution, creating 
distributional conflicts among negotiating parties. Third, the theory of delegation68 also 
supports the theory of distributional conflicts. The key finding of the principal-agent 
model of delegation is that the conflicts of preferences among principals (in this case, 
member states to a treaty) often prevent them from delegating to third party bodies.69  
                                                 
65 See Laffont 2005 
66 Narlikar and Odell 2006 
67 Putnam 1998 
68 Lake and McCubbins 2006 
69 In her interesting observation of the politics of delegation to the IMF, Martin 2006 notes the opposite 
logic. Once delegation happens, the already established third party could exploit the divergence of 
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I conclude with a summary of my main points, while putting my theoretical 
results in the context of the study of international cooperation. This research makes 
several points regarding the informational role of international institutions, by opening 
the black box of states’ preferences for one type of monitoring institution over others, and 
by explaining the nature of relevant political conflicts that might arise during the 
delegation process. First, employing international institutions is often an efficient way to 
resolve uncertainties surrounding noncompliance problems, particularly in the current 
legalistic cooperation environment. Second, despite its efficiency, the informational role 
of international institutions in overseeing compliance is constrained and the conditions 
for such institutions are demanding. They have to meet technological, political, and 
economic requirements, and other obstacles may exist. For instance, political factors 
stemming from a country’s domestic compliance environment could discourage other 
countries from establishing informative international institutions, and side payments to 
encourage the establishment of international institutions may be difficult to arrange 
because of distributional consequences in establishing internationally controlled 
monitoring systems. Amid this bad news, the good news is that informationally rich 
countries with private information about their own compliance environments also have 
incentives to establish verification systems, as long as sufficient flexibility is guaranteed.  
This dissertation also established a source of informational constraint on 
international institutions. Divergent preferences for monitoring institutions are shaped by 
domestic compliance environments and they decisively affect monitoring problems on 
the international level. The core implication is that international institutions are best 
positioned to wield their informational power 1) when domestic compliance 
environments among involved parties are sufficiently favorable for international 
cooperation, 2) when the technological/evaluative conditions of the proposed monitoring 
mechanism are conducive to identifying compliance information, and 3) when the 
informationally rich are willing to share their compliance information while avoiding 
misrepresentation of their preferences in order to extract more concessions in other 
                                                                                                                                                 
preferences and promote its own agenda such that the collective principals accept the proposal. However, 
this logic pertains to a post-institutional-design stage, not to the pre-institutional design stage I am 
concerned with.   
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areas.70 These three conditions, respectively, highlight the importance of domestic efforts 
to make compliance environments favorable and transparent, the importance of 
international cooperation in improving the technological/evaluative capacity of 
monitoring agencies, and the importance of convincing advantaged countries of the 
informational value of international institutions.  
The extent to which the informational role of international institutions is 
constrained should not be seen as a closed book because my model only considered the 
conditions leading to the establishment of monitoring systems, not the course of their 
development once they are established. Three possibilities exist for the development of 
monitoring systems that are not considered in my model. The first possibility is 
emulation. Given the cluster of similar regimes, one successful regime may influence the 
development of other regimes with similar issue characteristics, as the Montreal Protocol 
did.71 The second possibility is evolution. Once a system is established, a monitoring 
system could take on a life of its own and could be developed over time into a more 
centralized system. In this case, my theory suggests that initial conflict may hamper this 
trajectory of regime development.72 The third possibility is the involvement of non-
governmental organizations. Unlike intergovernmental organizations that are harnessed 
by states as principals, NGOs could gather and convey useful information, thereby 
enriching the information flow.73  
Given the existence of distributional conflicts, what are the prospects for 
international cooperation in the near future? The discussion in this research suggests 
implications for international policy regarding the promotion of transparency. The 
informational role of international institutions may not be as powerful as some would 
                                                 
70 Existing international institutions should therefore consider un-tying monitoring arrangements from 
financial aid when the recipient is unlikely to accept monitoring arrangements while remaining obdurate 
about getting more financial assistance. For example, the IMF may take the policy of negotiating 
monitoring conditions separately from other IMF conditionalities in loan packages, when the financially 
troubled country delays the deal sufficiently longer than expected.  
71 The use of the Technology and Economic Assessment Panel (TEAP) motivated other regimes to emulate 
the success of the Montreal Protocol in abating ozone-depleting materials. See Parson 2003. 
72 Casual observation of several African regional trade agreements (e.g. West African Economic 
Community) reveals this pattern. Although they start out with formalized monitoring arrangements, they do 
not last long and die out eventually.  
73 This is the key difference between inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations regarding 
their informational role. While IGOs are constrained by the bargaining of countries, NGOs are free from 
such constraints.  
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hope. Policymakers should be encouraged to examine comprehensively the interactive 
effects of domestic compliance environments, foster international efforts to improve 
evaluative systems, and broaden their understanding of negotiating dynamics surrounding 
monitoring arrangements. On a scholarly front, this theoretical analysis stresses the need 
for further empirical and theoretical analysis of how distributional issues arise in 








Monitoring Institutions in Regional Trade Agreements 
 
The following three chapters offer the empirical investigation of the theoretical 
arguments presented in Chapter 2. Some arguments are tested by way of statistical 
analyses and other arguments illustrated by case studies. The major argument tested is the 
effect of asymmetric compliance environment and the resulting distributional conflict. 
Other potential factors, such as monitoring capacity and consequences of violation, are 
examined whenever there is a relevance to the issue area in discussion. 
The first test case is the design of monitoring institutions in international trade.74 
The recent bifurcation between diplomatic measures and legal institutions in regional 
trade agreements demands a theoretical explanation and an empirical examination. While 
several multilateral agreements march toward legalization, many of the recently 
proliferating bilateral agreements have adopted diplomatic measures. To understand this 
variation, I evaluate the theory of asymmetric compliance environments. The theoretical 
focus is the role of domestic political and economic environments favorable (or 
unfavorable) to compliance with international agreements. The theory suggests that a 
country with a favorable trade environment will generally prefer not to be bound by third 
party monitoring if there is asymmetry in compliance environments between itself and its 
potential intra-pact trade partner(s).  
The theoretical mechanism is two-fold. The asymmetry in compliance 
environments is likely to reduce the informational gains from third parties when the costs 
of being bound by third party recommendations increases. In other words, the asymmetry 
                                                 
74 In this chapter, I examine regional trade agreements instead of the development of global trade system. 
Although the evolution of global trade system exhibits interesting observations about the design elements, 
the regional trade agreements render researchers more empirical variation. I discuss the relevance of global 
trading system when necessary. 
 46 
in compliance environments is likely to generate informational problems. These problems 
can sometimes be ameliorated by adjustments to the third parties’ informational role, but 
the chances of adjustments being made are sharply qualified because they produce 
distributional consequences by occasionally favoring countries with unfavorable trade 
environments.  
Testing a theoretical proposition empirically requires the imposition of a hidden 
assumption about how preferences translate into outcomes. I have proposed that the 
possibility of centralization breaks down when the asymmetry increases because one or 
more party may disagree with the adoption of a centralized monitoring mechanism.  
However, one has to be careful about interpreting the result in empirical analyses because 
there may be instances where preferences are not directly translated into negotiation 
outcomes. As Axelrod (1970) suggests, a conflict of interest leads to an active behavioral 
conflict only when “other things are equal.” In the empirical analyses, it may not be 
possible to control for every particulars, such as the process of international negotiations 
and the compromises or deals states struck in order to reach the institutional outcome.  
With this caveat, the statistical results of 123 regional trade agreements between 
1950 and 2005 show the working of this tradeoff between informational gains and 
flexibility costs and indicate the negative impact of asymmetric trading environments. 
Specifically, the increasing asymmetry in political and economic factors that determine 
trading environments can decrease the probability of centralized monitoring institutions 
by as much as 20%. 
 
Background: Monitoring Trade 
 
With the multilateral negotiations at Doha and Cancun facing deadlocks (as of 
August 2006), economic regionalism seems to be here to stay.75 The first wave of 
bilateral trade agreements in the 1960s was overshadowed by the progress of multilateral 
negotiations, but subsequently a second wave of bilateralism occurred in the 1980s.76  We 
                                                 
75 Many trade experts predict this trend will continue. See, for example, Bhagwati, in his series of articles in 
The Economist magazine.  
76 Bhagwati in De Pamelo. 
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are now experiencing a third wave of economic regionalism, as the United States pushes 
for bilateral agreements with 12 countries.77   
Given these shifts in trade patterns, as well as the overall increase in trade and 
global economic integration, it becomes increasingly important today to understand the 
role of the mechanisms and institutions that monitor and regulate international trade. At 
the heart of the web of international trade and trade agreements, monitoring institutions 
are designed to serve as engines to further trade deals and stabilize trading relations.  
Monitoring institutions in regional trade agreements can be broadly defined as 
systems (1) for gathering and evaluating compliance-related information (information 
about specific compliance behaviors, but also more generally about compliance 
environments, where “compliance environments” are defined as political or economic 
situations that are favorable or unfavorable to compliance with international agreements), 
and (2) for settling compliance and trade disputes when these arise. The forms monitoring 
institutions take are not uniform. They range from purely diplomatic measures to highly 
legalistic measures. States may agree to communicate and negotiate as the need arises 
through already existing diplomatic channels or newly established intergovernmental 
bodies, or they may choose to establish permanent institutional forms such as courts or 
tribunals. 
A study of monitoring institutions in regional trade agreements is important and 
timely for three reasons. First, one of the thorniest issues in contemporary international 
trade is the tension between regionalism and multilateralism. We would very much like to 
understand for what reasons states choose different regional monitoring systems in the 
face of the established global regime, as well as why they prefer specific forms. Second, 
the practice of monitoring is inevitably linked to policy reviews and decision-making in a 
broader institutional context. Given the recent proliferation of regional trade agreements 
with the explosion of bilateral agreements (Figure 3.1), and in light of the fact that many 
more are being negotiated or have been proposed,78 understanding how policies are 
monitored is crucial in evaluating and forecasting the likely performance of regional trade 
                                                 
77 Schott 2004. 
78 According to the C&M International’s unpublished source, a Washington-based consulting firm for 
international trade, 110 bilateral agreements are entered into force, 53 are concluded, 65 are negotiated, and 
115 are proposed.   
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agreements. The formation of RTAs and their economic impact is a much-explored 
topic,79 but systematic analysis of their institutional arrangements is relatively scant.80 
Third, on a more theoretical front, understanding how states design monitoring 
institutions to monitor themselves in trade matters will contribute to the general 
understanding of the institutional design of international organizations.  
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The following are the key components of this chapter. I first put the theory of 
asymmetric compliance environments in the context of international trade. Second, I 
discuss the empirical strategies to test my theoretical claims, particularly my claims about 
the effect of asymmetric compliance environments on the choice of monitoring 
institutions. I explain the structure of the dataset and the measurement of variables. I then 
examine my statistical findings and their implications in relation to the existing literature 





                                                 
79 Recent representative studies include Frankel 1997; Baier and Bergstrand 2005.  
80 Among those who at least touch on this topic, see Li 2000; Smith 2000; Pevehouse and Buhr 2005.  
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Theory of Distributional Conflicts in the Context of International Trade 
 
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model that explains why countries choose 
particular monitoring institutions. I specifically consider how country-specific 
characteristics relating to their strategic environments affect the choice of informational 
systems for information-gathering, information-sharing and information-reviewing in 
international agreements.  
I demonstrate why different states have divergent expectations about the potential 
informational roles of international trade institutions and how those expectations 
influence their decisions to establish (or not to establish) certain kinds of informational 
systems. One of the key theoretical findings is that the political disagreements stemming 
from different compliance environments may adversely affect the choice of centralized 
monitoring institutions and restrict their informational roles.81 States may gain 
information by establishing a third party, but that may simultaneously produce 
distributional conflicts when the compliance environments are asymmetric. This in turn 
may generate the incentives to choose substitute institutions such as intergovernmental 
bodies with specialized working groups. In this way, states may lose some informational 
efficiency but can lessen the distributional conflict.  
My theoretical model captures one of the salient strategic problems in recent 
international trade cooperation: the uncertainty of compliance environments in light of 
the guarantee of flexibility mechanisms (or legitimate political escapes82) and the practice 
of imposing non-tariff barriers that are opaque and often unverifiable. The proposed 
theoretical elements can easily be contextualized in international trade matters. One of 
the contemporary issues in international trade is the invocation of GATT-consistent but 
potentially protectionist measures, such as antidumping measures, countervailing duties, 
and safeguards. Although such measures are often necessary quid pro quo,83 they pose 
informational problems to the states involved because they are left in doubt as to the 
                                                 
81 Other theoretical implications—on the effect of side payments or the evaluative errors of a third party, 
for example—cannot be inferred from the large set of agreements but will be examined in the context of 
actual cases. 
82 For a study of escape clauses in international trade, see Milner and Rosendorff 2001. 
83 See Finger et al. 2005. 
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legitimacy of the measures—whether the measures are truly necessary, or whether they 
are in fact non-tariff barriers that deserve retaliation.  
How do states cope with this informational problem? Would the establishment of 
monitoring institutions help? Uncertainty about trading environments existed long before 
GATT’s 1948 inception and the implementation of GATT arrangements, but this 
uncertainty was typically addressed by unilateral determination of each state, such as the 
1988 Super-301 instrument of the United States. Currently, a third-party—either the 
WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) or other monitoring bodies established by regional 
trade agreements—can ameliorate informational problems by issuing authoritative rulings 
or advisory opinions for states to follow. On the other hand, third-party monitoring 
bodies may be disfavored by some states in a highly asymmetric environment when the 
monitoring allows legitimate deviations only to a small fraction of partner states. This 
process may create the collective incentive to choose inter-governmental monitoring 
bodies as substitutes. The inter-governmental bodies, particularly when they are coupled 
with specialized working groups or functional sub-committees, can issue alternative 
advisory opinions without imposing obligations on states to follow their decisions. These 
political bodies, unlike more legalistic institutions, monitor agreements while allowing 
policy discretion to the member states.  
A casual survey of monitoring systems in regional trade agreements begs an 
explanation as to why the majority of agreements establish joint committees or joint 
councils rather than permanent courts, despite the potential benefits conferred by third 
parties. Even when the WTO provides for a dispute settlement body and states have an 
available global forum, countries often customize their international monitoring 
environments by concluding separate bilateral or regional agreements. The theoretical 
framework presented above attempts to account for such patterns. The statistical results 
presented in the next section show that demand for centralized informational bodies is 
replaced by demand for intergovernmental bodies when the asymmetry in compliance 
environments is high.   
This point about the impact of compliance environments on the design of 
monitoring institutions is the focus of my contribution to the literature on international 
trade and information. Yarbrough and Yarbrough (1989) first established the role of 
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WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). Maggi (1999) added that the WTO dispute 
settlement procedure fulfills additional informational roles in terms of disseminating 
information to third-party members in a multilateral setting. Rosendorff (2005) weighed 
the benefits and costs of WTO DSB in the face of flexible mechanisms. Adding to this 
line of literature and shifting the focus from the global forum, I focus on the design 
process and investigate how and why legalistic mechanisms may be disfavored by some 
parties. My model shows that both adjudicatory and political bodies share the 
fundamental functions of informational roles, but that a state’s choice of one over the 
other depends on compliance environments.  
The theory of asymmetric compliance environments therefore speaks to an 
apparent puzzle arising from the aforementioned study of dispute settlement mechanisms: 
if a third party arrangement provides superior information, why doesn’t every trade 
agreement employ third party mechanisms? Rosendorff (2005) convincingly 
demonstrated that agreements with dispute settlement mechanisms are stable,84 but my 
theory suggests that (1) the initial establishment of such institutions may be difficult due 
to the presence of conflicting incentives in the design process of monitoring institutions 
and that, unfortunately, (2) we are less likely to observe robust and stable third parties 
despite the potential benefits conferred by them.  
In sum, this chapter contributes to the political economy of regional trade 
agreements both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it provides a micro-
foundation regarding informational environments in international trade and how such 
asymmetric environments impact the design of monitoring institutions. Empirically, it 
highlights a key explanatory variable that has not been previously emphasized. This 
variable—the asymmetry in compliance environments—is likely to upset some of the 
previous results, which will be discussed next.  
 
Empirical Analysis of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
This section provides an empirical test of the theory of asymmetric compliance 
environments in the context of regional trade agreements. I first present the hypothesis to 
                                                 
84 With the empirical support of Pevehouse, Hafner-Burton and Zierler 2002. 
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be tested, explain in detail how the data is structured to test the theoretical idea of 
distributional conflicts, and introduce the measurement of key independent variables and 




Based on the proposed theory of asymmetric environments, I now provide an 
empirically testable hypothesis in the context of regional trade agreements. The theory 
demonstrated that the asymmetric compliance environments among involved countries 
are likely to reduce the likelihood of a choice of a centralized monitoring institution. The 
following hypotheses translate the theoretical statement to an empirically testable 
hypothesis in the context of regional trade agreements: 
 
As the intra-pact asymmetry in compliance environments increases, the 




The dataset includes 123 regional trade agreements (86 bilateral agreements, 37 
multilateral agreements). By region, Africa has 12, Americas 25, Asia 34, Europe 32, and 
20 are inter-regional agreements (e.g. Mexico-Japan). Identifying the population of RTAs 
is not an easy task given the rapid pace of recently signed preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs).85 My dataset draws on data from the WTO (2005), the Tuck Center for 
International Business (CIB), the International Trade Reporter (various years), and 
Frankel (1997).86 Legal texts are mainly from the International Legal Materials (I.L.M), 
                                                 
85 PTAs involve agreements between trading blocs (e.g. EU-Mercosur). I do not include these clusters of 
agreements in my analysis.  
86 Appendix in Frankel has a good survey of regional trade agreements up to 1997. This document is also 
accessible on the web at http://www.iie.com/publications/chapters_preview/72/appaiie2024.pdf; for 
discussion of the development of regional trade agreements in Africa, see Yang and Gupta 2005, Foroutan 
1993  
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USTR87, CIB regional trade agreements archive, United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS), 
and SICE (Foreign Trade Information System).88  
Independence among observations is a critical issue, which I later deal with by 
deleting sub-samples and correcting for with statistical techniques. Among the population 
of RTAs, accession treaties and association agreements (agreements EC or EFTA 
concluded with individual countries; e.g. EC – Iceland, EC – Norway) are not 
independent from original agreements.89 An accession agreement such as the Bangkok 
agreement – Accession of China rarely changes monitoring systems. Rather, China 
accedes to the initial condition that is established already in the initial founding 
agreement. Similarly, association treaties do not exhibit much variation. EFTA 
agreements (e.g. EFTA – Turkey, EFTA – Romania) take similar forms. I did survey of 
accession and association treaties and found out there was not meaningful variation.90 For 




Similar to hierarchical models, the data presented here has two levels: country-
level and agreement-level. While the main unit of analysis is agreement—the choice of 
monitoring institutions for a particular agreement, to be more exact—independent 
variables are constructed based on the characteristics of member states.91 This type of 
data structure requires a methodology to aggregate the measures on the country-level in 
order to conduct analysis on the agreement-level.92 Depending on the theoretical story of 
                                                 
87 http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Agreements/Section_Index.html  
88 SICE for short from its Spanish acronym—Sistema de Información al Comercio Exterior—is the 
information technology arm of the Trade Unit of the Organization of American States (OAS). 
89 Accession and association treaties make up approximately 25% of the dataset. The number of EFTA 
association treaty is 20 with 1 accession treaty; the number of EC association treaties is 36 with 5 accession 
treaties. CEFTA has 5 accession treaties, CARICOM 4 association treaties.  
90 EC and EFTA association treaties employ different names for intergovernmental bodies, such as Joint 
Committee, Cooperation Council, and Association Council, but they serve almost identical functions. 
91 The dataset therefore follows the logic of hierarchical models where individual level characteristics as 
well as higher level characteristics (agreement-level, in my specific analysis) determine the occurrence of 
outcome variables. See Raudenbusch (2005). 
92 We cannot directly observe the position of contracting parties with regard to monitoring institutions and 
therefore, it would be ideal to estimate the effects of proposed structural factors on the positions each state 
takes. Unfortunately, however, the positions are not known unless a researcher thoroughly examines 
negotiating materials and interviews government officials to find out the official position of each country. 
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interests, the asymmetry measure (standard deviation), average, or weakest-link 
measure93 is chosen. This construction of aggregate variables will be explained in the 
context of each variable. 
 
Dependent Variable: Typology of Monitoring Institutions in RTAs 
 
Monitoring systems can be easily studied and objectively coded since agreement 
texts usually specify procedural mechanisms, institutional structures, and relevant 
principal organs for the implementation of the treaty.94 Equipped with a broad definition 
of monitoring institutions—a definition that encompasses the review of compliance 
environments, and entails much more than simply “catching cheaters”—I consider 
various institutions under the umbrella term of “monitoring systems.”95  
I include dispute settlement systems as monitoring bodies for two main reasons. 
First, the disputes represent a sample of compliance issues. Although regular trade 
disputes constitute only the tip of the iceberg of all disputes, those cases are high-profile 
                                                                                                                                                 
Unlike the easily observable bargaining postures in roll call votes in Congressional studies, international 
negotiations often involve no voting but rely on consensual process. Without such easily observable 
bargaining positions, I cannot test a specific hypothesis about a predictable bargaining position a country 
may take. This means that the unit of observation cannot be a bargaining position of a country with regard 
to monitoring institutions. An analysis can be performed only on the aggregate level (a so-called “aggregate 
approach”) for each trade pact. 
93 In the absence of full disclosure about the bargaining positions of each country, we have to make certain 
assumptions about bargaining behavior within a trade pact. I borrow from bargaining theory and employ 
the Nash bargaining solution. The solution states that the final decision of the parties in negotiation is likely 
to fall back to the proposal from the most recalcitrant party. This is the often used “weakest-link 
assumption” which specifies that the bargaining outcome is typically dictated by the most recalcitrant party. 
In the context of my RTA dataset for instance, in measuring the import penetration ratio within a RTA, one 
could reasonably assume that a country with the highest import penetration ratio would be more likely to 
dictate terms of monitoring institutions with its bargaining power. This assumption presumes the worst case 
scenario and therefore provides a harder test. This test has been used in Koremenos (2005) and various 
conflict studies. 
94 Most RTAs begin with initial treaty texts (often with annexes), and subsequently, protocols and 
declarations are added with regulatory details. The structure of RTA legal texts is as follows:  
1. Preamble, where members and objectives are defined 
2. Institutional arrangements 
3. Product details covered by the agreement (e.g. customs duties, agricultural policies, quantitative restrictions) 
4. Dispute settlements 
5. General/security exceptions, balance of payment difficulties   
6. Goods and according tariff rates (usually in annexes) 
95 There are cases where institutions are developed over time after the treaty is signed. For example, a treaty 
may mention the establishment of a permanent or ad hoc tribunal in the near future but may not directly 
deal with the matter. These cases are rare (e.g. several bilateral agreements Kyrgyzstan recently 
concluded). 
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cases that carry significant economic significance. Dispute settlement bodies have 
informational power to preside over those key compliance issues. The established court 
or arbitration panels are the core institutions to follow “disputes arising from 
implementation of economic obligations envisioned by agreements, [and] decisions of 
other institutions.”96 Subsequent to the reviews, the reports of a panel or rulings by a 
court serve an informational purpose for regime development. Second, the dispute 
settlement bodies usually are involved in fact-finding, either directly or indirectly. The 
bodies of course focus on the legality of the obligations, but in doing so, they must 
consider relevant facts about compliance environments or hear arguments brought by the 
respective national authorities.97 The bodies have symbiotic relationships with the 
political decision-making bodies. Political bodies provide information for the arbitration 
of disputes, and the tribunal delivers in public session a reasoned decision.98  
The monitoring systems in RTAs broadly include two categories: diplomatic and 
legalistic measures, parallel to the scenarios provided in the theoretical model. The use of 
existing national measures or intergovernmental bodies can be classified as diplomatic 
measures, and courts or arbitration panels as legalistic ones. Legalistic measures are also 
centralized institutions according to the rational design framework, which defines 
centralization as whether institutional tasks are performed by a single focal entity or 
not.99 Intergovernmental bodies are also focal entities, but they are relatively 
decentralized compared to permanent courts that carry specific informational roles with 
regard to closely examining potential non-compliance cases. More broadly, centralized 
monitoring institutions are the ones with the delegated authority to issue binding rulings 
or recommendations and with the informational capacity to (independently) gather and 
collect information about compliance and the implementation of treaty goals.   
Member states in a regional agreement often decide to use existing measures and 
establish inquiry points or assign coordinating ministries. In a majority of cases, states 
                                                 
96 Paraphrasing the language of the CIS agreement. 
97 Take the example of the U.S.-Chile Agreement, Article 22.11: Experts and Technical Advice, where the 
agreement outlines the information-gathering function of the arbitration panel as follows: “On request of a 
Party, or, unless the Parties disapprove, on its own initiative, the panel may seek information and technical 
advice, including information and technical advice concerning environmental, labor, health, safety, or other 
technical matters raised by a Party in a proceeding, from any person or body that it deems appropriate.”  
98 Case of EAC 1967, Art.37 
99 Koremenos 2001. 
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establish Joint Committees or Councils to deal with implementation issues. Joint 
Committees are usually composed of public and private sector representatives from each 
country and in turn operate sub-committees100 and working groups. Those political bodies 
are charged with responsibilities to reduce any friction in trade relations, usually with the 
help of technical bodies specializing in specific areas of trade (e.g. agriculture, 
technology, transportation, telecommunications, energy, finance, and human resources). 
The delegations within the Joint Committee possess technical capabilities to  
 
1) recommend additions or modifications to the list of traded products, determining 
corresponding percentages in the case of preferential treatment 
2) propose amendments to the Treaty 
3) study problems pertaining to export subsidies, dumping, and other unfair trade practices, 
and propose solutions to such problems, and 
4) supervise the implementation of the Treaty.  
 
Besides the functions to provide information for compliance environments, the inter-
governmental body offers coordinating functions as well. It provides a forum for 
consultation and conducts regular reviews of the measures taken by the contracting 
parties. The body facilitates information flow by aiding exchange of information and 
essentially operates as a quasi-Secretariat.  
Permanent courts and ad hoc arbitration panels differ in how they obtain 
information.101 With ad hoc tribunals or arbitration panels, procedural matters are 
negotiated case-by-case, and the parties in this way exert a high level of control over the 
quantity and quality of the information that is submitted.102 While ad hoc panels can 
appoint experts or conduct visits, their informational power mainly depends on the 
political body of the interested parties. Permanent courts or standing tribunals usually 
have set terms of reference.  
The following pie chart provides a percentage breakdown of monitoring 
arrangements for the RTA dataset according to the aforementioned categories. The 
                                                 
100 Examples for sub-committees include—to take the example of the US-Chile Agreement—a Committee 
on Trade in Goods, a Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Matters, a Committee on Technical 
Barriers to Trade, a Committee on Procurement, and a Financial Services Committee. Other common 
committees include a Committee on Agriculture, a Committee on Labor Affairs, and a Committee on 
Environmental Affairs. 
101 If the agreement does not specify whether the institution would be ad hoc or permanent (e.g. Kyrgyzstan 
- Kazakhstan), I consider it as ad hoc because the court is not clearly established.  
102 Merrills 1998, 88-91. 
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majority of them (52.9%) employ intergovernmental bodies as main monitoring bodies, 
while truly legalistic measures for dispute settlement (permanent courts) are chosen only 
8% of the time. An empirical investigation follows as to why countries do not 
overwhelmingly prefer a third party system—a seemingly efficient monitoring system. 
 







1 (inquiry points); 2 (intergovernmental bodies);3 (ad hoc arbitration panels); 4 (standing courts)
Monitoring Systems in RTAs
 
 
 In this analysis, I dichotomize the dependent variable into diplomatic measures 
(109 cases) and legalistic measures (14 cases), following the scenarios in the theoretical 
model.103 Diplomatic measures encompass the use of inquiry points, intergovernmental 
bodies, and the provision of ad hoc arbitration panels. 104 Legalistic measures include the 
establishment of standing courts.105  
                                                 
103 By suppressing the institutional details, one can lose some information, but the presentation of results is 
much simpler with ordinary logit analysis. In addition, a statistical assumption of proportionality in ordered 
logit or probit (see Boorah 2002) prevents me from using the ordered version of the analysis. I have run the 
test of proportionality of ordered logit with the dataset and the results are available upon request.  
104 There may be some disputes as to whether the provision for arbitration panels can be included as 
diplomatic measures. Many bilateral agreements allow arbitration, but the majority of them do not allow 
truly independently composed panels. There should be further research on how sensitive the results are to 
these different measurement strategies (it is also notable that Pevehouse and Buhr 2005 take different 
approaches in measuring legalism—they use index measures to create a legalism scale). Another issue is 
whether these written agreements are actually followed in practice. For example, there are many disputes 
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Constructing Independent Variables 
 
Table 3.1 lists the independent variables and how they were measured. The 
independent variables comprise both economic and political factors, including import 
penetration ratio, GDP asymmetry, polity scores, and distance. The first three asymmetry 
measures (import penetration ratio asymmetry, GDP asymmetry, and polity asymmetry) 
are the key explanatory variables I want to test and the remaining three variables 
(distance, regional cluster, and number of members) serve as control variables. This 
section explains the measurement of the first three asymmetry variables. The inclusion of 
control variables will be discussed in the model specification and results section.  
 
Table 3.1 List of Independent Variables 
Variable name Measurement  Source 
Import Penetration Ratio 
(IPR) Asymmetry 
Standard deviation of IPRs of each 
signatory within a trade pact one year 
prior to the signing year 




Asymmetry measures for the distribution 
of GDP within a trade pact 
Smith (2000) 
Polity Asymmetry Standard deviation of Polity IV scores of 
each signatory one year prior to the 
signing year 
Polity IV 
Distance weakest-link The farthest distance between member 
states  
Gleditsch (2002) 
Regional Cluster Five regional categories (Africa, 
Americas, Asia, Europe, and cross-
region) 
Based on legal texts 
Number of member 
states 
The number of member states Based on legal texts 
 
Independent Variable I:  
Intra-pact Asymmetry of Import Penetration Ratio (IPR Asymmetry) 
 
The key theoretical concept is the asymmetry in compliance environments, which 
I define as the political and economic differences across countries that determine 
openness to trade. Scholars have identified the economic sources of trade protectionism: 
                                                                                                                                                 
about whether the US really abides by the third party provision in the US-Israel Free Trade Agreement. The 
extent to which these rules are followed is another question future research should address.  
105 This is to maximize the distinction between the two categories of the dichotomous variable. One could 
have a division of {inquiry points and intergovernmental bodies}and {ad hoc tribunals and permanent 
courts}, but this distinction is misleading since ad hoc tribunals or arbitration panels resemble the working 
of intergovernmental bodies in many cases.  
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small economies and economically advanced countries tend to be more open.106  The 
work on political determinants of trade protectionism is a rapidly growing literature that 
has examined the effects of cross-national variations in political institutions on the 
different level of agreement formation.107 Note that the dependent variable of the 
previous work was the formation of regional trade agreements. I later examine whether 
the explanatory power of those variables hold up to the explanation for institutional 
arrangements.  
The IPR Asymmetry is the main explanatory variable, serving as a proxy for the 
asymmetry in compliance environments. I construct a measure of asymmetry in import 
penetration ratio (IPR) of countries within a trade bloc or trade pact. I compute standard 
deviation of the intra-pact IPRs to measure asymmetry. The standard deviation is a 
measure of how widely values are dispersed from the average value (the mean) and thus 
provides for a natural formula to calculate the asymmetry.108 The large standard deviation 
of IPRs among member countries signifies the high level of disparities in trade 
environments.  
The import penetration ratio captures the basic idea of the aggregate level of 
demand for and consumption of imports within the domestic economy.109 IPR is defined 
as “A measure of the importance of imports in the domestic economy, either by sector or 
overall, usually defined as the value of imports divided by the value of apparent 
consumption.”110 
 
                                                 
106 See Rodrik 1995. 
107 Mansfield and Busch 1995; Pevehouse and Buhr 2005; Mansfield, Milner and Pevehouse 2007. Political 
determinants of the formation of trade agreements that have been studied so far include the following: 
power distribution (Mansfield 1992), international security factors (Morrow, Siverson and Tabaes 1998), 
parliamentarism (Mansfield and Busch 1993), democracies (Mansfield and Milner), and number of veto 
players (Manfield, Milner and Pevehouse 2007). See Rodrik 1995 for a brief review of the literature up to 
1995 and Milner 1999 for the latest review. 
108 I exclude three observations from the statistical analysis presented in the next section. They are 
considered to be outliers, outside two standard deviations (1sd: 12.46) away from the mean (14.93). They 
are China-Hong Kong (86.1), Georgia-Ukraine (49.9), and CEMAC (57.8).  
109 See Vonortas and Auger 2002 for a detailed discussion of the measure.  
110 Where the apparent consumption refers to “Production plus imports minus exports, sometimes also 
adjusted for changes in inventories. The intention here is not to distinguish different uses for a good within 
the country, but only to infer the total that is used there for any purpose.” These definitions are from 
Deardorff’s Glossary of International Economics.  
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IPR   =  (imports)/(gross output)111   
= (imports)/(gross national expenditure)112  
=  (value of imports)/(value of apparent consumption)113 
 
The measure suffers several shortcomings, however. First, it does not capture the 
diversity of sectoral or factor-intensity divides across economies, one of the foundations 
of international trade economics.114 For instance, strong opposition from within the 
agricultural sectors of some countries—notable examples being Japan, South Korea and 
EU—is not captured in the measure. The import penetration ratio also suffers from the 
problem of endogeneity as noted in the literature of trade protectionism.115 A high import 
penetration ratio may indicate that a country continues to be open to imports but it could 
also mean that the industrial sector is not competitive enough and that politicians might 
be subjected to increasing political pressure to protect. Similarly, while a low import 
penetration ratio is a good indicator of how politicians have kept lid on protectionist 
pressure, it is precisely countries with a low IPR that may be most susceptible to 
increasing political pressures. Despite these opposing theoretical expectations, empirical 
findings are less controversial where statistical analyses find that the higher IPR leads to 
more protectionism. A higher IPR indicates a lower level of competitiveness of domestic 
industry vis-à-vis foreign countries, and this scenario often leads to protectionist 
measures.116   
The measure for “asymmetry in compliance environment” can of course be 
improved. It is a theoretical concept and needs further clarification to be measured 
empirically. What measures do decision-makers turn to when they want to form their 
expectations about the asymmetry? Casual observation of negotiating histories of 
bilateral trade agreements tells us that negotiators look not only at general economic 
indicators but also at domestic opposition to the sensitive areas and how political 
                                                 
111 Madani and Olareagga, 2002. 
112 Dark and Hawkins 2000. 
113 Deardorff, Glossary of International Economics; apparent consumption equals production plus imports 
minus exports; the cross-national apparent consumption is only available for energy consumption (e.g. 
Banks data archive), so I replaced it with GDP data for now. 
114 Ricardo-Viner and Heckscher-Olin theories, respectively, suggest sectoral divide and factor intensity as 
the sources for distributional consequences and as the basis for trade politics.  
115 See, for example, Goldberg and Maggi 1999. 
116 See Trefler’s 1993 theory of endogenous protection and its empirical testing. 
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authorities resolve conflicts with those groups. 117 As there is no best single indicator of 
trade restrictiveness, I plan to consider multiple measures, bearing mind that data 
availability presents enormous challenges. Potential candidates are the average tariff 
ratio, non-tariff barriers (quotas, product bans, trade imbalances index,118  and licensing 
requirements, measured by coverage ratio), and the IMF’s Trade Restrictiveness Index 
(TRI). This set of measures tries to capture the asymmetric trade environments, making 
inferences from records of trade history and trade structures in each member’s economy. 
The second set of potential proxies includes political organization of industries, effective 
number of pressure groups, and unionization. Those factors are identified in the literature 
on the political economy of trade as the factors that contribute to protectionist tendencies 
on the industrial level. National authorities tend to analyze the institutional or sectoral 
opposition they face; therefore, the effective number of pressure groups involved (both 
lobbying and counter-lobbying forces) would be a good indicator.119 
 
Independent Variable II: Asymmetry of GDP (asymmetry of economic power) 
 
 Smith (2000) constructed a measure of economic asymmetry, P/MAX, to test his 
hypothesis that large countries are less likely to prefer legalistic measures. He measures 
this concept with a P/MAX score indicating the asymmetry in bargaining power within a 
trade bloc.120 
∑ −= NxP /12  and NMAX /11−=  
where x is each member’s share of total pact GDP 
                                                 
117 I had the opportunity to read several governmental reports before the conclusion of Chile-Korea FTA, 
and the key concerns are how the conflicts caused by domestic opposition are resolved. This observation is 
not inconsistent with trade literature that has emphasized the role of opposition groups in the expectation of 
distributional consequences of opening up the market.  
118 The intra-group trade imbalance index is from Foroutan (1997, 248-58). The index for individual 
countries is calculated as total exports to the group minus total imports from the group expressed as a 
percentage of trade with the group. The average for the group is a weighted average of each member 
country’s index where weights are equal to the sum of the share of exports and imports.  
119 Generalizing the theoretical framework to cross-national settings is problematic due to the lack of 
reliable measurements of the effective number of pressure groups for protectionism, including both 
lobbying and counter-lobbying groups. Goldberg and Maggi 1999, Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000 
have tested the Grossman-Helpman model in the context of US industry-level protection. Unionization data 
is only available for OECD countries. 
120 P/MAX score is a variation of standard deviation (or variance) measure that is comparable across trade 
agreements. For the details of the derivation, see Smith (2000). 
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P/MAX serves as a competing hypothesis. Its theoretical expectation is that the 
asymmetry in bargaining power is more likely to lead to non-legalistic measures. 
According to Smith, it is primarily because the hegemon does not want to submit to 
legalistic measures due to their superior bargaining power. As my theory suggested, there 
is no a priori reason to expect that larger countries would be reluctant to establish 
legalistic measures because they also enjoy informational gains from third parties. 
Rather, I suggested, the preference depends on expectations regarding how monitoring 
institutions will perform in a variety of trade environments.121 Smith’s dataset includes 
the RTAs up to 1995 and his argument accounted for multilateral agreements. Whether 
the inclusion of the scores of bilateral agreements and the recent developments of 
multilateral agreements makes a difference will be seen in the following statistical test. 
 
Independent Variable III: Polity Asymmetry 
 
Similar to IPR Asymmetry, Polity Asymmetry is a measure of asymmetric 
compliance environments in trade relations. Previous studies have provided theoretical 
mechanisms and empirical evidence as to why different political institutions and 
democratic/autocratic political characteristics may affect the propensity for open trade.122 
I calculate standard deviation measures of the polity scores of member countries to see 
how wide the distribution of political environments is among member countries. The 
theoretical expectation is that the asymmetry in political environments may hinder the 
establishment of centralized monitoring systems due to informational asymmetry and 
resulting distributional consequences.  
 
                                                 
121 One might expect that asymmetry in GDP would proxy the asymmetry in compliance environments, but 
economy size does not directly affect asymmetry in compliance environments since smaller economies do 
not across the board have less favorable compliance environments than large economies. 
122 Exemplary works include Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) selectorate model, and Milner, Mansfield 
and Rosendorff (2002)’s electoral control model. Briefly, the selectorate theory posits that the leaders in 
countries with large winning coalitions are more likely to care about public goods (as opposed to private 
goods doled out to a small winning coalition) and therefore are more likely to be open to international 
trade. The electoral control model highlights the electoral control over leaders by voters. MMR also report 
statistical results that democratic countries are about twice as likely as autocratic countries to form 
preferential trade agreements.  
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Results of Empirical Analysis of Regional Trade Agreements 
 
Combining the list of independent variables and the measurement of the 
dependent variable, the following section describes the logit models to be estimated with 
the dichotomous dependent variable of “centralized monitoring system” and 
“decentralized monitoring system.” 
 
MODEL 1 (Baseline Model) 
 
Centralization of Monitoring Systems = β0 + β1 IPR Asymmetry + β2 
Distance + β3 Number of Members + β4 Europe + ε 
 
MODEL 1 considers the main quantity of interests, which is the coefficient and 
significance level of IPR Asymmetry. This estimate will be later contrasted to other 
measures of asymmetry: the effects of power asymmetry within a trade-pact (i.e. GDP 
Asymmetry) and those of polity differences (i.e. Polity Asymmetry).  
I control for three other factors that may affect the decision of monitoring 
institutions: the geographical distance of the intra-pact,123 the number of member states, 
and the effect of European RTAs. Shorter distance has a potential to produce more 
legalistic monitoring institutions and is included as a control variable. The number of 
member states is an important control variable since bilateral agreements do not establish 
standing or permanent court. For this reason, the number of parties is also included as a 
control in other specifications. Also note that the baseline model is a fixed effect model 
that assumes the RTAs concluded by European countries are intrinsically different from 
those concluded in other continents with respect to the legalization level.    
 
MODEL 2 (Test of Bargaining Story) 
 
Centralization of Monitoring Systems = β0 + β1 IPR Asymmetry + β2 GDP 
Asymmetry + β3 Distance + β4 Number of Members + β5 Europe + ε 
 
                                                 
123 For distance measure, I have chosen the farthest distance between a pair of countries within a particular 
trade pact. Conventionally, one would think that closely distanced countries are likely to establish legalistic 
measures. By choosing the farthest distance, I am choosing a harder test for the statement.  
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MODEL 2 compares the explanatory power of two variables: the asymmetry in 
compliance environments (proxied by the asymmetry in import penetration ratio, IPR 
Asymmetry) and the power asymmetry (proxied by GDP Asymmetry). The IPR 
Asymmetry conveys the information-based story proposed in the theoretical model, while 
the GDP Asymmetry tells the bargaining story. The differences in import penetration ratio 
within a trade pact would pose informational problems about the likelihood of 
protectionism in trade relations. In contrast, the large difference in GDP would indicate 
the relatively asymmetric bargaining power among contracting countries.  
 
MODEL 3 (Other Proxy for the Asymmetry in Compliance Environments)  
 
CENTRALIZATION = β0 + β1 IPR Asymmetry + β2 GDP Asymmetry + 
β3 Polity Asymmetry + β4 Distance + β5 Number of Members + β6 Europe 
+ ε 
 
The asymmetry in compliance environments comes not only from economic 
situations but also from political ones. Different political institutions have different 
expectations about trade environments. Democratic political institutions are more likely 
to have favorable trade environments for open trade (although they are subject to 
occasional protectionism) than autocratic countries. Therefore, a theoretical expectation 
is that a regional trade agreement composed of similar regime types is likely to employ 
centralized monitoring institutions. Polity Asymmetry is therefore another proxy variable 
for the asymmetry in compliance environments. The significance of this variable will 
further validate the theory of the asymmetric trade environments in explaining the choice 
of monitoring institutions. 
I report the results of three models in Table 3.2 to examine how well the proposed 




Table 3.2  Logit Estimates 
 
Dependent Variable: Monitoring Systems for Regional Trade Agreements 
 
 MODEL 1 
Baseline model with  
IPR Asymmetry 
MODEL 2 
Test of Bargaining 
Theory 
MODEL 3 
Additional proxy for 
asymmetry in 
compliance environment 
































    
Number of observations 
124 
110 104 103 
Pseudo R2    0.3891 0.5204 0.6089 
LR Chi2 31.10 40.78 47.56 
Prob>Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. I report robust standard errors 
after clustering by region.125 
 
MODEL 1 is a baseline specification that tests the explanatory power of the 
asymmetry in compliance environments, namely IPR asymmetry. As the theory 
suggested, the IPR asymmetry has a negative impact on the choice of centralized 
monitoring institutions.  
MODEL 2 tests the bargaining theory proposed by Smith (2000) against the 
informational theory proposed in Chapter 2. The result suggests that the asymmetry in 
compliance environments is systematically reflected in the choice of monitoring systems. 
Bargaining power may influence the terms of agreements (e.g. the number of trade 
concessions to be made), but it is not a good predictor of the choice of general monitoring 
mechanisms. Although the sign is negative, indicating that a power asymmetry has a 
negative impact on the choice of centralized monitoring institutions, the significance 
level is not high. Smith found the significance of bargaining power for the choice of 
                                                 
124 MacFadden’s pseudo R2, R2 for categorical analyses; see Long and Freese 91-94. 
125 Without clustering on region, IPR Asymmetry is not significant. This is because one region (e.g. Africa) 
has a different pattern from the other (e.g. Europe). If both of them pull the coefficient in opposite 
directions, coefficients cannot have statistical significance.  
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legalistic measures in his statistical model of 58 RTAs. The discrepancy may be due to 
the incorporation of recent bilateral agreements in the sample where bargaining power is 
not a decisive factor in the choice of monitoring mechanisms as much as in the case of 
multilateral agreements. In the bilateral agreements, as the results suggest, the 
discrepancy in compliance environments is a better predictor for the choice of monitoring 
mechanisms.    
MODEL 3 tests the explanatory power of the political differences among the 
member countries in a regional trade agreement. The significance of Polity Asymmetry 
means that the differences in political environments have an independent effect on the 
collective decision to choose centralized monitoring institutions. As expected, such 
political differences negatively affect the choice of centralized monitoring institutions.  
In all three models, unlike the gravity models to predict the formation of RTAs,126 
geographical distance turns out not to be a good predictor of the choice of monitoring 
institutions.127 This suggests that the determinants of agreement formation may be 
different from the determinants of institutional arrangements, indicating the need for 
separate investigation of the political and economic sources of institutional 
arrangements.128  
The coefficients reported in Table 3.2 are not directly interpretable as they are 
estimates from logit analysis, although the sign of the coefficients provides us with the 
general direction of the impact. The most interesting feature is the effect of IPR 
Asymmetry on the centralization of monitoring systems, raising the question, “How 
significant is the impact of IPR Asymmetry on the choice of monitoring systems?” Figure 
                                                 
126 Baier and Bergstrand 2005. 
127 The casual investigation of actual cases shows mixed support. Czech Republic and Slovakia, two 
proximate countries, concluded a bilateral agreement with independent arbitration while Canada and Israel, 
two distant countries, also have concluded an agreement with independent arbitration. 
128 Other political variables that predict the trade flows are not significant predictors for the choice of 
monitoring institutions. For example, the determinants of trade flows—the interaction of leadership 
turnover and regime type (McGillivray and Smith 2004)—are not good predictors for the choice of 
monitoring system. I also test for the importance of the key political variable “regime type” suggested by 
Mansfield, Milner, and Rosendorff 2002 and by selectorate model of Bueno de Mesquita et al 2003. In the 
context of institutionalization on the international level, the average polity score of a regional trade pact is 
not significant. As Pevehouse and Buhr 2005 suggest, democracies may or may not provide environments 
favorable to the establishment of international monitoring. Established structures of accountability in 
democracies may favor the legal model, but on the other hand, democratic governments may want latitude 
for more policy discretion. This again calls for a separate analysis for institutional arrangements from the 
analysis on the formation of agreements. 
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3.3 graphs the predicted probabilities in relation to the change in the IPR Asymmetry 
within the range of the IPR scores in the sample, from minimum 0.15 to maximum 38.129 
One can easily discern the general downward trend, which indicates that the extreme 
asymmetry in import penetration ratio dramatically lowers the probability of choosing a 
legalistic measure. The increase in IPR Asymmetry can decrease the probability of 
centralized monitoring institutions by 20%. Using these numbers, we can also estimate 
when the asymmetry will become an obstacle to the establishment of centralized 
monitoring. Approximately when the IPR asymmetry score is 20, the probability of 




The result suggests that negotiators who want to enhance the informational power 
of international institutions should strive to lower the effect of asymmetric compliance 
environments during or before the negotiation. One way to do so is to build transparent 
conflict resolution mechanisms on the domestic level between government and interest 
group pressures to reduce the fluctuation of interest group pressures. Such mechanisms 
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Figure 3.3         Predicted Probability for the Choice of Centralized Monitoring 
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will assure other trade partners a predictable and visible way to foresee the trade activities 
while providing political venues for interest groups to express their concerns. 
Similar to the negative effect of the asymmetry in import penetration ratio, the 
asymmetry in polities significantly and negatively affects the choice of centralized 
monitoring institutions. As the asymmetry increases from minimum to maximum, the 
probability of centralized monitoring institutions being established decreases by 10%.  
 
 
The results presented above can be summarized as follows. First, the analysis of 
123 regional trade agreements shows a definitive pattern of governments choosing inter-
governmental measures rather than legalistic measures, such as ad hoc panels or standing 
courts. Approximately 60% of monitoring systems are diplomatic rather than 
adjudicatory. Second, the asymmetry in compliance environments adversely affects the 
choice of centralized monitoring institutions but encourages the establishment of alternate 
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increases from minimum to maximum, the probability of establishing standing courts or 




It is well accepted that international institutions provide information about 
compliance and regime management. Nevertheless, how monitoring institutions are 
designed to collect information has been less explored. The variation in monitoring 
institutions across international agreements begs an explanation and a systematic test. I 
proposed the following theory of asymmetric compliance environments: the 
informational problem arising from different compliance environments is certainly abated 
with the involvement of an information provider but simultaneously produces 
distributional problems when the disparity in compliance environments is large. This 
scenario implies that the use of third parties may not always be efficient and provides a 
potential explanation for why states decide to choose inter-governmental bodies, such as 
Joint Committees or Joint Councils, to monitor the implementation of trade policies 
rather than courts or arbitration panels. Preliminary analyses of 123 regional trade 
agreements between 1950 and 2005 provide support for the theory, indicating the 
significantly negative impact of asymmetric compliance environments on the choice of 
centralized monitoring systems.  
This analysis of an updated dataset of regional trade agreements is a contribution 
to the study of political economy of international trade. Adding to the large literature on 
the formation of regional trade agreements, this study contributes to the literature by 
identifying the determinants of institutional arrangements, especially monitoring 
institutions. I provide a broad understanding of monitoring institutions in regional trade 
agreements including intra-governmental procedures as well as dispute settlement 
mechanisms. In light of the statistical evidence (although it needs improvements on 
measurements and further testing), my theory adds to our understanding of the RTA case 
by looking at available institutional options and by providing a preliminary explanation 
for why states may prefer less centralized forms of monitoring institutions.  
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Specifically, I demonstrate that the choice of monitoring systems in regional trade 
agreements has informational roots. Given the uncertainty affecting global trade 
environments, states customize their own monitoring systems despite the innovations 
developed under the WTO dispute settlement systems. This is mainly because of the 
complex asymmetric environments that exist between different trading nations. The 
complexity of non-tariff measures and occasional protectionist measures based on 
political needs generates the need for state-controlled monitoring systems. Many studies 
have highlighted the value of third-party monitoring systems, but the analysis has shown 
how incentives arise for states to create their own monitoring systems in regional trade 
agreements. The theory should be further developed to explain the recent surge in 
bilateral agreements accompanied by ad hoc arbitration measures or diplomatic bodies.  
The examination of RTA monitoring institutions yields additional implications for 
the study of international trade. First, the factors that affect the choice of monitoring 
systems are different from the traditional predictors for RTA formation or for trade flows. 
This difference necessitates a separate systematic analysis of the institutional 
arrangements behind trade agreements. The study also highlights the benefit of looking at 
the range of institutional alternatives for informational purposes that are not necessarily 
centralized and delegated to the international bodies. More broadly, this research 
contributes to the study of international institutions by re-examining their informational 
capacity. The study suggests that the differences in political and economic characteristics 
of member states could be an obstacle to the design of centralized monitoring systems. 
Prospective member states, in the face of informational problems and resulting 
distributional conflicts, are more likely to opt for the less institutionalized monitoring 
systems of inter-governmental bodies rather than ad hoc arbitration panels or standing 
courts. This seemingly deterministic conclusion would seem to invite a policy discussion 
and/or response with a view to reducing such asymmetry in compliance environments 















Monitoring institutions, ranging from independent scientific bodies to highly 
intrusive observer/inspection schemes, play a crucial role in fisheries management, with 
implications for both management and conservation. Collected information during 
monitoring processes is used for assessing stock levels, setting quota for conservation 
purposes, and distributing allocations to each member countries.  
Regional fisheries agreements provide fertile ground to test arguments about the 
influence of political determinants on international institution building. Drawing on 
seventy-three multilateral fisheries agreements generated by the International 
Environmental Agreements (IEA) database, I examine the factors driving the adoption of 
monitoring institutions, including nations’ often conflicting preferences for one kind of 
institution over another, with some favoring political consultative mechanisms and others 
favoring fisheries commissions with scientific subcommittees or relatively intrusive 
inspection/observer schemes.  
I assess and estimate the impact of asymmetric compliance environments caused 
by factors such as the differing political strength of domestic fishing industry lobbies. I 
find that asymmetric political environments are inimical to the establishment of 
monitoring bodies on the international level. I additionally test hypotheses regarding the 
determining importance of epistemic community and national administrative capacity on 
nations’ preferences for one monitoring institution over another and find partial/mixed 
support for both hypotheses.  
 
 72 
Background: Monitoring Fisheries 
 
Fisheries management has recently received international attention because of its 
potential social, political, and environmental problems. 50 percent of the world’s marine 
fishery resources are fully exploited, 25 percent are overexploited, and about 25 percent 
could support higher exploitation rates.130 
The activity of collecting and analyzing scientific information, collectively termed 
“monitoring,” is considered necessary for sound management of fisheries. Theories of 
international relations have analyzed the potential benefits of collecting and utilizing 
information in governing international environmental agreements. Victor, Raustiala, and 
Skolnikoff (1998) describe such monitoring institutions as “systems of implementation 
review (SIR)” and show that they are essential to implementation of regulatory measures. 
In a similar vein, Jacobson and Brown Weiss (1998) note the importance of transparency 
mechanisms to foster compliance in environmental agreements. International legal 
scholarship has also paid attention to the importance of monitoring. Wold et al. (2003), 
for instance, study the Monitoring, Surveillance, and Control (MSC) systems and argue 
that MSC systems assist fisheries regimes in a positive way. Throughout these studies, 
monitoring is an important component of conservation and management measures, 
alongside enforcement mechanisms such as trade restrictions.131  
However, even as these authors present a compelling case for the importance of 
monitoring institutions, they fail to address a set of underlying questions. Why are 
monitoring institutions designed the way they are, and what political conditions 
contribute to their formation? If it is beneficial and efficient to have such institutions, 
why do we not observe such institutional arrangements in all agreements? Many scholars 
agree that accurate, reliable information is essential for cooperation, but we also know 
that formal structures to promote or enforce cooperation are, in actuality, often 
controversial and contested. We therefore have to recognize that political constraints exist 
in designing such monitoring institutions. What are the sources of these political 
                                                 
130 The Director-General of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations Dr. Jacques 
Diouf at the Reykjavik Conference on Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem (1-4 October 2001), 
re-quoted from Sullivan 2003. 
131 ICCAT implemented trade restrictions with respect to bluefin tuna. See Balton 2004. 
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obstacles to independent monitoring bodies on the international level? What are the 
political mechanisms or processes that favor or disfavor the establishment of international 
bodies? Since the available literature does not provide answers to these questions about 
the formation of such informational institutions, this research attempts to fill the gap.  
The topic of the selection of informational mechanisms during the institution-
building or agreement-making stage was first addressed in Downs et al. (1996), where the 
authors theorize the selection process states go through due to political reasons while 
negotiating international agreements. The topic was more systematically explored in the 
project on the rational design of international institutions,132 and the topic’s empirical 
relevance was established in Von Stein (2005) in her study of the impact of Article VIII 
of the IMF agreements on the compliance behavior of member states. The question I 
propose to pursue—how monitoring systems are established and why they are difficult to 
create in some cases—is important in the study of international cooperation, because we 
have to understand not only what factors promote cooperation, but also why beneficial 
mechanisms are often difficult to obtain politically. By identifying the political obstacles 
that exist on the international level, I seek to advance understanding of the dynamics of 
international cooperation and provide an explanation as to why and how cooperation-
enhancing mechanisms—such as monitoring mechanisms—are often bogged down in the 
process of cooperation-building. 
The empirical assessment of monitoring mechanisms has also been impaired by 
the lack of systematic empirical investigations. For example, in their article on 
verification in environmental agreements, Ausubel and Victor (1992) conclude, 
 
Because international organizations have neither the power nor the capacity to 
monitor and enforce standards, we tentatively suggest that the most effective 
standards are those that allow for unilateral action, whether by parties to the 
agreement or by other actors such as NGOs.  
 
Partly influenced by the fledgling regulatory system in international environmental 
governance of the time when the article was written, the observation about the lack of 
information power of international institutions implies that the institutional basis or 
capacity for monitoring is uniformly lacking. However, this conclusion does not coincide 
                                                 
132 Koremenos et al. 2001 
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with the dominant view proposed by Keohane (1984) that informational institutions in 
fact perform an important informational role. These potentially conflicting evaluations 
call for a more systematic and objective empirical investigation to examine the extent to 
which various international organizations in fact fulfill their monitoring function, 
performing their task with relevant available measures. 
To make this discussion more concrete, we may now consider the monitoring 
institutions that are part of seventy-three fisheries management agreements.  
 
Table 4.1 Types of Monitoring Bodies in 73 Multilateral Fisheries Agreements 
 
Monitoring Body Absent Present Total 
Scientific Committee 51 22 73 
Commission 21 52 73 
Observer System 66 7 73 
 
Out of seventy-three total agreements, seventeen agreements have dual systems of 
Scientific Committee and Commission. Commissions are management bodies usually 
composed of national fisheries regulators. Scientific Committees sometimes speak to 
Commissions but they are usually established separately.133 Observer systems are scarce 
– only seven agreements have formal observer systems.134 Only one out of the seventy-
three agreements has all three monitoring systems.135 
The variation in monitoring mechanisms—with some agreements adopting 
scientific committees, others preferring observer systems, and some embracing both—
clearly asks for an explanation. Certainly, the statistical summary shows that we cannot 
conclude that international bodies are inherently weak. The institutional variation also 
suggests that conventional arguments to the effect that states are reluctant to delegate 
monitoring authority due to sovereignty concerns do not readily hold up. We therefore 
have to seek alternative explanations to understand the institutional variation. 
                                                 
133 The following agreements for instance establish scientific committees but do not have commission: 1) 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (1972), and 2) Constitution of the Center for Marketing 
Information and Advsiory Services for Fishery Products in Latin America and the Caribbean (1994). 
134 Examples include 1) Convention For The Conservation Of Anadromous Stocks In The North Pacific 
Ocean (1992), 2) Convention On The Conservation And Management Of Pollock Resources In The Central 
Bering Sea (1994), and 3) Federated States Of Micronesia Arrangement For Regional Fisheries Access 
(1994). 
135 It is the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (2000). 
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This chapter addresses the theoretical lacuna about the design of monitoring 
systems and provides a theory for the design of monitoring systems in regional fisheries 
management. In what follows, I present my argument as to why differences in domestic 
political factors are likely to negatively affect the adoption of international monitoring 
institutions. After the theoretical discussion, I provide empirical evidence to examine the 
effect of the political differences.   
 
 
Theory of Distributional Conflicts in the Context of Regional Fisheries Management 
 
 
To bring home the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 2 in the context of 
fisheries management, it may help to picture two states or groups of states entering into 
fisheries negotiations in a multilateral setting. The participating states will weigh the 
available monitoring institutions. Their choices include, but are not limited to, 1) an 
independent scientific committee that could advise and recommend catch allocations to a 
political body, 2) a political body such as a commission charged with collecting 
information from member countries, or 3) a more stringent inspection mechanism 
designed to independently collect information that can be cross-examined later.  
One commonly encountered international cooperation environment is such that 
one state allows the others some latitude for “escapes” from the terms of the agreement 
when their domestic political situations are not very favorable.136 Such leniency, under 
special circumstances, is a common feature of international cooperation. In fisheries 
management, this might take the form of country A allowing country B to delay the 
scrapping of its over-sized or over-capacity vessels. As new technologies develop, over-
fishing has become a problem, and the livelihoods of many fishermen are now threatened 
as governments restructure and regulate their fishing industry so as to ensure that fishing 
continues at a sustainable level. International cooperation in fisheries management is in 
this manner intertwined with domestic politics. Introducing reforms in the fishing 
industry requires the political consent of relevant stakeholders, particularly fishermen; 
jobs may be lost or changed, and people may have to transition to other sectors of the 
                                                 
136 See Milner and Rosendorff 2001 for the discussion of escape clauses (safeguards, antidumping, etc.) in 
trade relations. 
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economy. In such a relatively non-mobile sector, national governments may prefer to 
provide subsidies and protect the industry rather than committing to the cause of 
sustainable fisheries. Judging whether a neighbor’s violation of a fisheries agreement 
may be considered “legitimate,” and therefore be left unpunished, is a difficult exercise, 
but states still have to manage cooperation given this uncertainty.  
In these political circumstances, and given these uncertainties, on the international 
level, reciprocal punishment (e.g. denying access to one’s territorial waters) is usually 
suspended when other parties are seen to be experiencing “special circumstances.” If 
these special situations do not occur frequently, both parties could benefit from having an 
institution that can produce objective scientific information about catches along with 
recommendations for catch limits and get its advice on whether domestic restructuring 
and stringent management are necessary. 137 If these situations are too frequent138 and 
asymmetrically benefit one party over the other, participating states may not favor 
establishing a third party international institution such as a scientific body. If one state 
party tries to exploit its “special circumstances,” using them as a pretext for 
circumventing its duties for sustainable management, distributional conflicts tend to arise. 
The asymmetry in different domestic political environments therefore can be harmful to 
the establishment of international monitoring bodies. 
Domestic political concerns impact institutional design on the international level 
because they create uncertainties for other states with regard to future credibility. Fishing 
GDP, the portion of GDP deriving from the fishing industry, is in most cases miniscule 
(1-5%).139 However small the impact of fishing on the economy may be, the political 
factors at play in each member state are taken into account during the institutional design 
process, as they affect the perception of the other involved states about how future 
cooperative relations would play out. If one state signals that it may want to deviate from 
cooperation to accommodate its domestic political difficulties, other states’ willingness to 
invest in monitoring institutions may dissipate. In those cases of asymmetric compliance 
                                                 
137 See Jo 2006 for formalization of the idea of domestic compliance environments and their impacts on the 
institutional design. 
138 The threshold for this frequency level is determined in the theoretical model by the level of stakes 
involved. If the stake is high for the party that expects other party invoking these special circumstances, it 
is more likely to oppose to stringent monitoring mechanisms. 
139 See Fishery Country Profile at http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/fcp.asp  
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environments among member states, monitoring institutions may lose their value as 
collectors of relevant information and producers of coherent sustainability policies.  
This model of institutional design that considers larger domestic and international 
political contexts in strategic cooperation environments yields a key insight regarding the 
characteristics of distributional conflicts as these conflicts of interests among member 
countries contribute to building monitoring mechanisms. The argument ultimately 
concerns the constraining effect of politico-economic asymmetry among member 
countries. States need monitoring systems to sustain cooperation, which has been 
suggested by the functionalist account of international institutions—the demand creates 
the need for such institutions. However, political differences can and do impose 
constraints on the development of international monitoring systems. Differences in 
political and economic environments necessitate the development of monitoring systems 
but can generate serious political issues regarding future commitment.  
In what follows, I present in detail the argument about the political roots of 
international regulatory measures and explain how compliance problems in fisheries 
management shape the institutional choice. I first describe monitoring problems in the 
context of fisheries management and identify problem structures.140 Next, I examine the 
compliance environments in fisheries management and explain why domestic political 
structures or conditions may affect the choice of monitoring institutions on the 
international level.  
 
Status of global fisheries 
 
As Hardin (1968) trenchantly predicted, the tragedy of the commons problem has 
manifested itself in international fisheries. In the 1980s, seriously depleted fisheries 
resources emerged as an international problem, as evidenced by the collapse of northern 
cod fisheries, primarily as a result of technological developments in catching, coupled 
with illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing, According to the Food and 
Agricultural Organization (FAO), a major international body within the United Nations 
                                                 
140 In Mitchell (2006)’s sense. The problem structure involves the inherent uncertainties surrounding the 
issue, goals of cooperation, and asymmetric (or symmetric) expected benefits or costs. 
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that regulates global fisheries, almost 70 percent of all fish stocks are either fully to 
heavily exploited (44 per cent), over-exploited (16 per cent), depleted (6 per cent) or very 
slowly recovering from over-fishing (3 per cent).141 Dating back to the early twentieth 
century,142many international agreements have been concluded to enact a range 
conservation measures with respect to diverse marine resources such as dolphins, seals, 
and whales, with varying degrees of effective implementations and different levels of 
institutionalization.  
 
Informational and political problems in fisheries management 
 
Informational problems in assessing fish stocks in fisheries management arise 
primarily because fish do not respect borders. Prominent fisheries scientist John Sheperd 
cogently states the challenge scientists face:  
 
“Estimating the number of fish in the sea is just the same as counting the number 
of trees in a forest, except you can’t see the fish and they move.”143 
 
Despite the inherent uncertainty that affects the scientific modeling of fish stocks, the 
exchange of information about catches is crucial for sustainable fisheries management, as 
the annual sustainable yield is determined by weighing the available catch against the 
caught amount. Reliable assessments of fish stocks are crucial for implementing fisheries 
agreements. Since many fisheries agreements involve sharing “surplus stocks,” the 
estimation of those stocks is necessary for implementing the agreement with the objective 
of sustainable development. 
Fisheries are impure public goods that have characteristics of both private and 
public goods, which complicates the regulatory process. Coastal countries have their own 
EEZ of 200 nautical miles with special rights over the exploration and use of marine 
resources. Areas outside EEZs are virtually unregulated, with the exception of some 
                                                 
141 http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/fishery.htm  
142 According to the International Environmental Agreements (IEA) database, the earliest international 
fisheries agreements include Convention Between Alsace-Lorraine And The Two Initial Parties To The 
Convention Between Baden And Switzerland Concerning Fishing In The Rhine And Its Influxes As Well 
As In Lake Constance (1877) and Convention for Regulating the North Seas Fishery (1882). 
143 Re-quoted in the Full Committee Hearing on Global Overfishing and International Fisheries 
Management, Thursday, June 12 2003. http://commerce.senate.gov/hearings/witnesslist.cfm?id=808  
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global and regional measures. As most measures imposed on fishing vessels are the 
responsibilities of flag states (states where the vessels are registered), some commercial 
vessels adopt “flags of convenience” to get around the stringent regulations of some 
coastal states. Illegal fishing activities therefore cause informational problems in 
verifying catch amounts, particularly in high seas where regulation is lax or virtually non-
existent.    
Another informational problem in fisheries management is that states do not 
necessarily want to share information and, indeed, have some incentive to hide or distort 
information in the interest of their domestic commercial fishing industries. Besides the 
high profile cases of underreporting by Russia in the 1980s144 and over-reporting by 
China in the 1990s,145 national reporting has been a chronic problem.146 An ADE study 
notes that “figures used for negotiating and implementing the fisheries agreements, seem 
to be more the result of a commercial bargain than of scientific studies.147” In many 
cases, because of pressure to adhere to allocated quotas, fishermen have also resorted to 
the practice of releasing “discards” (dead fish) into the ocean, which upsets the ecological 
balance.148  
These informational problems of hiding information about catch statistics or 
getting around existing regulations usually go in tandem with other political problems 
that may affect the international negotiation of fisheries agreements. With respect to 
fisheries management, development goals often conflict sharply with the goal of 
sustainability. Member states to a fisheries agreement have to weigh these often-
competing objectives. With respect to development, and the choice between maintaining 
subsistence and developing the fishing industry, national governments have to consider 
the domestic political ramifications of supporting international measures that could 
influence the status and economic viability of their fishing industry.  
Although typically miniscule as a portion of the overall national economy, 
national fishing industries involve both economic and social aspects. Employment in 
                                                 
144 Documented in Weiss and Jacobson 1998 
145 Watson and Pauly 2001 in Nature; a response by FAO Fisheries Department 
146 See Jacobson and Weiss 1998 for empirical records of state reporting to international environmental 
agencies or bodies. 
147 ADE-PwC-EPU, p.57 
148 Bounds, Andrew. 2007. “EU Fisheries Commissioner: Dumping of dead fish is immoral, says Borg” 
Financial Times, Feb 20, 2007 
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fishing generally does not allow mobility, since the industry involves huge sunk costs as 
well as adjustment costs. At the same time, the fisheries sector is inherently vulnerable to 
economic changes. Because of these industry characteristics, traditional fishermen in 
industrialized countries are subsidized at an average of 17%.149 Fishing subsidies take 
many forms, from direct financial transfers to assistance in development projects.150 The 
extent of fishing subsidies has been increasing against the backdrop of the decreasing 
competitiveness of traditional fishing sectors. In the case of the EU, targeted 
compensation to the fisheries sector has recently increased151 compared to untargeted 
compensation that is provided to national governments. 
Private stakeholders (fishermen, ship-owners) in many developed countries are 
constituents with political power. The potentially harmful effects of fishing subsidies are 
well documented—they contribute to oversized fishing fleets and overcapacity152—and 
recently, making matters worse, big deep-sea trawlers have been subsidized by many 
major fishing nations with $150m a year. These deep-sea trawlers are otherwise 
economically unviable, and they have been shown to disrupt deep-sea ecosystems that 
exhibit slow growth compared to ecosystems in shallow waters.153 This subsidy problem 
is not limited to developed countries. In developing countries where the people rely on 
fish for subsistence, fisheries-dependent communities are often important constituents for 
politicians. Local communities dependent on fisheries also often demand exclusive 
fishing rights. Because of the political prominence of fishing lobbies in many developing 
countries, direct or indirect fishing subsidies are common in these countries as well as 
developed ones.  
 
Clashes among different compliance environment countries 
 
Purely scientific problems, in tandem with political conditions, may work against 
compliance with the central tenet of fisheries agreements: sustainable fisheries 
                                                 
149 ADE-PwC-EPU 2002 
150 Westlund 2004 
151 ADE-PwC-EPU 2002 
152 Milazzo 1998, Cox and Schmidt 2002 
153 Cookson, Clive. 2007 “Scientists Warn Deep Sea Trawling Strips the Ocean” Financial Times. February 
20, 2007. Largest payers are Japan, Russia, South Korea, and Spain. 
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management. These scientific and political difficulties, I argue, may ultimately block the 
institutional building process, especially when parties to an agreement experience 
divergent domestic political conditions.154 In what follows I define the domestic political 
situations that may favor or disfavor compliance with international obligations as 
“compliance environments.” 
How do domestic political considerations and compliance environments affect 
international negotiations regarding monitoring arrangements in the fisheries 
management case? Fisheries-dependent countries (mostly distant water fishing nations) 
expect more flexibility and therefore may seek flexible measures or weak regulations in 
monitoring mechanisms. They will approve centralized monitoring mechanisms only if 
flexibility mechanisms (e.g. fishing allowed for research purposes) are included in 
written agreements. In contrast, coastal states would want to strengthen the regulation 
because of their interest in protecting their own resources within their EEZ. But 
monitoring would not help those coastal states if other states enjoy flexibility.    
To illustrate these arguments about strategic considerations that guide institutional 
creation among related parties, I rely on the Fish Stock negotiation between 1995 and 
1997. I chose this global negotiation episode because negotiation materials for smaller-
scale treaties are difficult to come by.155 In the Fish Stocks negotiation, the different 
compliance environments of fishing nations yielded different bargaining positions 
regarding the kinds of monitoring systems that were preferred. Each member country 
belonged to one of the following categories: 
 
• Distant water fishing nations (DWFNs): states that possess many vessels or fleets operating for 
extending periods far from their home base 
• Coastal states: to which the Law of the Sea conferred exclusive economic rights, including the 
right to fish within 200 miles off their shores 
• Port states: states with national ports that foreign ships temporarily embark 
• Flag nations: states that register vessels 
 
The major divide was between costal states and “distant water” fishing nations 
(DWFNs) on the high seas. Costal states that worried about their domestic harvest 
                                                 
154 The political and scientific problems influence each other. For example, political differences color 
scientific evaluations and rhetoric involved in discussion of scientific facts. 
155 Peterson 1993 provides some episodes of distributional conflicts related to regional fisheries 
commissions. 
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included Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Iceland and New Zealand. DWFNs that 
were responsible for 90 percent of distant water fishing included Russia, Japan, Spain, 
Poland, the Republic of Korea, and Taiwan province of China.156  
The major areas of contention over management schemes during the negotiation 
illustrate the political tensions that arise when countries experience divergent compliance 
environments. The central debate opposed distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to 
costal states. Distant water fishing nations pushed for non-binding guidelines for the 
detailed regulatory measures, while costal states favored a binding treaty.157 DWFNs also 
rejected strong enforcement measures, which led to the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries, a non-binding agreement. As in other negotiations, the position of 
states with unfavorable compliance environments (in this case, DWFNs) was adamant, 
ignoring the potential benefits that rigorous international monitoring mechanisms can 
provide. Coastal states complained that their conservation efforts were marred by 
indiscriminate over-fishing by distant water fishing nations. DWFNs, including the EU, 
wanted not to strengthen existing inspection measures, so as to avoid the possibility of 
any use of force on the high seas (that is, claiming the extended level of “special 
circumstances”), while costal states emphasized their right to board and inspect vessels as 
part of their enforcement of conservation measures.158   
As the negotiation over the Fish Stocks Agreement demonstrates, the conflicting 
preferences of member countries stem from their domestic compliance environments, and 
divergent compliance environments tend to result in disputes that often work against the 
adoption of strong management measures. In the following section, I examine whether 
any systematic evidence for this theory exists in regional fisheries agreements.  
 
Dataset of Regional Fisheries Agreements 
 
To test my theory of the design of monitoring institutions, I analyze seventy-three 
multilateral fisheries agreements. Regional fisheries agreements have various legal 
                                                 
156 Earth Summit backgrounder, http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/fishery.htm Earth Summit 
+5: Special session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the Implementation of Agenda 21. 
New York 23-27 June 1997, Backgrounder 
157 Devaney 2005 
158 Earth Summit backgrounder, http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/sustdev/fishery.htm  
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provisions ranging from action plans with relatively light obligations to regional 
conventions underpinned by strong legal frameworks. Associated protocols often deal 
with specific problems in a manner consistent with the goals stated in the original 
convention.  
Fisheries management is organized in four layers: global, regional, national, and 
local. On the global level, the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
regulates the fishing behavior of member countries with specific written regulatory 
details in the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (FAO-CC), along with its 
historical predecessors, as summarized in Table 4.2.  
 
Table 4.2 Milestones:  Historical overview of legal instruments  
for global fisheries management  
 
 
Mid-1970s Creation of EEZ 
1982  United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (EEZ regime emerged) 
1993 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (Compliance Agreement) 
1995  United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (entered into force in 2001) 
  FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
2001 International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU) 
 
 
On the regional level, regional fisheries bodies (RFB) implement the regulations 
complementary to global rules. On the national level, each nation has its own fishing 
program and more often than not, local fisheries management influences how the upper 
levels of national and regional management operate.  
The global fisheries regime, like other international cooperation regimes, relies 
heavily on national level implementation. States are expected to improve their 
monitoring, control and surveillance systems (MCS), establish mandatory licensing 
regimes and strengthen legal frameworks.159 As of 2005, the percentage of FAO member 
states that had adopted vessel-monitoring systems (VMS) to some degree had increased 
from 26 percent in 2001 to 70 percent.160 Today, global regulation continues to depend on 
voluntary national implementation.   
                                                 
159 COFI/2005/2 
160 Vessel registration is the easiest method; states rarely monitor by-catch and discards.   
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Although the development of the global fisheries regime is well worth studying, 
not least for the light such analysis can shed on the political conflicts that complicate the 
building of fisheries regimes, it is a much-studied topic161 and does not give much 
leverage for large-N statistical analysis because it varies with time but exhibits little 
variation. In order to tackle a less-studied area that exhibits great variation, I chose to 
examine regional fisheries agreements, for which good data is available” 162 My decision 
to focus elsewhere reflects that the examination of regional fisheries agreements presents 
itself as an analytically fruitful exercise due to the large number and wide geographical 
distribution of these agreements. Certainly global and regional arrangements interact with 
each other, mostly in a coherent manner: regional systems aid the implementation of 
globally agreed rules while at the same time influencing the adoption of rules on the 
global level. Ultimately, the interaction between global, regional, and national levels 
should be studied,163 and this research contributes to the discussion by providing the first 
cut to examine the variation in regional fisheries agreements. 
Besides providing a sufficiently large dataset to allow me to estimate the effects 
of political differences among member states, other benefits of looking at regional 
agreements include the ability to sort out “problem features”—characteristics of problems 
that cooperation purports to solve—that may otherwise impair inference, if they are 
uncontrolled for. As Mitchell (2005) notes, regional fisheries agreements share the goal 
of addressing the issue of over-harvesting, a fact that allows an analyst to control issue 
characteristics that might otherwise weaken his/her research design. Controlling for the 
aims of agreements is important, since different goals tend to generate different motives 
among parties as they choose among various possible monitoring institutions.  
To control for the end-goals of treaties, I have ensured that every agreement in the 
sample addresses the issue of over-harvesting or common pool resource (CPR) problems, 
                                                 
161 See Kaye 2001 for recent work on the global fisheries regime. 
162 It would be ideal to have the dataset of local fisheries management regulatory measures, but this does 
not yet exist. Besides, my goal in this paper is to examine the domestic political roots of international 
regulatory measures.  
163 See the collection of papers from the Nested and Overlapping Institutions Conference at Princeton 
University, February 24, 2006, for recent theoretical efforts to explain different levels of cooperation. 
Available at http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/conference_nesting.htm (accessed on December 22, 
2006) 
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committing to the protection of certain stocks, for example.164 Some agreements 
specifically target the problem of sustainable management of fisheries while other 
agreements address this as a secondary goal, instead focusing on the problem of free 
passage, conferring rights to fish. If an agreement did not state these sorts of goals and 
interests in its Preamble or in the provisions that outline convention objectives (e.g. 
conservation of marine environment, optimum utilization of fishery resources), it was left 
out of the sample.  
 
Sample and Data Source 
 
To identify an adequate sample for testing the aforementioned hypotheses 
regarding the institutional design of monitoring systems, I first cast my net over the entire 
universe of multilateral fisheries agreements by consulting the International 
Environmental Agreement (IEA) database165 The IEA database contains 200 multilateral 
and 570 bilateral fisheries agreements. The agreements pertain to pacific salmon, 
northeast Atlantic fisheries, Baltic Sea fishing, international whaling, and a host of other 
issues.166 As explained before, I excluded global-scale agreements, such as the 
agreements related to the UN Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS).167 These 
global-scale agreements may influence arrangements on the regional level, which will be 
later briefly explored in the statistical analysis. I currently also exclude bilateral fisheries 
agreements, since the majority of these agreements deal with the issue of access rather 
than the issue of collective management and conservation.168 Many bilateral agreements 
                                                 
164 One caveat here is that I do not control for the characteristics of fish species, which could be potentially 
important. For example, tuna and swordfish are classified as “highly migratory stocks” while cod and 
pollack are classified as “straddling fish stocks”—fish that live between different EEZ jurisdictions. See 
Munro et al. 2004 for more information regarding the classifications. Their characteristics may well affect 
the monitoring mechanisms, although it is unlikely the characteristics would determine the centralization of 
monitoring institutions.  
165 Available at http://iea.uoregon.edu/  
166 The sample covers different species, including tunas, salmons, seals, and whales. 
167 Ron Mitchell organized the database such that the related agreements are linked by “lineage.” So, the 
Laws of the Sea lineage includes the original convention in 1982 as well as the 1995 Fish Stocks 
agreement. 
168 This claim is currently under investigation. Bilateral agreements involving shared seas (e.g. the Yellow 
Sea between China and Korea) concern conservation and management measures, while bilateral 
agreements involving distant fishing nations (e.g. African countries and the EU) express less concern for 
sustainable fishing.  
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pertain to conferring fishing rights to the other party, usually one country granting access 
and the other providing financial assistance in return. Since I am mainly interested in the 
initial design of agreements rather than subsequent institutional changes, I additionally 
exclude further amendments and protocols.169  
This elimination process leaves only about 100 multilateral agreements. 
Unfortunately, some legal texts are unavailable or in a language other than English, so the 
current sample contains a total of 90 agreements. Some explanatory variables are limited 
in time and scope (for example, catch data may be available for a 50-year period with 
respect to species and areas, but environmental governance indicators may be available 
only for 2005 and 2000), which finally leaves 73 agreements that can be usefully 
analyzed. The independent variables are collected by Earth trends,170 the Environment 
Sustainability Index (ESI),171 the Environment Vulnerability Index (EVI),172 and the FAO 
fishery country profile.173 
 
Dependent Variable:  Aggregate Measure of Monitoring Institutions 
 
The dependent variable is the aggregate measure of monitoring institutions. The 
variable takes the value of zero when an agreement employs none of the following three 
available monitoring institutions in fisheries agreements174: 1) Commission, 2) Scientific 
                                                 
169 This omission leaves further room for future research on the evolution and development of monitoring 
systems. The theory of institutional change has to be developed first, or one has to examine whether the 
theory of institutional design can be transplanted to explain institutional change. Empirical testing can be 
done using hierarchical linear models.  
170 Earthtrends is from the World Resources Institute and their research topics include 1) coastal and marine 
ecosystems, 2) water resources and freshwater ecosystems, 3) climate and atmosphere, 4) biodiversity and 
protected areas, 5) environmental governance and institutions. Available at http://earthtrends.wri.org/ 
171 The Center for Internaitonal Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN) with the World Economic 
Forum, provides a composite index tracking a diverse set of socioeconomic, environmental and institutional 
indicators that characterize and influence environmental sustainability at the national scale. Available at 
http://www.yale.edu/esi/  
172 Developed by the South Pacific Applied Geoscience Commission (SOPAC), the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP) and their partners, the index provides 50 ‘smart indicators’ to capture the 
key elements of environmental vulnerability. Available at http://www.vulnerabilityindex.net/  
173 FAO's Fisheries Department prepares and publishes Fishery Country Profiles (FCP) with economic and 
demographic data, including structure and characteristics of the fishing industry. Available at 
http://www.fao.org/fi/fcp/fcp.asp   
174 Wold et al. (2003) in their study on ten fisheries agreements identify six categories of monitoring, 
surveillance and monitoring systems: 1) vessel registration, 2) vessel monitoring systems (VMSs), 3) 
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Committee, 3) Observer or Inspection System. Among the available institutions, such as 
Secretariats or sub-committees, these three sub-bodies are directly related to monitoring 
activities. I exclude ex ante monitoring measures such as licensing and vessel registration 
because these measures do not directly monitor compliance behaviors but rather serve as 
measures to prevent illegal fishing in advance.  
 
Table 4.3 Summary Statistics of Dependent Variable:  
Three Levels of Monitoring Systems in Regional Fisheries Agreements 
 
Number of Monitoring Institutions 
(Commission, Scientific Committee, Observer and Inspection System) 
 
None (no monitoring institution specified) 15 
One (either Commission, SC, or OS) 36 
Two (e.g. Commission and Scientific Committee) 21 
Three (all three institutions)175 1 
Total 73 
 
The dependent variable is therefore an ordered variable that indicates greater and 
greater centralization as the number increases. The larger values indicate higher-order 
monitoring institutions with more independence and information collection capacity on 
the international level. A Commission typically has the mandate to make political 
decisions, is often empowered to collect scientific information, and is equipped by the 
member states with the power to establish a technical committee. Scientific bodies are 
organs that most often monitor compliance and compliance-related data in fisheries 
agreements. The respective fisheries institutions in each country’s domestic arena collect 
key information, but scientific bodies in regional fisheries bodies operate as repositories 
of information. A Scientific Committee normally reports to a Commission by providing 
recommendations.176 In rare cases, the inspection and observer schemes are introduced to 
monitor compliance in a more objective way by bringing neutral observers on board. In 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprehensive observer programs, 4) catch documentation schemes, 5) inspection, and 6) compliance 
mechanisms (e.g. trade prohibitions). See their report for the collection of respective legal provisions.  
175 This is the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (2000). In the subsequent analysis, I drop this observation to avoid bias 
due to limited variation. 
176 An interesting episode that captures the political nature of commission work under fisheries agreements: 
“scientific advice this year recommended closing the North Sea cod fishery, yet the Commission asked for 
a mere 25% cut at the annual December quota-setting-meeting. Ministers trimmed that to between 14% and 
20%” Bounds, Andrew. 2007. “EU Fisheries Commissioner: Dumping of dead fish is immoral, says Borg” 
Financial Times, Feb 20, 2007.  
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cases where no formal institutions exist, consultative mechanisms using national contact 
points within governments serve the purpose of information exchange. 
However, one should note that the distance between the four scores is not equal. 
Adopting observer or inspection schemes is usually a bigger step forward than 
establishing a commission and scientific committee together. This means that observer or 
inspection schemes are not usually politically appealing options due to the high level of 
delegation of authority to international organizations by member states, compared to the 
combined option of commission and scientific body.  
A caveat is in order with regard to using this kind of aggregate measure of 
institutions as a proxy for the strength of monitoring institutions. The key issue is 
whether the written legal provisions reflect actual practices. Once international 
agreements are signed, their implementation is at the mercy of corresponding national 
legislatures and political realities. The proposed measures may not reflect the extent to 
which scientific programs are actually conducted by such monitoring institutions. For 
these reasons, one cannot guarantee that practices on the ground perfectly coincide with 
what has been written. However, in this research, I am primarily interested in the ex ante 
design of monitoring institutions, so actual practices are less important than they might 
otherwise be for my analytical purposes. Additionally, a researcher may prefer objective 
measures to often-subjective assessments of reality. By adopting unobtrusive measure 
(i.e. just looking at legal provisions), an analyst can avoid the risk of employing 
subjective assessments and measures of actual practice.177 Based on these two reasons, I 
have based my research on the objective coding of information mechanisms written into 
legal provisions. 
 
Independent Variable I: Fisheries-Related Employment 
 
I have posited that the asymmetry in compliance environments has a negative 
impact on the development of fisheries management measures. National governments 
want to appeal to their domestic fishing constituencies while also considering broader 
                                                 
177 Another practical issue is that coding of written rules is clearly superior in terms of getting inter-coder 
reliability. 
 89 
environmental impacts. Amid this tradeoff between domestic political interests and 
international obligations, each government looks to the other governments. When the 
parties to an agreement exhibit many differences, national governments are less likely to 
choose the benefit of soundly managing the environment. The reason is that state parties 
with widely divergent compliance environments cannot jointly maximize their benefit 
from an agreement by assenting to an institution that determines members’ catch 
allocations based on scientific evidence. A state party with a small number of people 
employed in its fishing industry would welcome the prospect of the other state party 
restraining its fishing activity. On the other hand, a state party with a larger number of 
people employed in the fishing industry would suffer some temporary political loss, 
regardless of the benefits of having clear institutional bases for joint monitoring.  
A potential political pressure arising from the fishing industry—one of the factors 
shaping a nation’s domestic compliance environment—is proxied by the percentage of its 
total population employed in fishing.178 Data on the number of people employed in 
fishing and aquaculture is available from Earthtrends. To obtain a relative measure, the 
number was divided by total population to estimate the importance of the fishing industry 
in the economy of each member country in the signing year. Later, to obtain a measure of 
asymmetry among member countries, I calculated the standard deviation of the 
percentage of each country’s population employed in fishing. Standard deviation is a 
standard measure for dispersion, and in order to capture the idea of how diverse fishing 
populations are among member countries, I used standard deviation measures. The 
theoretical expectation is that the larger the difference in fishing employment among 
member countries (i.e. the larger the standard deviation), the less likely states are to adopt 




                                                 
178 A better alternative measure, I think, is fisheries GDP, an estimate of the contribution of fishing to the 
GDP and as a part of agricultural GDP. The measure includes the production of offshore fishing, 
incorporated fishing enterprises involved in processing and services, small-scale commercial fishing, and 
the contribution of subsistence fishing. This measure is in the process of being incorporated into the dataset 
by the author. Alternatively, the heterogeneity can be measured by the size of privately owned distant-water 
fleets since they are usually the ones who exercise their political voices to influence policy. 
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Independent Variable II: Productivity Overfishing (Degrees of Overfishing) 
 
Countries with overfishing problems at home tend to send their vessels outside 
their territorial waters, and consequently become distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). 
Their ecological vulnerability pushes those countries to go overseas. They are usually the 
ones with efficient fishing technology and low capture-per-unit-effort. Countries with a 
high level of productivity overfishing are likely to be distant water fishing nations. In 
terms of the Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) measure of overfishing with 
seven-point scale, for instance, Japan scores 7 along with China and South Korea. Most 
European countries, including Ireland and Italy, score 5 and above. Consequently, these 
countries are generally classified as DWFNs. As illustrated in the UN Fish Stocks 
negotiation case, DWFNs tend to discourage the development of stringent monitoring 
systems. We therefore expect less centralized monitoring institutions when an 
agreement’s membership includes more overfished nations.  
 
Independent Variable III: Polity Asymmetry 
 
Many studies find that democracies are more prone to international cooperation 
than non-democratic regimes.179 To control for general political differences, I include the 
differences in polity scores, conventional measures in political science that measures how 
democratic (or autocratic) a country, for each agreement. Again, differences are measured 
in terms of the standard deviation of each signatory in the signing year.  
 
Independent Variable IV: Scientific Knowledge Creation 
 
While the first two variables are based on theories of interests and strategic 
interactions, the next two independent variables serve as competing hypotheses that are 
identified in international cooperation literature, namely, the view that focuses on 
national capacity to comply (an approach called the “managerial thesis”) and the 
                                                 
179 See, for example, Mansfield et al. 2002 for the international trade context and Lai and Reiter 2000 for 
the alliance context. 
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perspective that scientific networks contribute most to international cooperation in 
environmental governance.  
The role of epistemic community in international environmental governance has 
been documented by many international relations scholars, most notably and 
comprehensively by Haas.180 An “epistemic community” is a network of knowledge-
based experts or groups with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
the domain of their expertise.181  
The variable “knowledge creation in environmental science, technology and 
policy” was constructed by the Environmental Sustainability index (ESI). The variable is 
an average rank between 1 and 78 of three individual regressions with small values 
corresponding to above average performance. The reference year I have used is 2003.182  
The methodology of the ESI was to study the publication of scientific knowledge in the 
top-rated peer-reviewed journals in the fields of environmental science, technology, and 
policy. Three regressions were carried out as follows and the residuals of each regression 
were ranked183 and aggregated to form an average rank score. 
 
1. Publications per author per million population ~ researchers per million population + R&D 
spending as % of GDP + publications per area and population  
2. Publications about foreign countries ~ log (GDP) + Publications per area 
3. Publications per area ~ publications per author + population 
 
I have to admit that this index is not a perfect measure of epistemic community. 
First, the measure does not entail the core concept of “connectivity” among scientific 
experts. Second, the measure may proxy for the government effectiveness and capacity of 
a nation and may be correlated with it.184 Despite these limitations, if the epistemic 
community serves a role in establishing international monitoring bodies, we would expect 
it to have a significantly positive impact. 
 
                                                 
180 Haas 1992 
181 Haas 1992, p.3 
182 This variable is only available for 1993, 1998 and 2003, and the rankings do not change much over time.  
183 Regression residuals are often used as performance measures. If a model predicts y_hat but actual 
outcome is y, the difference (y minus y_hat) serves as the measure for performance. See Wang and Jamison 
(1998) for their discussion of the methodology and actual practice of using residuals as performance 
measures. 
184 Indeed, in my dataset, there was a moderate level of correlation (.2) between knowledge and capacity 
variables with some significance (.06). 
 92 
Independent Variable V: Government Effectiveness 
 
Managerial views of international cooperation have emphasized the 
administrative and bureaucratic capacity of a nation. According to Chayes and Chayes 
(1995), national capabilities—or the lack thereof—may constitute critical obstacles to 
compliance. We should therefore see a significant “mirror image” effect when we 
consider the influence of national capabilities on domestic politics. Countries that rate 
higher in terms of government effectiveness will tend to favor better international 
coordination and the building of centralized monitoring institutions.185 
To see how national environments contribute to institutional coordination on the 
international level, and to examine how national measures translate into international 
politics, I also include the variable “government effectiveness,”186 constructed by the 
World Bank. 187 The Bank aggregates 25 resources of information on governmental 
effectiveness to produce comparable indicators including “quality of public service 
provision, the quality of bureaucracy, the competence of civil servants, the independence 
of the civil service from political pressures, and the credibility of the government’s 




For control variables189, two agreement features are included in the model: 1) the 
number of member countries and 2) the binary variable that specifies whether a specific 
agreement was concluded before or after the United Nations Convention on the Laws of 
                                                 
185 It could be that effective measures at home might cancel the need for any international measures. The 
aforementioned “managerial perspective” does not directly address institutional design issues, so I am 
drawing a hypothesis based on the implications of the managerial thesis.  
186 The data reference year is 2002; I checked later for endogeneity in order to examine whether global 
monitoring institutions in turn affected government effectiveness. It is unlikely but possible that global 
measures may enhance a national government’s effectiveness. 
187 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2005/pdf/ge.pdf  
188 ESI codebook 
189 Ideally, the kind of species (turtles, tunas, salmons, seals, whales, or dolphins) should be controlled, as 
different species could pose different problems for fisheries management depending on their mobility or 
attached commercial values. Seals can be found on the coastal line whereas straddling stocks create more 
complex situation, which could creat more contentious policy processes due to their distributive 
implications.   
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the Sea Agreement (UNCLOS) of 1982. The number of countries is included because of 
the concern that a smaller number of countries may be conducive to easier bargaining. To 
control for the size-effect in collective action, I include the number of state parties to each 
agreement in the sample. The UNCLOS variable is included to address the concern that 
the global regime that specified the EEZ regime may have impacted the kinds of 
arrangements considered on the regional level. As discussed before, this variable is 
helpful when examining the interaction between global and regional regimes, specifically 
when assessing whether a change in the global regime drove a change in the regional 
setting as well.   
Table 4.4  Summary of Variables 
 
Variable  Source Note (reference year, scale, etc.) 
Dependent variable 
 







4 point scale of centralization of monitoring 












ESI Average for 1993-1998;  7-point scale 
Polity Asymmetry Polity IV Standard deviation of policy scores among member 
countries in an agreement 
Average of Scientific 
Knowledge Creation 
ESI Ranked score of 1-74 the publication of scientific 
knowledge in the top-rated peer-reviewed journals in 
the fields of environmental science, technology, and 




ESI Standardized score (z-score) with high values 
corresponding to high levels of effectiveness; Average 
of government effectiveness scores of member 







Number of signatories to a given agreement 
United Nations 
Convention on the 
Laws of the Sea 
Agreement 
(UNCLOS) 
 Binary variable (0 for pre-UNCLOS, 1 for post-
UNCLOS) 
 
                                                 
190  I recoded such that pre-1975 measures use 1970 measure, 1975-85 use 1980 measure, 1985-95 use 
1990 measure. 
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Results of Empirical Analysis of Regional Fisheries Agreements 
 
To summarize, the sample considered here consists of seventy-three regional 
fisheries agreements, each with its own member characteristics or agreement features, as 
summarized in Table 4.4. The main unit of analysis is therefore a regional fisheries 
agreement. Based on the theoretical framework, member characteristics might include 
differences in the size of the fishing industry, political regime type, and environmental 
conditions contributing to overfishing. Additionally, I include two variables to estimate 
the effect of epistemic community and of national governmental capacity on the 
institutional arrangements on the international level.  
The dependent variable is an ordered – multiple and ranked discrete variable, so I 
use the estimation method of ordered probit. Table 4.5 provides the estimation results of 
two ordered probit models of institutional choice. The results suggest that greater 
asymmetry in fishing industries among member countries, higher polity scores, and 
higher levels of overfishing are all associated with decreased centralization of monitoring 
institutions.  
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Table 4.5  Ordered Probit Results on the Choice of Monitoring Institutions 
    in Regional Fisheries Agreements 
 
 Model 1 
Baseline Model 
Model 2 




% of population in fishing and 












Degree of overfishing  










Government effectiveness  






Knowledge creation  






UNCLOS  .423 
(.347) 
Number of member countries  .027 
(.025) 
   












* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
The results generally support the theoretical discussions, and at the same time, 
yield interesting observations about the determinants driving the institutional choice of 
international monitoring systems in regional fisheries agreements.  
The difference in domestic compliance environments, measured by the 
differences in fishing industries, decreases the probability that centralized monitoring 
systems will be adopted. Figure 4.1 shows the estimated effect of the asymmetry in 
fishing industries on the choice of international monitoring systems. As the asymmetry 
increases, the probability of a relatively centralized monitoring institution (Level 2, such 
as the combination of scientific body and commission) decreases. The effect is as large as 
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50%.191 This means that the asymmetry in compliance environments can reduce the 
probability of adopting a centralized monitoring institution by as much as half.  
 
Figure 4.1  Predicted Probability of the Choice of Monitoring Institution According to Change 



























0 1 2 3 4 5
Asymmetry in Fishing Industry
Pr(DV=2) 95% upper bound
95% lower bound
Effect of Fish Industry Asymmetry on the Choice of Monitoring Institutions
 
 
I return to the interpretation of other results presented in Table 4.5. The 
significantly negative sign for the degree of overfishing confirms our casual empirical 
observation that overfished nations are distant water fishing nations and therefore more 
likely to oppose stringent regulatory measures.  
It also appears that the knowledge variable reflecting the idea of epistemic 
community has a negative impact on the adoption of a centralized monitoring institution 
on the international level. This is a curious result because epistemic community literature 
would predict that domestic scientific communities have a positive impact on the 
development of international institutions. The empirical result may suggest an opposite 
causal mechanism: efficient domestic epistemic communities may serve as sufficient 
governance mechanisms, and may reduce the perceived benefit deriving from additional 
                                                 
191 The effect is estimated holding other variables at their means and changing the value of the variable of 
interest, in this case, the asymmetry level in fishing industry, which ranges from zero to five. 
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regulatory and monitoring mechanisms. Depending on whether we view epistemic 
communities as substitutes or complements to international regulatory measures, the 
negative and marginally significant impact of epistemic community discovered in this 
study might produce a novel interpretation of the relationship between domestic 
epistemic communities and international regulations.  
Finally, government effectiveness does not produce a statistically significant 
impact on the choice of monitoring systems on the international level. The UNCLOS 
variable was added to check whether global-level regulations changed the landscape for 
regional regulations, but the effect is statistically insignificant, although the positive sign 
means that the signing of the global convention may have had some positive impact on 
the development of the regional-level monitoring systems.  
 
Summary and Further Research Directions 
 
 
This chapter started with a puzzle: “Why do states not adopt information 
mechanisms on the international level in all agreements, if they are deemed beneficial?” I 
have presented a theory that highlights the distributional issues in establishing monitoring 
institutions in international fisheries management. I have argued that the sovereignty 
costs are not uniform across potential member countries. Differences in domestic 
compliance environments have negative effects on the establishment of monitoring 
bodies on the regional level, creating conflicts at the bargaining table. To examine this 
theoretical argument empirically, I have identified the relevant monitoring systems in 
fisheries management and tested the hypothesis against other prominent hypotheses, such 
as the epistemic community hypothesis and the so-called “managerial thesis.” The 
statistical analysis of seventy-three regional fisheries agreements largely supports the 
theoretical argument that differences in compliance environments tend to harm the 
development of a stringent international regulatory environment.  
However, the results presented in this report should not be taken as conclusive 
evidence, due to the study’s limited sample size. The full sample, including the 
development of each lineage (international whaling, pacific salmon, etc.), will bring the 
present results into even sharper focus. A natural future research direction therefore 
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would be to examine the development and implementation of particular institutional 
structures for monitoring fisheries agreements. Some agreements develop scientific or 
other monitoring programs fairly quickly after the initial agreements are signed, while in 
other cases there is a lengthy delay. For example, the International Whaling Commission 
(IWC) instituted a formal mechanism comprising a scientific committee in 1954, almost 
ten years after the original agreement. The Commission is still struggling to conclude the 
Revised Management Scheme, which could include more conservative measures relating 
to the determination of quotas.192 The International Commission for the Conservation of 
Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), on the other hand, developed their institutional structures for 
monitoring within a much shorter timeframe. Comparing the development of various 
agreements and attending institutions will provide a wealth of data that will, in turn, 
advance an examination of the political strategies and associated conditions that 
contribute to resolving political differences among member countries. In addition to 
tracing the development of various fisheries cases, the exact causal mechanisms that 
shape negotiations of regional fisheries agreements should also be carefully examined, 
not least to find out how states negotiate past their differences and how negotiators 
themselves perceive the political obstacles they face in establishing international 
regulatory measures. 
 
                                                 








Monitoring Institutions in Arms Control Agreements 
 
 
Monitoring mechanisms in international agreements are probably most studied in 
relation to arms control agreements, due to the experience of the Cold War. Although the 
workings of international supervisory mechanisms recently have been studied in other 
areas such as human rights, the arms control literature is by far the most extensive, with a 
large body of studies on issues such as international and domestic political 
environments.193 The literature also includes the studies on the role of technology194 in 
shaping the design of monitoring systems. The general conclusion from the literature has 
been that monitoring mechanisms should be commensurate with the associated security 
risks, and that technology has been a necessary but not a sufficient condition in predicting 
monitoring outcomes.195 
Building on the existing literature, this chapter tests the central theoretical 
implication regarding distributional conflicts in the context of arms control agreements 
governing weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—nuclear, chemical and biological 
weapons—as well as conventional weapons. More specifically, I will test the hypothesis 
that distributional concerns are the primary factor influencing the choice of monitoring 
institutions. The asymmetric security environments are likely to reduce the possibility of 
observing international monitoring measures and increase the adoption of domestic or 
equivalent measures. I define compliance environments in international security 
cooperation as the situations or circumstances that are related to compliance with 
international security agreements. Given the definition, I analyze how those security 
                                                 
193 On international political environments, see Schelling 1960, and Schelling and Halperin 1961; on 
domestic political environments, see Morrow 1991 and Knopf 1998. 
194 Krass 1986, Tsipis et al. 1986, CISAC 2005. 
195 Krass 1986, for instance, discusses the interaction between politics and technology; Gallagher 2001 
shows the independent roles of political factions. 
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environments affect the choice of monitoring systems. While testing the key hypothesis 
about the distributional conflicts surrounding the agreement-making, I will also 
qualitatively assess other secondary but related factors that may influence the choice of 
monitoring systems in arms control agreements, such as the role of side payments and the 
concern regarding different types of possible errors (false alarms and missed hits).  
The international regulation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons 
comprises the major part of security-related international agreements. Aside from 
peacekeeping arrangements and alliance agreements, arms control treaties make up most 
of the security agreements of the past fifty years, as listed in Table 5.1. Nuclear related 
agreements make up 47% of arms control agreements,196 with other agreements 
addressing the issues of chemical, biological and conventional weapons. 
 
Table 5.1 The Universe of International Security Agreements
197 
UNTS subject list Number of documents Notes 
Alliance  22 --  
Disarmament  564 -- 
Nuclear matters 275 Many overlap with “energy” and “environment” 
Peace 415 Many involve peacekeeping operations 
Terrorism 38 -- 
War 962 Many related to “war reparations” and “war victims” 
Weapons 582 Overlap with “military matters” and “disarmament” 
 
The examination of weapons of mass destruction treaties and their monitoring 
mechanisms is important in the current security environment, especially in terms of 
understanding the possibilities and limitations of international cooperation in preventing 
the use of WMD by terrorists. This chapter will attempt to evaluate the scope of 
international monitoring (as opposed to domestic monitoring) based on structural factors 
described in the theoretical framework. Through the prism of history of arms control, the 
                                                 
196 The United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS) agreement list only includes treaties registered with the UN, 
which as a result omits a large number of alliances listed in other places, such as ATOP (Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions, http://atop.rice.edu/home) whose dataset returns 220 post-WWII alliance 
agreements. The ATOP database includes non-binding agreements such as MOUs, Exchange of Letters, as 
well as binding agreements and other special types of agreements (both original and subsequent 
agreements). Although this calculation is based on the number of counts, the number reflects the attention 
given to the subject list since the majority of significant agreements subsequently include protocols and 
exchange of notes. [This last sentence is a bit unclear to me. Which “calculation” do you mean, and what 
do you mean by “the number of counts”? Can you rephrase these things?] 
197 This search was conducted on March 7, 2006 at http://untreaty.un.org/English/access.asp. I am assuming 
here that the number of agreements reflects the salience of the issue subject.  
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result of this study will shed light on the extent to which we can expect cooperation in 
building international monitoring systems in the near future.  
In the context of arms control, monitoring encompasses various activities ranging 
from military data collection to on-site inspections.198 Compliance-monitoring also 
includes control of the flow of information and the development of the relevant technical 
and political authorities. The determinants of the choice of monitoring systems have 
already received extensive attention in the literature, but to my knowledge, statistical 
evidence of the importance of distributional conflicts in shaping international agreements 
is presented here, in this dissertation, for the first time. 
Conventional wisdom has it that treaty verification procedures have to be 
commensurate with the magnitude of the threat posed by the weapon or weapon types in 
question. If this hypothesis is true, we might expect similar monitoring and inspection 
regimes for biological and chemical weapons, given that they share the characteristics of 
being dual-use materials and carrying the risk of potential use by non-state actors.199  
However, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) contains no information 
mechanism, while the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) contains an advanced 
verification mechanism, with significant authority delegated to the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Additionally, we should recognize that 
treaties related to nuclear weapons have undergone a series of changes since 1967 with 
regard to monitoring institutions. It is generally true that weapons involving huge risks—
such as nuclear weapons—generate considerable interest in and discussion about 
institutionalized international cooperation, yet such interest and discussion does not 
directly translate into concrete measures and agreements formally adopted by treaty 
members. In short, the magnitude of the risk of the weapon or weapons at issue is not 
enough to explain the choice of monitoring institutions in arms control agreements. 
                                                 
198 Many arms control scholars distinguish monitoring from verification (Krass 1993 and Meyer 1984): 
monitoring is confined to information gathering activity while verification involves subjective evaluation of 
the collected data. My definition of monitoring is broader than their definition and includes verification 
processes, as explained in the introductory chapter. The analytical benefit of this broad definition is to 
examine the choice in a broader context at the expense of closely looking at the verification itself. 
199 Or some could even argue that the biological weapons create greater risk as they could be manufactured 
in a small setting while chemical weapons usually require industrial scale production capability. See Tucker 
1998a for detailed differences between chemical and biological weapons. 
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This dissertation takes the view that the choice of monitoring institutions is a 
problem in a larger political and institutional context with interlocking problems of 
diagnosis and treatment for non-compliance. In terms of political context, I emphasize the 
political uncertainties states face in discussing arms control issues as well as the political 
situations where states do not react to non-compliance due to prohibitive cost of 
punishment. In terms of institutional context, I examine how monitoring arrangements 
are related to other legal provisions. The choice of monitoring institutions is a part of 
larger institutional building process and therefore invariably depends on the development 
of other institutional mechanisms or sub-institutions. I specifically point out that the 
flexibility allowed under international agreements causes some degree of uncertainty 
regarding violations and how these violations will be adjudged, punished, and/or 
remedied. Violations tend to produce some amount of legal and practical ambiguity and 
therefore create demand for expertise and/or for collectively made decisions under the 
auspices of international institutions. However, as is often the case in security 
agreements, member states typically may invoke military secrecy or national security 
reasons to obtain an exception or free pass. Such allowances for “strategic breakouts200” 
may hurt the institutional building process. The guarantee of flexibility may provide 
stability by making it easier to join, but the inclusion of flexibility may exclude or 
obstruct other institutional developments. 
As Fearon (1998) suggests, issues of verification are a proxy issue in the scene of 
tough negotiations between involved parties. Krass (1986), an arms control expert, also 
mentions that concerns about verification are often expressed as surrogates for more 
substantive objections to agreements. These scholarly observations tell us that monitoring 
institutions have been developed in a larger institutional context where many competing 
factors are brought to bear. Monitoring may not be a crucial issue for all agreements, but 
even in those agreements where monitoring is of secondary importance or a by-product 
of high politics, it is a revealing issue that brings into focus political relationships among 
negotiators in the context of other negotiating items. The analysis presented in the next 
                                                 
200 See the use of the term in Becker 1977. Originally, the term was defined as a form of military buildup 
"breaking away" from an informal strategic accommodation in the context of SALT negotiation. Similarly, 
I refer to the situations in which states have overriding incentives to violate the spirit of the treaty, if not the 
letter of it.  
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section makes this point clear: the political characteristics and security relations of 
member countries are reflected on the choice of monitoring institutions. The choice also 
depends on how other negotiating items – such as technological transfers and allowance 
of strategic breakouts. The possibility of technological transfers often facilitates the 
adoption of monitoring systems by alleviating distributional problem. The allowance of 
strategic breakouts on the other hand aggravates the distributional problem and therefore 
discourages the adoption of international monitoring systems. 
In the following paragraphs, I will explain in detail the model elements that are 
essential in the arms control context (information asymmetry, undeterrable violations, 
etc.) and show how these elements can be translated into the empirical analysis of 
distributional conflicts in the design of monitoring systems. 
 
Background: Monitoring Arms Control 
 
 The theoretical model in Chapter 2 has identified four main elements in 
monitoring compliance with arms control agreements, which I explain one by one in the 
context of arms control, but these elements often operate interactively in empirical 
examples, as discussed below. 
 





α (alpha)  Incentive to defect 
β (beta)  Risk due to other party’s violation 
ε(epsilon)  Possibility of strategic breakouts which may cause uncertainty 
q and r Monitoring errors (false alarms and missed hits) 
 
First Determinant: Incentive to Defect 
 
The first determinant of monitoring systems is the magnitude of incentive to 
defect. It is the job of any monitoring system to stave off incentives to defect. In this 
sense, the key to controlling incentives to defect is to set up a system that will deter future 
violations. This deterrent capability is difficult to acquire in many cases and therefore, in 
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some cases, states may be allowed some flexibility to defect occasionally in international 
agreements. Some state behaviors can thus be compliant but not fully cooperative.  
The upside of flexibility is that it increases resilience to changing political 
developments by allowing states to retain their policy autonomy. On the other hand, it 
can create uncertainty when occasional defections occur, creating demand for 
information about whether defections constitute violations against international 
obligations. The flexibility creates legal doubts as to whether some state behaviors are in 
accordance with international obligations and, at the same time, leaves practical 
ambiguity as to how states respond to each other. Intelligence gathered by member states 
through their own domestic institutions might in some cases satisfy this demand. 
However, the detection and assessment of defections often require some amount of 
expertise and experience in such matters, which national intelligence-gathering 
institutions may lack, and detection may depend on access to foreign sites, documents, 
and personnel. The latter issue weighs more in the adoption of international monitoring 
bodies since intelligence invariably involves judgment both on the national and 
international level. Furthermore, findings by independent international institutions 
typically have less bias as the inspection teams are carefully selected from the pool of 
diverse nationalities. The decisions usually carry a higher level of legitimacy, as the 
findings are approved by the relevant parties. For instance, the Board of Directors within 
the IAEA, composed of 35 Member States, as designated and elected by the General 
Conference, make resolutions based on the findings of the IAEA inspectorate, by a two-
thirds majority of the Members present and voting.201 All these factors contribute to the 
decision to constitute international bodies for monitoring to cater the needs to tame 
incentives to defect. 
The magnitude of incentive to defect is a powerful determinant of monitoring 
choice because one of the goals of monitoring is to reduce the level of defections. States 
may have strong incentives to institute monitoring systems when defection incentives are 
large. Incentive to defect however is not a sufficient condition to observe an international 
monitoring body because differences among member states could discourage such 
                                                 
201 IAEA, “Rules and Procedures of the Board of Governors” Accessed 10/13/07 at 
http://www.iaea.org/About/Policy/Board/bgrules1.html  
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institutional building process even with large defection incentives. Countries may opt for 
unilateral moves rather than following the advice of international monitoring bodies.  
 
Second Determinant: Risk 
 
The central concern of arms control is the risk of other parties clandestinely 
engaging in efforts to upgrade or increase their weaponry. The concept of risk and risk-
assessment is therefore at the heart of arms control debates, as Stephen Meyer puts it 
cogently: “Is the military and political threat posed by undetected cheating greater than 
the military and political threat posed by unconstrained military activity?”202 This risk is 
amplified when states try to act unilaterally, producing security dilemma situations.203 
Monitoring systems in part reduce these risks by accumulating positive evidence that 
compliance has occurred and ultimately by building confidence among actors. In addition 
to accurate positive signals of compliance, accurate signals of cheating also plays an 
important role in inducing countries to join international efforts to monitor potential 
cheaters.  
Risk is a part of the design of monitoring systems because how risk is distributed 
may affect the dynamics of negotiation. Countries with a high level of military risk 
stemming from violations will have different preferences for monitoring systems than 
countries with a lower level of risk. The former may prefer a system with a deterrent 
capability, while the latter may prefer a less sensitive system. In this way, preferences are 
linked to each country’s concerns regarding the types of error that different monitoring 
systems could entail.   
 
Third Determinant: Monitoring Errors & Types of Error 
 
Monitoring in the arms control context is a balancing act between reducing the 
incidence of false accusations and increasing detection rates. If a system is designed to 
deter violations, it risks being too sensitive and therefore is prone to produce false 
                                                 
202 Meyer 1984, p.126 
203 Jervis 1978 
 106 
accusations. By contrast, if the system is attuned to avoid false accusations, it may miss 
opportunities to detect violations. The theoretical chapter characterized an equilibrium 
where a monitoring agency focuses on its capacity to deter violations in normal 
circumstances.  The second priority was to correctly identify special circumstances to 
reduce the possibility of unnecessary punishments. This equilibrium feature is consistent 
with the concept of “adequate violation” propounded by the Nixon and Carter 
Administrations. The dominant thinking at that time was that, as long as significant 
military actions (that could alter the strategic balance) are detected, other violations might 
go unnoticed. 
Concerns regarding types of errors have been analyzed elsewhere,204 but how 
these errors influence the choice of monitoring institutions has not been fully examined. 
The error types are important not only for determining the technological capabilities of 
monitoring systems, but also for drawing out political implications and predicting what 
negotiating positions will be adopted in the expectation of future cooperation. 
Types of errors are different across issue areas and therefore have different 
implications for the choice of monitoring systems. Some nuclear safeguards agreements 
allow “managed access” and afford some room for manipulation to the inspectee, who 
may, for example, determine at what particular times inspection visits will take place. 
Such safeguard systems raise the risk of missing potential violations. Due to potential 
“hidden information,” the deterrent value of inspections under a “managed access” 
regime is not large. This design for monitoring systems is optimized to reduce false 
alarms. Although it may do its best to detect potential violations, the managed access can 
easily produce a cat-and-mouse game. The longer it takes to develop a certain weapon, 
the more such a system with managed access is likely to be established. When such 
weapons present difficulty of detection, parties weigh more on preventing frivolous 
accusations than on instituting perfect deterrence. However, if parties discover the 
footprint205 of a secret program of a country, this will prompt the parties to weigh in 
reducing the type of error that could reduce the possibility of non-compliance. 
                                                 
204 See Axelrod 1979, Meyer 1984, and Schelling 1985.  See Carpenter and Ting 2005 on the types of 
errors in the domestic regulatory setting. 
205 In this context, footprint is defined as the outline of area –usually spotted by satellites—where 
hazardous substances are suspected or known to exist 
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This act of balancing two types of errors is illustrated by the recent change in the 
safeguard systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN’s nuclear 
watchdog. The IAEA currently advocates the signing of Additional Protocols appended 
to comprehensive safeguards agreements,206 which allow access to non-declared as well 
as declared materials and facilitate short-notice inspections.207 The history of the IAEA 
illustrates the move from the system that correctly identifies violations in declared 
materials to the one that purports to cover undeclared materials and increase the chance 
of potential violations. 
The IAEA’s safeguards system precedes its cornerstone agreement, the Nuclear 
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). The IAEA, created in 1957, established its first 
safeguards system in 1961,208 which was revised subsequently in 1965 and 1968 with the 
NPT.209 The NPT established a comprehensive safeguards system wherein member 
countries are required to submit their nuclear facilities to the IAEA’s safeguards.210 The 
principal aim of the comprehensive safeguards system was to verify peaceful nuclear 
activities, and the system included such procedures as routine inspections of declared 
nuclear materials and nuclear related activities,211 and safeguards visits to check the 
nuclear cycle.212 Since 1968, the member states have concluded bilateral safeguards 
agreements with the IAEA. 
The Zangger Committee of 1971-74 (group of 15 states) established export 
guidelines, including a “trigger list” of nuclear materials that could be easily diverted to a 
nuclear program, but the effort did not involve any inspection system and was restricted 
                                                 
206 Fearon 2005, in his report to global task force, also proposes the signing of APs as one of the immediate 
measures for effective international monitoring and control of WMD. 
207 IAEA 2005 
208 Federation of American Scientists (FAS) http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/npt/chron.htm accessed 
February 8, 2006; referred as FAS Chronology below. 
209 Additional provisions to safeguard nuclear material in conversion and fabrication plants. FAS 
Chronology 
210 Both NWS and NNWS have signed the comprehensive agreement (for the status of the signature, see  
http://www.iaea.org/OurWork/SV/Safeguards/sg_protocol.html,), although the scope of inspections may 
differ. Nuclear weapons states voluntarily accepted some IAEA monitoring, either on certain civilian 
nuclear installations or on material or equipment imported from other NPT states (Spector 2002).  
211 Based on material accountancy 
212 For other activities under the comprehensive safeguards system, see IAEA Factsheet: IAEA Safeguards 
Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Additional Protocols, available at 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html   
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to reporting.213 Throughout the initial Review Conferences (2nd, 3rd, and 4th), member 
states expressed their satisfaction with the system, and the potential change in the 
inspection systems was not entirely separate from the distributional conflicts between 
nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).  
The major breakthrough came in 1997 when the IAEA Board of Governors 
approved the model of the Additional Protocol (AP) to be added to the existing 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements. The AP included such measures as 
- access to declared as well as non-declared materials 
- use of remotely operating surveillance systems  
- mechanisms to facilitate short-notice inspections 
 
Thus far, 128 countries have signed the AP, and the IAEA is in the process of 
concluding the AP with remaining NPT members to supplement its comprehensive 
safeguards system. The monitoring of published sites has not been truly comprehensive 
or ad hoc, as the cases of Iraq and North Korea showed, but this move will advance the 
IAEA safeguards system from a conservative system aimed at reducing false accusations 
to a system that is equipped with meaningful tools to detect violations.    
The development of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) shows that 
monitoring systems do not necessarily achieve their full deterrent capability right away at 
the initial design stage; a verification equilibrium may only be reached after a series of 
step-by-step changes. The scope of IAEA investigation under the comprehensive 
safeguard agreement has been restricted to declared facilities, which at best prevents the 
diversion of declared materials only. The previous safeguard system was limited to 
deterring clandestine violations and was not sufficient to verify whether the member 
country in question abides by the NPT obligations. The new safeguards of the Additional 
Protocol (AP) establish agreements to allow inspections of undeclared facilities as well, 
which may facilitate the detection of many common violations. Instead of aiming to 
develop a deterrent capability upfront, the NPT safeguards system was developed first to 
reduce false positives with only a limited capability to deter, and then gradually to 
incorporate more and more deterrent capability measures. To interpret this development 
according to the framework of Koremenos (2001)’s learning model, states dealt with the 
                                                 
213 Zangger committee memo (IAEA document INFCIRC/209, dated September 3, 1974): FAS 
Chronology. 
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uncertainty about inspecting declared materials and then renegotiated the agreement to 
include the inspection of undeclared materials.  
The IAEA’s budget allocation numbers show that the majority of the 
organization’s funding is targeted toward not missing any potential violations among 
declared materials. In the reported IAEA budget in Table 5.3, verification activities make 
up one third of the organization’s annual budget ($268 million in 2004), totaling 
approximately € 100m. Verification activities are undertaken to ensure that violations do 
not go unnoticed within the scope of declared materials. Other activities—nuclear safety 
and security, nuclear techniques for development and environmental protection—are to 
ensure peaceful use of nuclear technology with the primary aim of avoiding false alarms.  
 
 
Table 5.3 IAEA Budget
214 
 
Regular Budget 2006  Euro 
   Nuclear Power, Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Science 26, 679, 000 
   Nuclear Techniques for Development and Environmental Protection 30, 436, 000 
   Nuclear Safety and Security 22, 272, 000 
   Nuclear Verification 106, 336, 000 
   Information Support Services 15, 992, 000 
   Management of Technical Co-operation for Development 15, 396, 000 
   Policy and General Management 51, 259, 000 
   Subtotal  268, 370, 000 
  
       Special Appropriation for Security Enhancements 2, 430, 000 
  
       Subtotal Agency Programs 270, 800, 000 
             Reimbursable Work for Others 2, 819, 000 
TOTAL 273, 619, 000 
 
In the case of biological weapons, even though states watch out for telltale signs 
to detect biological proliferation (for instance, the burial of dead animals from tests, 
advanced air filtration equipment, and so on),215 surveillance measures can still fail to 
detect violations. Some apparent evidence of violations can be caused by natural forces, 
and this in turn can produce the risk of erroneously identifying non-violations as 
violations.  
                                                 
214 Source: http://www.iaea.org/About/budget.html, emphasis added by the author.  
215 See Smithson 1998 for further discussion of identifying signs of violation. 
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The difficulty of investigation is illustrated by the allegation of biological warfare 
in China and Korea, 1951-52 and the resulting work of the International Scientific 
Commission (ISC) for the Investigation of the Facts concerning Bacterial Warfare in 
Korea and China.216 North Korea and China alleged that the US had waged “germ 
warfare” and the multilateral investigation team of six nations, including Sweden, France, 
UK, Italy, Brazil and USSR, was gathered to investigate the field in 1952. In the absence 
of knowledge about prior ecological conditions, the ISC acknowledged its difficulties in 
distinguishing between natural causation and military effects. US General Ridgeway 
rejected the North Korean and Chinese allegations, citing the confusion of military 
effects with seasonal epidemics.217  
Interestingly, different international investigation teams reached different 
conclusions.218 The Association of Democratic Lawyers and the ISC reached similar 
conclusion whereas later organizations left the decision undecided.   
Table 5.4  
Investigation Teams and Related Judgments regarding the Allegations in Korea, 1951-2 
 
Investigation team Year Composition Conclusion  







Multilateral team of lawyers with 
nationalities of Austria, Italy, UK, 
France, China, Belgium, Brazil, and 
Poland  
“the deliberate dispersion 
of flies and other insects 
artificially infected with 
bacteria…has been 








Multilateral investigation team of 
scientists from six nations, including 
Sweden, France, UK, Italy, Brazil and 
USSR 
“The peoples of Korea 
and China have indeed 
been the objective of 
bacteriological weapons… 
employed by units of the 
USA armed forces…”219 
British National 
Committee of 
Science for Peace 
1953  “complete scientific proof 
of the charges had not 
been given”220  
Report of the UN 
Secretary General 
on CBW 
1969 The report signed by representatives of 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, 
France, Hungary, India, Japan, Mexico, 
the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, the 
UK, the USA and the USSR 
“BW agents have never 
been used as weapons of 
war” 
 
                                                 
216 SIPRI 1971, Vol 5. pp.238-58. 
217 SIPRI 1971, Vol 5. p.253 
218 Kelley in her study of election monitoring also demonstrates that the reports of various international 
monitoring bodies are not necessarily consistent. 
219 SIPRI 1971, p.240 
220 SIPRI 1971, p.258 
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The method of investigation was confined to the examination of the reports 
supported by competent authorities, except the Association of Democratic Lawyers that 
conducted field interviews. China, non-UN member at that time, denied the access of the 
ICRC and WHO, citing their political bias. This case illustrates the challenge of 
harnessing divergent opinions in designing a monitoring system to deal with such often-
intractable uncertainty. Some countries argue that cases like the aforementioned one are 
simply unverifiable, while others argue for trying rudimentary verification measures at 
least. 
Signed in 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) has come a long way 
before a consensus was reached to establish a verification system.221 The original text of 
the BWC lacked formal mechanisms to monitor compliance. Over the course of two 
decades starting in 1980, five BWC Review Conferences were held mainly to discuss 
monitoring measures. A group of verification experts (VEREX) first established technical 
guidelines for the assessment of BWC verification measures, discussing such issues as 
surveillance by satellite and multilateral information sharing,222 and then, between 1986 
and 1991, the State Parties agreed upon confidence-building measures involving 
information and data exchanges.223 In 1994, the parties established an Ad Hoc Group 
(AHG) to deliberate on appropriate monitoring measures. However, the effort came to a 
halt in 2001 when the United States rejected the text proposed by the AHG. The US 
government position is that the BWC is essentially unverifiable and that, without special 
provisions, the treaty might have detrimental effects on US industry and bio-defense 
efforts.224 In this case, the expected failure of detection prevented an international treaty 
effort from reaching the stage of verification equilibrium.  
The country positions about error types for the monitoring system reflect 
distributional conflicts. The difference in opinions during the negotiation of the BWC 
Review Conferences played an important role in the discussion of what type of 
                                                 
221 As of June 2005, 155 states are parties to the Convention. For the list of state parties, see 
BWC/MSP/2005/MX/INF.5 
222 BWC/CONF.III/VEREX/4; see ACDA website for background 
http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/factshee/wmd/bw/bwcover.htm  
223 United Nations Disarmament Yearbook 2003, Chapter II 
224 See for instance the speech of John Bolton, then Under Secretary for Arms Control and International 
Security, at Tokyo America Center, titled “The U.S. Position on the Biological Weapons Convention: 
Combating the BW Threat” accessed at http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/13090.htm  
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monitoring system state parties should adopt. As Tucker observed during the Ad Hoc 
Group discussion, members’ uneven concern about the two kinds of possible monitoring 
error heavily influenced member states’ views regarding the value of challenge 
inspections: 
 
Those countries most concerned about pursuing violations (e.g. a majority of the Western 
states) favor a “red-light” approval mechanism, in which a majority or supermajority of 
the Executive Council (the governing body of the future BWC implementing 
organization) must vote to block a challenge inspection. Conversely, countries most 
concerned about preventing frivolous or abusive inspections (e.g. US, Russia, China, 
Iran, India, and Pakistan) favor a “green-light” mechanism, in which a majority or 
supermajority of the council must vote to authorize a challenge inspection.225 
 
The details of desirable monitoring mechanisms were discussed in connection with 
different voting procedure for initiation of investigations, which reveals the different 
opinions of states depending upon their compliance environments. The supporters for 
“green-light approach” wanted to provide a check on frequent deterrents by way of 
giving the Council sufficient authority to authorize challenge inspections. On the other 
hand, the supporters of “red-light approach” with concerns for non-compliance wanted to 
reduce the role of the Council and consequently a strong Protocol. Coupled with the 
unverifiability argument put forward by the US, the differences in opinions are unlikely 
to be resolved soon.  
 Both biological and nuclear weapons treaty regimes show that the balance 
between two kinds of errors and different standards of accuracy has been a central issue 
of contention. Some parties prefer a system with adequate detection capability, while 
others try to delegate investigative power as little as possible. Conflicts over what 
constitutes an adequate monitoring system, together with arguments about unverifiability, 
ultimately brought down the treaty, in the case of the biological weapons convention. In 
other cases, as the NPT case shows, institutions slowly developed into systems that can 
sound alarms when necessary.  
 
Fourth Determinant: Uncertainty and Undeterrable Violations 
 
                                                 
225 Tucker 1998b, parentheses added by this author for readers’ reference. The information on country 
positions come from Littlewood 2005, p.126-8. 
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This subsection discusses various kinds of uncertainty in the arena of arms control 
and explains how uncertainty about certain violations generates a demand for information 
and why the demand may be undercut by a situation where parties allow themselves the 
leeway to commit occasional violations. I intend to show that one of the main 
determinants of the choice of monitoring arrangements is the scope and strictness of the 
treaty at hand (what is allowable and what is not) and the attending distributional 
conflicts. 
Uncertainties in the arms control context are of many kinds. Uncertainty about 
capabilities, uncertainty about intentions, and uncertainty about behaviors are all part of 
the calculations that go into strategic cooperation.226 Uncertainty about intentions is the 
most difficult to gauge as it involves interpreting the actions and mindsets of foreign 
policy decision-makers. When violations are detected, the leadership has to decide 
whether the violation was flagrant and deliberate or was due to extenuating 
circumstances. Judgments regarding the sources and consequence of violations produce 
decisions about how to respond to such violations. If the violation is not going to have 
much effect on the future compliance behavior of the other party, or if punishments are 
prohibitively costly, leaders may opt not to pursue punishment. In fact, these conditions 
are often written into international agreements, much as they are in many insurance 
policies, to protect states in cases where they can point to extraordinary or extenuating 
circumstances. These provisions are called “flexible provisions.” Although tacit 
bargaining is usually recognized as a robust response to arms control situations,227 there 
exist some situations where states do not and cannot use the treaty in question to obtain 
redress for a particular violation. 
The inclusion of flexibility provisions may produce ambiguous situations and may 
give other parties an incentive to claim such cases even when they can and should simply 
comply with the agreement. Adversaries may pretend that an undeterrable violation 
happened when in fact the violation was deterrable. This excuse may be put forward 
                                                 
226 For more discussion on the kinds of uncertainty for other areas in international cooperation, see 
Koremenos et al. 2001  
227 Downs and Rocke 1990. 
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when a state believes that there is a chance it will go unpunished.228 Consider, for 
example, the following incident where Egypt made such excuses: 
 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports that it has found evidence of 
past clandestine nuclear activities in Egypt. According to the statement from an IAEA 
diplomat, Egypt allegedly attempted to produce a number of uranium components and 
failed to declare its activities to the UN agency, as required by the nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty. Egyptian officials emphasize that these activities were solely for 
peaceful purposes and refute any military applications.229 
 
Similar excuses may be found in North Korea’s withdrawal statement230 on January 10, 
2003 and Iran’s repeated official claims.231 
The possibility of such strategic breakouts, and their potential impact on the 
design of monitoring systems, is therefore an important element to consider. Monitoring 
systems are built to reduce uncertainty, and uncertainty about the sources of non-
compliance often leaves adversaries puzzled and undecided about future actions. 
Informational demands may stop when uncertainty starts to disappear and when one state 
has to allow more strategic breakouts to the other state. This problem is most acute when 
the strategic environments of two or more member states are asymmetric or very 
different. This in turn suggests that asymmetric compliance environments among member 
states are likely to make states more likely to opt for a more decentralized system, where 
international regulatory mechanisms are deemed unnecessary or undesirable. As the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) case shows, when the plan to strengthen the 
treaty does not work due to the differences in compliance environments, states are more 
likely to choose national implementation as a default option. 
Industrial concerns may also inhibit cooperation by giving states opportunities to 
make excuses for their national political circumstances. The thorniest issue in the 
                                                 
228 It is interesting to compare the following cases (North Korea, Iran and Egypt) to the case of South 
Africa. South Africa was cautious of international pressures, so it decided to neither acknowledge nor deny 
its nuclear capabitliy. Only after South Africa joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991, its 
President F.W.de Klerk announced that South Africa had a nuclear weapons program (Masiza 1993). 
229 NTI, WMD 411 Chronology, 2005. http://www.nti.org/f_wmd411/2005.html, emphasis added by the 
author. 
230 "a dangerous situation where our nation's sovereignty and our state's security are being seriously 
violated is prevailing on the Korean Peninsula due to the US vicious hostile policy towards the DPRK." 
http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nptstate.htm  
231 Iran’s official claim is that it plans to produce 7,000 megawatts (MW) of nuclear energy by 2020 in 
order to meet future energy demands, which requires the presence of all elements of the nuclear fuel cycle 
(Bowen 2005).  
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negotiation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was concern for proprietary 
information on the part of the pharmaceutical industry and biotechnology firms. 
Information related to biotechnology has been jealously guarded by the pharmaceutical 
industry and biotechnology firms, and since these companies constitute one of the most 
rapidly growing and most profitable sectors of the economy, they exercise increasing 
political power. In response to industry pressures, the current Bush administration did not 
approve any expansion of the BWC monitoring regime.232 The Clinton administration 
had reviewed the policy proposals favorably but failed to establish any effective 
monitoring mechanism. 
The possibility of strategic breakouts is further complicated by the problem of 
dual use for most of controlled weaponry. Since WMDs are both offensive and defensive, 
and since relevant technologies are used both in industry and in the military, they leave 
considerable room for the claim of undeterrable violations. The NPT allows peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy, but a nation can exploit this provision as a loophole and enrich 
uranium to the point where it becomes weapons-grade uranium, as in the case of Iran or 
North Korea.  
The phrase “Atoms for Peace”233 clearly captures, in a nutshell, the uncertainty 
surrounding many compliance problems in the nuclear nonproliferation regime and 
highlights the technical dimension of undeterrable violations. The dual use of nuclear 
technology – for energy (the primary peaceful use of nuclear technology) and for 
weapons – generates an informational problem with regard to undeterrable violations: if a 
state restricts the IAEA’s access and shows a tendency to develop more nuclear sites, 
does this signal an outright violation or might this be evidence of innocent efforts expand 
its nuclear energy program? The nuclear cycle of enriching uranium to a fuel- or 
weapons-grade makes it difficult to draw a sharp borderline between peaceful and 
dangerous uses.234  
                                                 
232 See Winzoski 2006 for her narrative tracking down the influence of the biotech and pharmaceutical 
industries on the development of the BWC regime. 
233 First devised by Dwight Eisenhower’s landmark speech to the UN General Assembly on 8 December 
1953; also see Carter 2004.  
234 Despite nuclear detection technologies, this line between peaceful use and weapons development is not 
easy to see for outside monitors. See for reference, Sanger and Broad 2006; Quester 1973. 
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Similar problem of dual use has been apparent in the case of nuclear testing. The 
Treaty on underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes (PNE Treaty) allows 
nuclear tests for civilian purposes, such as the creation of canals, but under the treaty’s 
provisions, similar tests actually conducted for military purposes can be declared to have 
a peaceful use, too. Between 1965 and 1988, the Soviet Union conducted 239 nuclear 
tests under a program called “Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy,” and many 
of these tests were suspected of military use.235  
In addition to dual use problems, evasion techniques also add to uncertainties and 
ambiguities, subjecting arms control agreements to almost endless problems and 
challenges. States can specify monitoring methods but there exists a possibility that the 
other party can develop evasion techniques to avoid other parties’ monitoring. To cope 
with this kind of problem, states allow national technical means and explicitly write down 
non-interference of such measures. Due to this possibility of informational asymmetry, 
evasion techniques are taken into consideration in the design of monitoring institutions, 
as the intense discussion in the Carter Administration revealed during the negotiations for 
a Comprehensive Teat Ban Treaty (CTBT) as to whether other countries could use 
evasion techniques to obstruct the verification process of underground tests.236  
The concept of dual technology also opens up the possibility of non-state actors 
acquiring WMDs or their components without any straightforward way of ascertaining 
state responsibility. States, especially failed states, do not always have control over their 
population. The involvement of sub-state actors therefore opens the door to possibilities 
of undeterrable defections—compliance problems that cannot easily be arbitrated and 
punished to prevent future defections. Undeterrable violations that come from sub-state 
actors are usually not easily verifiable, and this unverifiability can be an obstacle to the 
establishment of monitoring systems, as the case of the Biological Weapons Convention 
aptly illustrates.  
Informational asymmetry, for its part, is most worrisome to countries dealing with 
clandestine parties. In cases of closed societies, undeterrable violations are often 
                                                 
235 US State Department 1986. The report, taking into uncertainty, concludes that “A factor of two 
uncertainty means, for example, that a Soviet test for which we derive a ‘central yield (yield corresponding 
to the level of nuclear test)’ value of 150 kt may have, with a 95% probability, a yield as high as 300 kt or 
as low as 75 kt.” 
236 Krass 1986, p.133. 
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extremely difficult to judge,237 and democracies are more likely to be informationally 
poor about what happens in closed societies. Throughout the Cold War, US government 
sources—including annual reports from the Defense Department, posture statements of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Congressional hearings, etc.238—have been open to the public, 
but the Soviet system was not open, which compounded the problem of judgment. This 
information asymmetry between the US and the Soviet Union was a central reason 
behind the US’s determination to establish a verifiable monitoring process in many arms 
control negotiations.  
Together with informational asymmetry in intelligence capabilities and the 
possibility of dual uses, the informational asymmetry that often exists between countries 
is easily translated into distributional conflicts. Some type of international body with 
expertise and with the ability to gather and publish new facts, and then arbitrate 
violations and disputes, can often help the situation, but such an organization cannot be 
the remedy if the asymmetry between countries is large and commitment problems 
overwhelms potential informational benefit. States weigh the available monitoring 
options,239 but when externalities are large, they themselves have to regulate the weapons 
and weapon-making materials collectively. Uncertainties posed by dual-use materials that 
can be used both for peaceful and military purposes can create distributional 
consequences. Countries that have a lot of proprietary information of commercial value, 
and therefore have concerns about intellectual property theft, are likely to object to 
international measures unless they are guaranteed some other mechanisms to protect the 
sensitive information. Monitoring institutions are in this way designed to be mindful of 
these uncertainties and responses to undeterrable violations. 
 
Theory of Distributional Conflicts in the Context of Arms Control Agreements 
 
Among the four determinants of the monitoring design introduced in this chapter, 
I mainly focus on potential distributional conflicts stemming from uncertainty about 
compliance environments. This has an important implication for the design of monitoring 
                                                 
237 This fact is supported by the finding of Rosendorff and Vreeland 2006 who show that democracies tend 
to be more open. 
238 Krass 1986, p.128. 
239 Dai 2002. 
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systems in international agreements. Different security environments may generate 
informational demands, but these demands may in turn also be undercut by the 
asymmetry among member states.  
The theoretical model introduced in Chapter 2 demonstrated the existence of 
distributional conflicts in the choice of monitoring systems, while demonstrating the 
importance of the traditional roles of verification, that is, confidence-building and 
assurance functions. A country with poor domestic political conditions that are not 
favorable to compliance with international obligations is generally discouraged from 
adopting a monitoring system, though it might be persuaded to support such a system if 
the scope of the treaty in question is restricted to some extent, affording it some guarantee 
of sovereign escapes. However, these adjustments will in turn reduce the incentive for 
other parties to support a delegated monitoring system. The flexibility afforded to country 
A, if excessive, erodes the support of other parties for the development of monitoring 
systems.  
A casual look at the history of arms control treaties illustrates the impact of 
distributional conflicts on monitoring systems each treaty embodies. Treaties with few 
distributional consequences, such as the Antarctic Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the 
Sea Bed Treaty, include provisions for unlimited on-site inspection by any party. Those 
treaties carry limited political significance and present few distributional consequences. 
On the other hand, many nuclear weapons related agreements, such as the Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (LTBT) and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), witnessed 
protracted negotiations with much acrimonious debate about monitoring systems.  
The focus on distributional consequences in the arms control context has been 
empirically suggested and tested elsewhere, although the statistical analysis of 
monitoring in arms control agreements is new in this dissertation. Knopf (1998) shows 
how nuclear parity leads to the acceptance of arms control agreements between the 
United States and the Soviet Union. In his time series analysis, Brown (2006) 
demonstrates that the heterogeneity of preferences preceded retractions of the delegation 
of monitoring authority to international organizations in the agreements governing 
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WMD.240 In a somewhat different arena of international security, namely peacekeeping 
observation missions, Fortna (2004) also finds similar effects of the heterogeneity of 
warring parties on the acceptance of international observation missions. Specifically, her 
analysis of 45 peacekeeping deployment cases shows that peacekeepers are more likely to 
be allowed when the capabilities of warring parties are roughly equal. All three literatures 
present a similar finding, that is, heterogeneity among participants reduces the acceptance 
of international third parties.   
Unlike previous studies, this dissertation has theorized a potential mechanism 
whereby distributional conflicts are created by the scope of a specific agreement. 
Empirically, the terms of agreements depend on the composition of compliance 
environments of member countries. States encounter unforeseen events of profitable yet 
legitimate treaty violations in the course of future cooperation. These events suggest that 
what is left out of a treaty can sometimes be more important than what has been included. 
For example, the US maintained its strategic superiority by reserving the right to multiple 
independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV) in the negotiations for the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). As these cases suggest, countries often set aside difficult 
issues or register reservations and understandings that stipulate when a signed treaty will 
apply or not apply. In many cases, the contract cannot be complete and may miss some 
contingencies. The existence of such flexible provisions can restrict the scope of 
cooperation and limit the development of a monitoring system when the asymmetry 
among member states is large. 
The reason why unfavorable compliance environments become an obstacle to the 
choice of monitoring institutions stems from the combination of information and 
commitment problems that hamper international cooperation. Informational problems, or 
the uncertainty about the political contexts of violations, are at the heart of the design of 
                                                 
240 Note the difference in dependent variable. Knopf focuses on the conclusion of arms control agreements 
while Brown focuses on the issue of delegation. Although my dependent variable is close to Brown’s, the 
independent variable is different from his. Brown draws his independent variable from voting patterns in 
the resolutions related to WMD, essentially estimating the positions of each country. In contrast, my 
independent variable asks where the preference comes from. The model shows that the sources of 
preferences reside in domestic and international political conditions, and therefore, I use proxies rather than 
using direct preferences. This way, the theoretical mechanism can be more closely tested. Also, I can avoid 
the problem of endogeneity where the preference for delegation is estimated from the preference for 
broader institutional arrangements.  
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monitoring institutions. Compliance environments, whether they are favorable or 
unfavorable, create uncertainty about the proper response of other member countries 
when country A commits a violation. If country A’s compliance environment is 
unfavorable, other countries may leave room for immunity, and when a violation is not 
deterrable, other countries are in any case better off not punishing that violation.  
Facing this kind of uncertainty, as neoliberal institutionalism predicts, a third 
party monitoring arrangement brings with it potential benefits for all parties up to a 
certain point. However, in order to solve the informational problem and benefit all 
parties, certain conditions must exist and those requirements may be restrictive in many 
cases. First, the technological requirements of predicting violations correctly need to be 
satisfied.241 Second, compliance environments must not be disparate among potential 
member countries. The value of a third-party monitoring body declines as the differences 
among member states loom large. This is due to the problem of low commitment 
stemming from unfavorable compliance environments for a certain number of state 
parties. Unfavorable compliance environments often generate practically and legally 
excusable violations, and extremely different environments that affect cooperation 
behaviors therefore render monitoring useless. In short, a low level of commitment 
discourages the development of monitoring institutions. The inclusion of flexibility 
provisions is therefore worrisome, as it may discourage other institutional developments, 
such as tools for compliance monitoring.  
In what follows, I briefly discuss the role of side payments as potential solution to 
the problem in the following section and then examine the statistical evidence of 
distributional conflicts in the design of monitoring institutions in arms control 
agreements. 
 
Role of Side Payments 
 
The offer of side payments is one way to solve distributional problems. Side 
payments in the arms control context consist of technical assistance/transfers or the 
                                                 
241 The range of parameter values of q and r (monitoring accuracy) is not wide. q should be high—about 
.8—and r should be higher than .6 to support verification equilibrium. 
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provision of security guarantees, such as a nuclear umbrella. Along with other political 
considerations, side payments also play a role as a determinant of monitoring institutions, 
although side payments are not used exclusively for establishing monitoring institutions.  
Take the example of the establishment of the Organization for the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW). The agreement to control chemical weapons provided 
carrots to the membership by promising technological assistance and lifting previous 
restrictions on export controls. The club of thirty-four developed countries called the 
Australia Group (AG) had  restricted the trade in chemical precursors before the 
negotiation, which made the developing nations reluctant to accept a verification regime 
for fear that it would further restrict their development of chemicals for civilian use.242 
Allaying the fear of developing countries, the deal was struck to do away with previous 
restrictions on export controls and allow limited technological transfers for peaceful 
purposes among state parties according to the list of schedules.243 
In contrast, the discussion of similar arrangements for side payments can also be 
found in the negotiations of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) but with no 
success. Developing countries wanted to tie compliance mechanisms to technical 
assistance, trying to derive some form of economic benefit from security issues. 
However, states facing threats from biological weapons including the United States did 
not want to establish a strong connection between technical assistance and compliance 
measures.244 Rather, those countries preferred mild measures to assist implementation of 
the Convention in lieu of technological transfers. They wanted to retain propriety 
information of the fast-developing biological research and did not want to open up the 
possibility that other countries (dangerous countries in particular) use the critical 
information for any development of biological weapons. As a result, other issues as well 
as this issue of side payments have been an obstacle to the implementation of the BWC, 
leaving it as a toothless convention thus far.  
In the area of nuclear nonproliferation, there is also evidence of linkage between 
monitoring systems and side payments in the form of technological assistance and the 
                                                 
242 See Shah 2001 for the positions of developing and developed nations during the CWC negotiation. The 
author led the Indian Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament.  
243 See Feakes 2001 on the implementation of CWC export controls. 
244 Tucker 1998a. 
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provision of nuclear umbrella. During the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) 
negotiations (1965-68),245 the discussion about safeguards systems was inseparable from 
technology transfer in the field of nuclear energy. Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) 
expressed their concerns about a potential technological disadvantage in developing their 
energy needs, and Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) for their part focused on the need to 
ensure non-diversion of nuclear energy into nuclear weapons. Although both NNWS and 
NWS acknowledged the value of safeguards systems, the two camps differed on the 
language of the related provision, Article III. 
The draft proposal of the United States explicitly linked technological assistance 
in the area of nuclear energy to safeguards systems, suggesting a compromise point 
between NWS and NNWS positions.246  
 
1. Each of the non-nuclear states party to this treaty undertakes to accept International 
Atomic Energy Agency or similar safeguards on all of their nuclear activities. 
2. Each of the states party to this treaty undertakes to provide a source of fissionable 
material, or specialized equipment or non-nuclear material for the processing or use 
of source or fissionable material or for the production of fissionable material, to 
other states for peaceful purposes only if such material and equipment will be subject 
to International Atomic Energy Agency or similar international safeguards.247 
   
Under this agenda, NNWS were required to subject themselves to a safeguards 
system while NWS were under a partial safeguards system, with the condition of 
technological transfer. In this way, the series of technical assistance and safeguards 
agreements came together. Among the safeguards agreements registered with the IAEA, 
many follow the pattern of starting from a program of technical assistance and building 
toward a safeguards agreement. For example, Technical Assistance to Hungary was 
concluded between Hungary and the IAEA in July 1971 and was then followed by the 
Application of safeguards in connection with the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                                                 
245 For the recent distributional conflicts between NNWS and NWS, see Applegarth and Tyson 2005. 
246 Reagan’s Non-proliferation Policy of 1981 explicitly laid out the U.S. policy to “seek agreement on 
requiring IAEA safeguards on all nuclear activities in a NWS as a condition for any significant new nuclear 
supply commitment.” This position was reaffirmed in 1983 when Reagan urged other countries to tie 
comprehensive safeguards to the supply nuclear energy or technical assistance. As a pioneer of this linkage 
deal between safeguards and peaceful nuclear use, the US has maintained the same policy since then. 
247 Floor Statement for Senator John O. Pastore on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 9 March 1967. 
re-quoted from Kramish (1967, 3) 
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Weapons in March 1972.248 In conclusion, the examination of biological, chemical and 
nuclear weapons show that the side payments influenced the development of monitoring 
systems.   
 
                                                 
248 Agreements Registered with the International Atomic Energy Agency, Eleventh Edition (entries up to 
1993), International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna 1994. 
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Empirical Analysis of Arms Control Agreements 
 
Having discussed the determinants of monitoring institutions, I now test my 
theoretical predictions about the extent to which different compliance environments 
affect states’ monitoring choices by statistically analyzing post-WWII arms control 
agreements. The theory of distributional conflicts says that there is a demand for 
information provision, but such demand is conditioned by the level of commitment, 
which is in turn dependent upon the compliance environments states are in. The 
appropriate empirical strategy, then, is to find the sources of distributional conflicts in the 
arms control context and to connect them to the choice of monitoring systems. I first 
identify the categories of monitoring systems in arms control agreements and then discuss 
the measurement of a key explanatory variable that captures the distributional conflicts 
among member states, in addition to other control variables that may simultaneously 
affect the choice of monitoring systems.  
 
Measurement of Dependent and Independent Variables 
 
Dependent Variable: Monitoring Systems in Arms Control Agreements 
 
I identify six categories of monitoring systems for arms control agreements: no 
system, notification and exchange of information, consultation, national technical means 
(NTM), on-site inspection, and establishment of international organizations.249 The 
dependent variable is a 6-point scale. If an agreement has none of the systems, it is coded 
as zero; if it involves one of the systems, then it is coded as 1; and so on. The coding 
procedure was such that several coders had sessions to match their codes250 and then the 
final code was double-checked with existing categorizations in Krass (1998)251 and 
UNDIR & VERTIC (2003).252 
                                                 
249 See Crawford et al. 1987 for more detailed classification of monitoring institutions in arms control 
context.  
250 Unfortunately, inter-coder reliability score could not be calculated as the coding scheme went through 
several changes during the research design. 
251 Krass 1986 provides the overview of major arms control monitoring systems up to 1982. 




Table 5.5 Codes for Dependent Variable 
 
Scale Meaning  Frequency 
0 No monitoring system 8 
1 One system among notification and exchange of 
information, consultation, NTM, on-site inspection, or 
establishment of international organizations 
12 
2 Two systems among five monitoring systems 10 
3 Three systems among five monitoring systems 10 
4 Four systems among five monitoring systems 7 
5 Five systems among five monitoring systems253 1 
 Total 48 
 
In this conception of delegation, the delegation level is additive. If an agreement 
employs two systems jointly, it is considered to involve more delegation than an 
agreement using just one system. The measurement approximately gets to the notion of 
the level of delegation because it measures how many various informational functions 
states are willing to write into international agreements. This aggregate measure of 
various monitoring systems is presumably the best measurement strategy given the small 
sample size. Retaining each category and running the multinomial analysis is not a viable 
option due to the small sample size.254 The construction of an ordinal variable is another 
feasible option, but the dependent variable cannot be exactly ordered in a substantively 
meaningful way. For instance, a system of notification and exchange of information does 
not necessarily involve a higher level of delegation than a system relying on national 
technical means. 
As the goal of empirical analysis is to uncover the existence of distributional 
conflicts, the current aggregation measure serves the analytical purpose well. However, 
this measure is not without fault for it does not reflect the true extent of delegation. Two 
agreements that share the same level of delegation, when measured in terms of aggregate 
points, may be somewhat qualitatively different in some cases. For instance, according to 
the proposed method of aggregating the number of monitoring systems, Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talk (SALT) II and Environmental Modification Technique (ENMOD) both 
                                                 
253 This is Vienna Document of 1994. The following statistical results do not change even if this category is 
dropped.  
254 Since multinomial analysis sub-divides the sample into the category of dependent variables and 
compares each pair of category, it uses up a lot of degrees of freedom. 
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receive the same number of points—namely, three—but one could arguably reason that 
the delegation levels are in fact qualitative different and that the monitoring system in the 
ENMOD involves more delegation than that in SALT II. The ENMOD involves 
consultation, on-site inspection, and establishment of international organizations, while 
SALT II includes notification and exchange of information, consultation, and national 
technical means. The measurement does not capture the more intricate or subtle details of 
particular inspection systems, either, primarily because inspection schemes are not 
created equal. Challenge and on-site inspections contribute to deterrent capability, 
whereas regular inspections are more aimed toward guaranteeing the peaceful use of 
nuclear materials, although they try to detect potential diversions. I try to remedy these 
problems by analyzing different kinds of dependent variables and checking the 
robustness of the results. 
 
Independent Variables: Security Threats and Latent Capacity 
 
The following empirical analysis aims to find systematic evidence of 
distributional conflicts in the design of monitoring arrangements in arms control 
agreements. The sources of unfavorable compliance environments are manifold. 
Countries can face unfavorable compliance environments either due to international or 
domestic political situations. In the previous chapter on regional fisheries agreements, I 
focused on political pressures from countries’ domestic fishing industries. Looking at 
regional trade agreements, I analyzed the effect of protectionist pressures stemming from 
a large import penetration ratio. Both types of agreements are subject to domestic 
political and economic factors. In the arms control context, by contrast, international 
structural factors matter more, as the bottom-up policymaking influence is more or less 
restricted. This is not to say that arms control issues do not involve domestic political 
pressures255: international structural factors can often translate into domestic political 
pressures, as the rivalry between India and Pakistan changed domestic political opinions.  
                                                 
255 Several works show that domestic politics influences arms control decisions. Morrow (1991) for 
instance finds that domestic political and economic situations affected the bargaining postures of the United 
States and the Soviet Union during the arms control negotiation. Knopf (1998) finds the effect of domestic 
protest on arms control negotiation initiation.  
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The existing literature on arms control, and in particular the literature on nuclear 
proliferation, has identified two key factors that determine a country’s decision to possess 
arms or start their production: opportunity and willingness.256 Opportunity mainly refers 
to a country’s economic and technical weapons capacity, while willingness refers to the 
country’s level of motivation, as influenced by its security environment, such as security 
threats from rivals. This opportunity-willingness framework is also applied to the design 
of monitoring systems because they are the proxies of security environments that could 
induce the compliance behavior of states. Willingness, in particular, affects compliance 
behavior more than opportunity does, although a high level of willingness does not 
necessarily entail a decision to proliferate. Given the current security environment of 
technological diffusion, opportunity as a pre-condition is prevalent: weapons capability is 
not difficult to develop if one desires. The motivation is the linchpin of the final decision 
of weapons-making. 257 
As emphasized in the theoretical chapter, states may not adhere to international 
obligations due to overriding political incentives, either domestic or international. This 
motivation to willingly violate the terms of agreements usually arises when foreign 
policymakers expect that the short term gains of non-cooperation will be large. 
Undeterrable violations can also occur inadvertently when states cannot control private 
actors effectively. Up to a certain point, establishing monitoring institutions is 
collectively beneficial—both for an inspector who uncovers non-compliance behavior 
and for an inspectee who demonstrates compliance. However, the value of monitoring 
starts to go down when the willingness to violate exceeds a certain threshold. This will 
become especially true when monitoring activity is costly and when violations cannot be 
deterred and often go unpunished due to the cost imposed on the punishing party. At this 
point, potential inspecting-states would prefer not to have a third party inspector and 
would rather remain in the dark.  
The theory therefore expects that, when security environments for potential 
inspectors and inspectees diverge, this difference adversely affects the adoption of a third 
                                                 
256 Siverson and Starr, 1990 
257 Interestingly, in their analysis of nuclear proliferation decisions, Jo and Gartzke (2007) find not-so-
robust results for opportunity variables (latent nuclear weapons production capability, economic capacity) 
but robust results for willingness variables (conventional threats, nuclear threats). By robust, I mean the 
stability of statistical significance across various model specifications. 
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party. The willingness to violate is proxied by threat levels each country faces. Based on 
the theory of distributional conflicts, we would expect that asymmetry in threat levels 
would in general reduce the probability of member states reaching an arms control 
agreement with substantial delegation of monitoring roles.  
To test the theory of distributional conflicts, the empirical analysis presents 
agreements as the unit of analysis. For each agreement, country characteristics, be it GDP 
amounts or polity scores, are aggregated either with averages or standard deviations. The 
choice of average or standard deviation (i.e. asymmetry) measures depends on the 
theoretical story we are interested in. When the variable of interests is to measure the 
average effect of an agreement, averages are used to compare across agreements. When 
the variable of interests is to obtain the effect of heterogeneity within one agreement 
compared across agreements, the standard deviation measure was used.  
 
Threat Level Asymmetry (disparity in willingness) 
   
Arms control decisions are heavily influenced by security threats posed by rivals. 
The decision to monitor also takes such threat levels into account as those institutional 
decisions are made given a broader security environment. Within a bilateral setting, for 
example, if one party faces a high level of security threat, and the other doesn’t, this 
difference is likely to produce a low level of monitoring. This outcome is because in 
general, the party that expects to face stochastic violations would not favor stringent arms 
control monitoring. However, other parties would want a more stringent mechanism 
because a less stringent system may not be effective in deterring violations. When the 
agreement is written with flexibility provisions such that some violations may go 
unpunished, or if it is practically impossible to punish the other party, monitoring loses its 
value to the potential inspectors. A potential inspectee might still want to establish some 
kind of monitoring system, but this interest in monitoring would simply amount to a 
gesture to demonstrate compliance, which might not be valuable to potential inspectors. 
With non-compliance behaviors that are costly to punish, monitoring loses its core value 
of reducing uncertainty. 
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I measure threat levels differently for two types of agreements. Threat levels for 
nuclear-related agreements are assessed by the dummy variable that tells us whether a 
state has a rival with a nuclear program or not. The measure was constructed by Jo and 
Gartzke.258 For conventional and bio/chemical threat levels, I used conventional 
threats,259 also relying on Jo and Gartzke. Due to scale differences between nuclear 
threats and conventional threats, I standardized the values using z-scores.260 Once those 
z-scores are created for each member country in an agreement and the scores are 
normalized, the measure for asymmetry was created using standard deviation, which tells 
us how dispersed willingness is among member countries in an agreement.  
 
Latent Weapons Capacity Average (opportunity matters) 
 
Controlling for the asymmetry in willingness and/or motivation fueled by security 
environments, opportunity or capability can affect non-compliance behavior, which again 
may influence the preference for third party monitoring. A group of countries with latent 
capacity may not want to be monitored by a third party, while a group of countries with 
low latent capacity may be more receptive to the idea. The latter case is illustrated with 
the case of several nuclear free zone agreements261 where the delegation of monitoring 
authority to the IAEA was not much disputed and Commissions were even created to deal 
with potential disputes.  
To measure weapons capability, the latent capacity variable is created as an 
amalgamated measure of various weapons capacities: seven indices of nuclear capacity 
for nuclear related agreements, the existence of bio-chemical weapons programs for the 
agreements on bio-chemical weapons, and the defense budget as a proxy for the 





                                                 
258 Jo and Gartzke 2007. 
259 I have to admit that this is a crude measure that fails to capture the threat level of biological and 
chemical weapons in particular.   
260 The use of z-score creates normalized (thus comparable) scores of different scales in nuclear and 
conventional threats.  
261 Latin America, South Pacific and African Nuclear Free Zone Agreements. 
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Table 5.6 Latent Weapons Capacity: Scales and Sources 
 
 Scale/ description  Source  
Nuclear capacity 7 point scale of nuclear 
capacity262 
Jo and Gartzke (2007) 
Bio/chemical weapons capacity 3 point scale of whether a 
country has a biological or 
chemical weapons program263 
Center for Nonproliferation 
Studies, Monterey institute (2002) 
Conventional weapons capacity Military expenditure World Development Indicators 
 
Similar to the threat-level variable, due to different scales for each type of 
capacity, I use z-scores to standardize the measures across different weapons capacities. 
Once the normalization is done using z-scores, I have calculated average latent capacity 




I include four main control variables in the analysis: number of member countries, 
nuclear dummy, GDP averages, and polity score averages.  
 
Number of Member Countries  The number of countries is an important 
control variable because the sheer number of members can inhibit institutional 
development. The number of countries has been hypothesized to have a negative impact 
on institutional development,264 but the opposite logic suggests that the number of 
countries in an agreement could work favorably toward institutional development. In 
many cases of international treaty-making processes, the decision to undertake complex 
negotiations itself signifies a positive attitude toward developing new cooperative 
institutions. Therefore, once the treaty is negotiated and opened for signature, the number 
of countries would have a positive effect on the overall institutional development on the 
                                                 
262 Seven components of the index are 1) uranium deposits, 2) metallurgists, 3) chemical engineers, and 
nuclear engineers/physicists/chemists, 4) electronic/explosive specialists, 5) nitric acid production capacity, 
and 6) electricity production capacity. 
263 1) Known (where states have either declared their programs or there is clear evidence of chemical or 
biological weapons possession), 2) Probable (where states have been publicly named by government or 
military officials as "probable" chemical or biological weapons possessors or as producing chemical or 
biological weapons ), 3) Possible (where states have been widely identified as possibly having chemical or 
biological weapons or a CBW program by sources other than government officials).  
264 Koremenos et al. 2001 
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international level because the participants are a selected coalition of the willing. Given 
these theoretical expectations and considering the fact that most arms control agreements 
are bimodal in numbers (either bilateral or multilateral with large memberships), we 
would not expect a significant effect of number on the monitoring choice. 
 
Nuclear Dummy  Since the majority of agreements deal with nuclear weapons (34 
out of 48 agreements), the characteristics of nuclear weapons should be controlled for. 
All WMDs have dual-use characteristics, but the regulatory environments are different, 
as practitioners suggest in terms of clandestine activities and the involvement of private 
actors, as tabled below. Chemical weapons have long been regarded as the “poor man’s 
nuclear weapon,” and the threat of biological weapons is in a sense omnipresent because 
precursor materials are easily available to manufacture, compared to the much more 
difficult process of acquiring enriched uranium or plutonium.  
 
Table 5.7 Characteristics of Weapons of Mass Destruction
265 
 Biological  Chemical  Nuclear  Radiological 
Complexity of production 2 3 5 1 
Cost of production 2 3 5 3 
Difficulty of acquisition 2 2 5 2 
Difficulty of delivery or dispersal 1 2 4 1 
Likelihood of effectiveness 3 3 5 3 
Worst-case consequences 5 4 5 4 
Note: 1 = lowest or least; 5 = highest or most 
 
GDP Average  Controlling for asymmetric environments, an agreement involving 
rich countries as members may differ from one involving poor countries as members. 
Rich member countries are often associated with international institutional developments, 
but the majority of them are at the same time the countries with a latent weapons 
capability. Therefore, controlling for weapons capacity, we would expect a positive sign 
for the effect of GDP average, that is, a greater likelihood of choosing third party 
monitoring. To create the specific variable, GDP was logged for each country and then 
the logged GDP values were averaged within each agreement.  
                                                 
265 Cole 2006. p.165. Note that he adds “radiological” category to WMD since it poses different danger of 
creating “dirty bombs” from nuclear radiation. Cole mentions that these numbers are subjective and could 
differ across a range of agents. 
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Polity Average  This variable is included to see whether there is a meaningful 
difference between a group of more democratic countries and a group of less democratic 
countries, controlling for the asymmetry in threat levels and latent capabilities. Following 
the finding of Rosendorff and Vreeland266 that showed the transparency and information 
openness of democratic countries, I would expect that having more democratic members 
in an agreement would increase the probability of the delegation of monitoring authority. 
The variable was created by having a democracy score (1-10) for each member country 
from Polity IV and then calculating the average score for each agreement. 
     
Results of the Ordered Probit Analysis 
on the Choice of Monitoring Systems in Arms Control Agreements 
 
Table 5.8 presents the results from the ordered probit analysis, using the 
aggregated dependent measure of monitoring systems and the aforementioned 
independent variables. In general, the results support the theory of distributional conflicts. 
The asymmetry in threat levels among member countries is likely to reduce the likelihood 
of collective adoption of a highly delegated system.  
One big caveat is in order before I explain the results. Due to data limitations, 
some variables have not been collected for recent agreements. Since the sample size is 
very limited (a total of 34 agreements), the results should be taken with caution and 
regarded as tentative results.  
 
 
                                                 




Table 5.8   Ordered Probit Results on the Choice of Monitoring Institutions in 34 
Arms Control Agreements 
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MODEL 1 through MODEL 5 test the hypothesis regarding distributional conflicts, 
controlling for other effects. Distributional conflicts among member states are assessed 
using the measure of threat level asymmetry, and control variables include the economic 
and political factors as well as agreement-specific characteristics such as the number of 
members and a dummy for nuclear related agreements. MODEL 6 captures the theoretical 
concern that the effect may be non-linear. As the heterogeneity grows, delegation of 
authority is less likely to happen, but there are regions of low asymmetry where states 
demand some monitoring mechanisms. In contrast to MODELs 1-5 that impose linearity, 
MODEL 6 presents a statistical model flexible enough to produce an empirical prediction 
closer to the theoretical discussion that has emphasized both the demand for information 
and the reluctance to build monitoring systems.  
For various specifications from MODEL 1 to MODEL 5, threat level asymmetry 
produces a negative effect on the choice of monitoring systems. Larger asymmetries in 
threat levels induce countries to adopt a smaller number of different kinds of monitoring 
mechanisms as part of an agreement. By contrast, other kinds of asymmetry among 
members—such as an asymmetry in latent weapons capacity—have a positive impact on 
the choice of monitoring mechanisms in an arms control agreements. This means that a 
group of countries with heterogeneous weapons capacity is more likely to establish more 
monitoring systems than a group of countries with homogenous capabilities. This result is 
unexpected by the theory and rather puzzling. In those groups with heterogeneous 
capabilities, side payments may have played a big role where large capability countries 
providing side payments to small capability countries. Side payments would be certainly 
easier for reducing technology gaps than for manipulating threat levels. However, 
without side payments as a control variable, one cannot ascertain what kind of effect this 
variable makes. Given the evidence, one could only gather that overall, the impact of 
threat level asymmetry is larger than that of weapons capacity asymmetry.267 This 
suggests that willingness weighs more heavily than opportunity in states’ decisions 
regarding monitoring institutions.  
                                                 
267 As both asymmetry measures are standardized using z-scores, the coefficients are comparable. 
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It is also notable that the effect of democratic political regimes is positive, 
suggesting that democratic regimes are more likely to institute international institutional 
mechanisms such as monitoring institutions in written agreements. This is consistent with 
the finding of Rosendorff and Vreeland (2006), which shows that democracies tend to be 
more open. Such openness could then be reflected in the international bodies they jointly 
establish.268 Due to the small sample size, some effects were difficult to catch in a 
reliable way. For instance, the effects of GDP average and nuclear dummy are not stable 
enough to render any conclusive judgment.  
The results presented here are based on robust standard errors. It is important to 
get robust standard errors in this analysis since the arms control agreements have several 
clusters of nuclear, conventional and chemical/biological weapons.269 Robust standard 
errors correct for potential autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in error terms.270 
Figure 5.1 presents the predicted probabilities of each level of delegation 
evaluated at various levels of threat asymmetry based on the non-linear model that 
includes the square term of threat level asymmetry.  
 
                                                 
268 The result may be biased toward producing significant results as the sample contains member countries 
that are mostly democratic, but it nonetheless appears to be robust across various specifications. 
269 The sample includes agreements that share a closely knitted historical lineage. Examples include the test 
ban treaties (LTBT, TTBT and CTBT) and the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE) agreements (Helsinki Final Act of 1975 to Paris Charter in 1990, to 1994 Vienna Document). 
Offshoots of the Geneva Convention: CWC, BWC, and CCW. Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) fall under the IAEA umbrella. The Australia Group (AG) is under the CWC regime. The 
example of nuclear weapons related treaties is in Appendix II. 
270 Fortna (2004) uses the same statistical technique in her analysis of 48 peacekeeping agreements that 
contain similar clusters of agreements (e.g. peacekeeping arrangements in the Middle East).  
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Figure 5.1  The Effect of Threat Level Asymmetry  


























on various monitoring systems in arms control agreements
Effect of Threat Level Asymmetry
 
 
The figure reveals several empirical patterns about the choice of monitoring 
systems in arms control agreements that are consistent with the theory of distributional 
conflicts presented in Chapter 2.  
First, notice the overall ebbing trend (or a series of receding waves) from 
predicted probabilities for lower level to higher level delegation in monitoring roles. Five 
tidal waves show that the probabilities of delegation become smaller as the asymmetry 
increases. In other words, member states are more likely to adopt a centralized 
mechanism in an arms control agreement as the threat level asymmetry decreases.  
Second, the shape of three waves (Pr(2), Pr(3) and Pr(4)) – predicted probabilities 
for the delegation-level two, three and four, respectively – show both the demand for 
information and the reluctance to establish monitoring systems. Up to point, demand for 
monitoring increases as asymmetry increases. However, after a certain threshold, demand 
for monitoring institutions decrease as asymmetry increases. The non-linear patterns 
show that some base-level demand exists for some forms of monitoring systems in 




Third, the graph can be meaningfully analyzed in approximately two parts—a first 
low asymmetry area and a second high asymmetry area. When the asymmetry level is 
low (between zero and .7), a high level of delegation is more likely. That is, Pr(3) and 
Pr(4) are larger than Pr(1) and Pr(2). The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT), the 
Helsinki Final Act, and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone (SPNFZ) Treaty are the 
agreements in this zone, with low asymmetry in threat levels and consequently 
moderately high delegation levels. TTBT was signed in 1990 when threat level 
asymmetry between the United States and Russia was significantly lowered. The 
negotiation for TTBT was in stark contrast to the LTBT negotiation which lasted for 
eight years but produced no progress as to institutionalizing any international monitoring 
mechanism. The Helsinki Final Act and SPNFZ are regional security agreements among 
countries with similar security levels, European and Latin American countries, 
respectively. The Helsinki Final Act is coded as delegation level 1, but its notification 
and exchange of information system is much institutionalized with details of annual 
exchanges of military force structure and advance notification of military movements. 
Along with other nuclear free zone agreements, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone 
(SPNFZ) relies on various monitoring systems including the existing international 
measure of the IAEA, and the treaty negotiation process was without much conflict given 
the similar security environments among its members.271 
When the asymmetry level increases above 0.7, delegation becomes much less 
likely. A one-mechanism system (i.e. Pr(1)) is more likely to occur and the probability of 
not observing any monitoring system (i.e. Pr(0)) dramatically increases. The Limited Test 
Ban Treaty (LTBT), the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and the Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) are in this latter category. Characterized by a drawn-out eight-year 
negotiation, the LTBT specified the use of national technical means with no other 
monitoring structures. The NPT exhibited a fairly high level of asymmetry (7.23), but its 
members managed to resolve distributional problems to establish a moderate level of 
monitoring (DV score 3) by inserting nuclear technology transfers, as discussed in the 
                                                 
271 The members include Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Papua New 




section on the role of side payments. Lastly, the BWC is notorious for its failure to make 
progress on its monitoring regime, as discussed previously. 
 
Table 5.9  Distributional Conflict and the Choice of Monitoring Institutions 
   in Selected Arms Control Agreements 
 
Agreement  Threat level Asymmetry (standard deviation 
measure of conventional and nuclear threats) 
as a measure of distributional conflict 
Level of Delegation, or the Choice 
of Monitoring Institutions 
TTBT 0 4 




NPT .72 3 
BWC .94 0 
LTBT 1.63 1 
 
Thus far, the analysis was conducted under the premise that the larger number of 
monitoring systems implies more centralization. Monitoring systems can be analyzed 
separately. The following table reports the results. They show slightly different decisions 
enter into the establishment of each monitoring system, although we can spot some 
regularity. First, major power status explains the choice of monitoring systems that 
require low level of international coordination, such as national technical means and 
information exchange and notification systems. Major powers tend to favor the national 
technical means or information exchange; they clearly disfavor delegation to international 
organizations. Second, the creation of inspection systems or delegation to international 
organizations involves the lower level asymmetry in security environments, in this case, 




Table 5.10 The Design Variables for Each Monitoring System in Arms Control 
 


































































Pseudo-R2 0.195 0.365 0.195 0.144 0.162 
* p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Taken as a whole, the results can be interpreted as statistical evidence that, when 
international agreements are formed, the delegation of an informational role to a third 
party is conditioned by the heterogeneous security environments among member states. 
Traditional variables such as major power status matter – major powers choose lower 
level of international coordination. However, in choosing international monitoring 
systems such as inspection systems or formal international bodies, the difference in 
security environments played a significant role. In short, the analysis of 34 arms control 
agreements suggests that the potential informational role of international institutions is 
cut short by differences in compliance environments among member states, mainly 
because these differences influence states’ expectations about future cooperation. 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
I find both strategic and non-strategic elements in the design of monitoring 
institutions. By strategic elements, I mean features that are the product of interdependent 
decisions among involved stakeholders. Strategic relationships among member states 
were empirically assessed in terms of asymmetry in threats levels among member states 
in an agreement. An asymmetry in threat levels results in an increased incentive to defect 
and increased risks of defection for some members. This difference produces diverse 
opinions about which types of error a monitoring mechanism should focus on because 
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distributional impacts of monitoring systems. This is not to say that the asymmetric 
environment always produces the least stringent type of monitoring system. The present 
study also shows statistical evidence that the demand for information tends to increase up 
to a certain point while asymmetry in threat levels can hurt the demand.  
Non-strategic elements also affect the choice of monitoring systems. New 
agreements employ existing institutions in a cost effective way and we see in many cases 
considerable continuity of institutional arrangements.272 For example, the Latin American 
Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (1967) utilizes pre-existing IAEA safeguards. The delegation 
of information capacity to the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin 
America (OPANAL), however, embeds the strategic element, insofar as the heightened 
difficulty of escapes makes it easier for potential member countries to commit to such an 
organization. In many cases, states employ whatever pre-existing institutional structures 
are available. For exchanging data and visits of chemical-weapons related materials under 
the Wyoming MOU and for scheduled elimination of the missiles under the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty), pre-existing on-site inspection agencies in 
each country were employed. Another non-strategic element is the tendency of one treaty 
to be modeled on previous treaties. This mechanism of emulation occurred in the case of 
the Outer Space Treaty (1967), which was modeled on the Antarctic Treaty (1959), both 
being “non-armament” treaties.  
The statistical evidence shows that, controlling for non-strategic factors, the 
strategic elements of distributional conflicts manifest themselves in the design of 
monitoring systems in arms control agreements. When we consider as well the empirical 
evidence from regional trade agreements and regional fisheries agreements, we can 
conclude with some confidence that distributional conflicts function as inhibitors of the 
delegation of authority to international institutions. 
                                                 
272 As explained in the body of the text, this potential temporal effect or possible emulation effect has been 











Conclusion: Taking Stock and Policy Recommendation 
 
This dissertation concludes with a summary of its theoretical arguments, a 
detailed examination of the empirical results presented earlier across three issue areas, a 
series of policy recommendations for future negotiators, and some case studies on how 
monitoring institutions actually operate. My research has sought to elucidate cooperation 
problems in international cooperation, with a particular focus on informational problems 
in international cooperation. I have examined the relationship among core problems of 
international cooperation – enforcement, commitment, distribution and information 
problems.273 I have identified the roots of informational asymmetry among states, 
suggesting that the expectation about distributional consequences emerging from the 
uncertainty about future commitments result in different kinds of monitoring institutions 
in international cooperation. It has been shown that the information problems do not exist 
alone but interact with distributional effects in international cooperation, making it harder 
for centralized monitoring to emerge.  
The main argument of this dissertation is that, in the arena of international treaties 
and monitoring institutions, the demand for information may be cut short by a low level 
of commitment. The theoretical model was motivated by the general empirical pattern 
that international agreements allow states to retain their autonomy to a certain degree. 
This feature of agreements, which limits commitment levels, has the benefit of affording 
states a degree of flexibility, but also has consequences in terms of constraining what 
states can achieve as they design international bodies. Demand for information from 
international organizations, often based on their neutrality and expertise, is fueled by 
uncertainties concerning cooperation behavior, but the guarantee of flexibility may 
undermine such demand. In short, I argue that the combined factors of information and 
                                                 
273 For the definitions of each cooperation problem, see Koremenos et al. 2001.  
142 
 
commitment are the key to uncovering the causes that drive the choice of monitoring 
systems in forging international agreements.  
Informational asymmetry is ameliorated by instituting a third-party information 
clearinghouse on the international level, but this informational gain is counteracted by the 
corresponding distributional consequences of such a mechanism. If the informational 
clearinghouse provides too much flexibility, the parties compelled to concede their policy 
discretions to a third party tend to oppose the establishment of such a mechanism at the 
outset. In other words, these parties may gain informationally by creating a new third 
party or calling in an existing third party, but risk their policy discretion by binding 
themselves to an international mechanism. This tradeoff between informational gains and 
resulting distributional consequences has been modeled by Morrow (1994) and this 
dissertation has developed his thesis by considering the commitment problems among 
potential partners in long-term relationships.  
More broadly, this dissertation has advanced the conventional argument about the 
fundamental tradeoff in international cooperation between cooperation gains and 
adjustment costs. In my theoretical model, cooperation gains are represented by 
informational gains and adjustment costs by policy concessions following the 
recommendations of international organizations.  
I have argued that this basic tradeoff is mediated by the degree of informational 
asymmetry stemming from each government’s domestic compliance environment. When 
the informational asymmetry becomes severe, the costs of sovereignty, or the policy 
concession costs, dominate. When the informational asymmetry is low or medium, states 
are more likely to choose centralized monitoring with more delegated authority in order 
to enhance informational gains. My argument about informational asymmetry 
surrounding domestic compliance environments is not previously been advanced. 
Previous literature has emphasized the tradeoff but was silent about what factors tilt the 
tradeoff one way or the other.  
The theoretical argument is empirically demonstrated by looking at statistical 
evidence in monitoring systems of regional trade agreements. Both the informational 
asymmetry within international trade environment and the uncertainty about protectionist 
tendencies of potential trading partners – prospective interest group pressures or regime 
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instability – are likely to be obstacles to substantial cooperation on centralized 
monitoring. On average, the asymmetry is likely to discourage centralized information 
mechanisms, lowering the chance of instituting such mechanisms by 10%.    
Corresponding case studies selected from the sample of regional trade agreements 
also render support for the theoretical argument. The negotiating history and its narratives 
tell us that negotiators in the selected bilateral/multilateral negotiations had concerns 
about the future commitment of other party (or parties) to the agreement if protectionist 
tendencies are present. The domestic political and economic environments conducive to 
protectionist moves within a sensitive sector by the one party were more likely to make 
the other party take a negotiating posture that pushes for absolute concession on that 
sector (in order to look for certainty) or for an accompanying weak dispute settlement. 
The party with a favorable compliance environment for free trade would like to retain its 
policy options vis-à-vis protectionist countries. Although a third party is helpful in 
generating compliance information, this option loses its attractiveness when the 
asymmetry is extreme.  
The theoretical model also generates a new perspective on the preference for 
monitoring mechanisms. Contrary to the ordinary expectation that the informationally 
disadvantaged would resist a dispute resolution mechanism, the party with an unfavorable 
compliance environment that generates informational asymmetry also has an incentive to 
establish a dispute settlement mechanism. This incentive arises mainly because this party 
could restrict the unilateral actions of other parties while also demonstrating its 
commitment. Many negotiation processes establishing regional trade agreements 
exhibited this phenomenon where the party that had expectations about their own 
commitment problems proposed or supported strong dispute settlement mechanisms, as 
Mexico did in NAFTA negotiations.  
The benefits of examining monitoring institutions in a broader institutional 
context are many. By looking at a dispute settlement process as a broader process of 
information procedure, we can better understand how states cope with informational 
demands with the help of supplementary monitoring institutions, such as political bodies 
or technical subcommittees. More importantly, by studying the design of monitoring 
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institutions, we gain a deeper understanding of the nature of compliance and compliance 
environments in such issue areas as international trade, environment and security.  
This study of the design of monitoring institutions has several implications for the 
study of international institutions. It demonstrates the durability of diplomatic 
institutions, particularly in bilateral agreement settings. Scholarly work on international 
institutions thus far has focused on salient and centralized institutions for good reason – 
for their impact on international and domestic politics. This study demonstrates that a 
more comprehensive perspective on less salient institutions can shed a new light on the 
operation of salient institutions. By studying both forms of institutions, we are able to 
predict under what circumstances one form comes into being rather than the other: the 
context of informational asymmetry in compliance environments determines the 
prevalent use of political bodies instead of international third parties.  
The proposed theoretical argument about informational asymmetry – higher 
asymmetry leads to less centralized monitoring – may sound deterministic, and thus give 
the impression that the discussion leaves less room for policy implications. That is not the 
case because informational asymmetry is not necessarily a fixed element; there are ample 
factors policymakers may maneuver to reduce informational asymmetry. For instance, 
policymakers can engineer the kinds of errors a candidate institution may make by 
emphasizing the informational capacity to distinguish clear violations.274 A third party in 
question may be able to gain additional political legitimacy, despite informational 
asymmetry, if the body can be expected to maintain consistency and build credibility for 
deterring potential violations. Civil society also has the potential to enhance this 
informational mechanism by improving domestic political environments, and also by 
providing information to governments and international society that ameliorates 
informational asymmetry and facilitates information flow. This scenario points to the 
greater role of civil society in future global governance. 
States are increasingly engaged in cooperative tasks in this globalized world. The 
reduction of informational asymmetry to decrease adjustment costs and to increase 
cooperation gains will be crucial in the coming decades in forging interactions among 
                                                 
274 One way to do so is exemplified by Mitchell’s work on an oil pollution regime where the MARPOL 




sovereign states. This dissertation suggests ways for negotiators to recognize compliance 
environments of its own and others’ before negotiation and make attempts to improve 
those compliance environments so that the distributional conflicts would not be a serious 





The empirical results from the three issue areas reveal interesting similarities and 
differences with respect to the various types of monitoring institutions and the effects of 
membership characteristics. The three issue areas considered differed in important ways. 
For instance, results in one issue area were derived from global-level agreements, while 
in the other two areas the agreements considered were regional. My main task in this 
section is to examine these results, looking for commonalities in order to test the reach of 
my theoretical arguments. By comparing and contrasting the empirical results in these 
different issue areas, my aim is to ascertain to what extent the theory of monitoring 
designs travels in each issue area. The methods of comparison are simple: I gather the 
empirical results that have used the same methods and put the evidence from three issue 
areas side-by-side. Then, I qualitatively discuss the differences and potential causes for 
the differences.275 
The theory presented in Chapter 2 has suggested four determinants of monitoring 
institutions: asymmetry in compliance environments, consequences of violations, benefits 
from cooperation and quality of potential verification. In the subsequent empirical 
chapters, I mainly tested the impact of asymmetry on the choice of international 
monitoring institutions and occasionally discussed the effect of other variables in a 
qualitative way. This is because I see that the key theoretical contribution of my 
dissertation is to provide systematic evidence for distributional conflicts over the design 
of monitoring institutions. The empirical measures of each variable in three issue areas 
are summarized in Table 6.1.  
 
                                                 




Table 6.1 Summary of Variables 
 






    






Differences in import 
penetration ratio (IPR) 
Differences in the size of 
fishing industry  
Differences in the level 
of security threats  
Consequences of 
violation/risk 
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Gathering the conclusions of the three empirical chapters, the fact that asymmetry 
in compliance environments has negative effects is, by now, old news. Differences in 
political and economic structures among member countries tend to impede the 
development of monitoring arrangements and other institutional structures on the 
international level. When we compare and contrast our three issue areas, however, we are 
able to achieve some new insights. Some of the empirical results suggest new research 
questions and uncover puzzling results not completely consistent with existing theoretical 
models. Consequently, we are challenged to go back and forth between theoretical and 
empirical levels. This section aims to do just that, taking stock of the three earlier 
empirical chapters. 
Once placed side by side, the three issue areas reveal several re-occurring 
patterns. Figure 6.1 clearly shows that, in most agreements, members opt for monitoring 
                                                 
276 This element is actually fixed in the model, so its effect is not tested.  
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that involves inter-member communication and a relaxed form of monitoring. In regional 
trade agreements, intergovernmental bodies are the most frequently chosen form of 
monitoring arrangement; in regional fisheries agreements, commissions are the most 
favored form; and consultation and notification/information exchanges are the most 
widely used form of monitoring mechanism in arms control agreements. This preference 
for informal venues instead of formal institutionalization points to the fact that a 
centralized form of monitoring is rarely adopted in any of the three issue areas. Arms 
control agreements may be an exception in that inspection regimes are a well-established 
and expected component of many control agreements. These patterns prompt us to think 
about why informal arrangements abound while formal monitoring institutions are rare, 
and why there is variation across the three issue areas – the topic of this dissertation. In 
short, this dissertation answers the question by looking at the distributional conflicts and 
suggests that a larger asymmetry in member countries’ compliance environments277 is 
likely to produce a less centralized form of monitoring. The following discussion collects 
the evidence for it and explores what the evidence means to a broad conclusion about 
institutional design and other related theories. 
                                                 
277 Again, compliance environments refer to political and economic situations or conditions that are 






Figure 6.1  Types of Monitoring Systems in Three Issue Areas 
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The theoretical model in Chapter 2 examined the various elements of monitoring, 
and the discussion that followed focused on the attendant distributional conflicts. 
Distributional conflicts are created due to different compliance environments that 
members face. Some members experience favorable political and economic 
environments, while others are not so fortunate. Up to a certain point, international 
institutions help to alleviate the uncertainty that arises when information is scarce or 
unreliable; at the same time, the flexibility that agreements often allow has a high cost, 
since it discourages some countries from making a commitment to institutional 
development. The amount of flexibility allowed in agreements is usually determined by 
the political and economic conditions states face. If a state expects frequent deviations 
from international obligations due to capacity limitations, for instance, then the resulting 
asymmetry in compliance is likely to discourage other states from instituting a strong 
regulatory mechanism. 
Empirically identifying good measures for asymmetry requires taking a further 
step beyond simply defining a theoretical concept of asymmetry. In the three empirical 
chapters, I have introduced key asymmetries that influence compliance behaviors. Their 
distributions are summarized in Figure 6.2. In the area of regional trade agreements, I 
have suggested the asymmetry in import penetration ratio (IPR) as the key independent 
variable, based on the empirical record showing that a higher IPR is likely to make states 
engage in trade protectionism. In the case of regional fisheries, the size of a nation’s 
fishing industry is likely to affect domestic lobbying for fishing subsidies, and therefore, 
differences across countries in the size of their respective fishing industries approximates 
the theoretical idea of asymmetric compliance environments in fisheries management. In 
the context of regulating prohibited weapons, the perception of security threats may be a 
factor that determines expectations about how likely countries are to be deviant in the 
course of future cooperation.  
These three issue areas have one thing in common with regard to asymmetry: the 
member countries in these agreements have mostly symmetric compliance environments. 
There are only a small number of countries that fall on the highly asymmetric side. 
Despite this commonality, the key asymmetries in our three issue areas differ with regard 
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to their distribution. Regional trade agreements present a right-skewed asymmetry level; 
regional fisheries agreements have primarily symmetric countries; and arms control 
agreements approximate a normal distribution. These differences in distributions reveal 
the characteristics of member countries in the sample. Arms control agreements were 
concluded among countries with a moderate level of asymmetry in terms of their regional 
threat levels. Fisheries agreements are signed among countries whose fishing industries 
are of similar size. By contrast, countries are much less picky about choosing partners in 
the area of international trade – regional trade agreements exhibit a range of different 
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Given the empirical distribution of the dependent variable (Figure 6.1) and the 
key explanatory variable (Figure 6.2), similar statistical analyses were conducted in all 
three issue areas. The results generally support the theoretical conclusion that 
heterogeneous compliance environments are likely to discourage the choice of 
international delegation. The general pattern is summarized in Figure 6.3. Controlling for 
other types of symmetry and potential confounding factors (polity asymmetry, regional 
clustering, etc.), as the key asymmetry increases, the probability of having an 
international monitoring mechanism decreases. When asymmetry increases, it appears 
that a fully delegated inspection system or international body vested in expertise is rarely 
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Although the overall effect of asymmetry on the adoption of centralized 
monitoring is negative, its effect is not necessarily monotonic. We have also seen that 
countries in the sample expect to benefit from having an international monitoring body. 
Amid the kinds of asymmetries we have mentioned, some states reap substantial benefits 
from delegating informational capacity to international organizations.  
If we further investigate the non-linear statistical effect of asymmetry, we find 
that the asymmetry has a positive effect on the development of international monitoring 
systems in certain regions of asymmetry, as Figure 6.4 shows. The positive effect of 
asymmetry only occurs when the asymmetry is extreme. This means that countries with 
large asymmetries between them are more likely to institute a monitoring mechanism. At 
the same time, the reader should be cautioned that, given the small sample size of 
centralized monitoring institutions, the reliability of this effect should be further tested. 
This is particularly true in the case of arms control agreements, where the sample size 
numbered 38. However, this empirical pattern generates a puzzle that the theory did not 
address: the issue of what types of countries initially enter negotiations to sign an 
agreement.  
Since the data only covers countries that have entered into agreements, the sample 
is not completely adequate to test thoroughly the effects of the heterogeneity of potential 
member states. Some countries may not appear in the dataset, despite the high level of 
asymmetry they exhibit. Those countries may have screened themselves out of the 
sample. It is likely that structurally similar countries tend to initiate international 
negotiations to produce agreements, and we may be overlooking many potential member 
states that could have entered the agreements. This issue of voluntary exclusion from 
membership prompts us to re-think our methods for treating non-member countries and 
their substantive effects on the development of institutions. This also lets us think about 








Figure 6.4 The Non-linear Effect of Asymmetry on the Choice of International Monitoring Systems 
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In relation to the issue of selection into agreements, the non-linear analysis shows 
that the arms control issue area has a different pattern with regard to the effect of 
asymmetry. The non-linear term in arms control is significantly negative but the same 
square term is positive in fisheries and regional trade agreements, which produces the 
differing effect of asymmetry on the design of monitoring institutions. I made a 
conjecture that the peak at the extreme asymmetry may be due to the cohesion among 
member states in regional trade and fisheries case. In contrast, arms control case has a 
little hump at the lower level of asymmetry because states realize the benefits when the 
asymmetry is not so great. It has monotonically decreasing pattern in asymmetry maybe 
because countries in asymmetric environments are more careful entering an agreement. 
Again, the selection process may be different in arms control case from other two cases, 
which requires further analysis on the negotiating process of each issue area. 
Thus far, I have presented the results of statistical analyses that used dummy 
variables to yield a choice of “delegation” or “no delegation” in both linear and non-
linear statistical models. In reality, however, monitoring systems come in different 
shades. The results of ordered analysis are presented in Figure 6.5. The benefits of 
ordered analyses are two-fold. The first is that we can see how sensitive the probabilities 
are to changes in asymmetry. Compared to the areas of fisheries and arms control, the 
trade issue area exhibits rather stable patterns in terms of bringing in institutions. We can 
conclude that predictions regarding the adoption of monitoring institutions in regional 
trade agreements are relatively stable, while similar predictions in the areas of fisheries 
and arms control are volatile.  
The second benefit of ordered analyses is to predict, more specifically, the 
particular category of monitoring system that will be adopted depending on the 
asymmetry levels and other control variables. We are able to generate predictions about 
the likelihood of getting one monitoring system over the others. For instance, we can see 
that when two countries exhibit an asymmetry level in the size of their fishing industries 
of about 0.2, the probability of their opting for no monitoring system is as high as 0.6; the 
probability of their having either a political commission, a scientific committee or an 






Figure 6.5 The Ordered Analysis of the Effect of Asymmetry on Monitoring Choice 
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Identifying compliance-environment asymmetry as the source of distributional 
conflicts is, by itself, not enough to explain fully the making of monitoring institutions. 
One complicating factor in the analysis of the choice and design of monitoring systems is 
that the asymmetries we have identified may not be the only proximate cause of 
compliance behaviors that, in turn, determine the amount of flexibility allowed under a 
particular agreement. Other theories have suggested other potential causal mechanisms, 
indicating that political differences or economic power differences may affect the 
outcome of institutional bargaining. With these existing theories in mind, I have 
examined the effects of polity differences as well as of bargaining power differentials by 
including such variables as control variables.  
The findings about the effects of polity differences are mixed in our three issue 
areas. It turns out that polity asymmetry – the standard deviation of polity scores of 
member countries – has a statistically significant negative effect on the design of 
monitoring institutions in the case of regional trade and arms control cases. This is an 
expected effect. But polity asymmetry had a slightly significant and positive effect in the 
case of regional fisheries agreements. We can discount this positive effect in the case of 
fisheries due to its low level of statistical significance; still, this result presents us with a 
puzzle as to why fisheries agreements exhibit a different effect than either arms control or 
trade agreements with respect to the differences in polity scores. 
Among the other control variables, the effect of the number of member countries 
is worth considering, given the traditional concern about collective action problems. The 
theory of collective action suggests that the number of participants may increase 
collective action problems. The composition of the group matters too, of course, whether 
or not collective action problems are present, but if we bracket the characteristics of 
member countries, then the rising number of participants can be expected to have a 
negative effect on institutional development.  
Surprisingly, the effect of a rising number of participants is ambiguous in the case 
of international agreements, and even sometimes defies the conventional wisdom that a 
large number of participants is not conducive to institutional development. In fact, the 
regional trade case shows that a large number of participants is more conducive to 
institutional creation, all other factors being equal (even controlling for different kinds of 
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asymmetry). This effect is graphed in Figure 6.6. The number of participants was not 
significant in the analysis of regional fisheries agreements and arms control agreements, 
but still appears to have a positive effect on the probability of getting a more delegated 
monitoring institution.  
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The U-shaped pattern of the relationship between asymmetric environment and 
the likelihood of the adoption of monitoring institutions suggests that there is something 
different about the international agreements that distinguishes them from other types of 
contractual relationship. Countries enter into agreements with the expectation that there is 
a positive probability that the agreement would be concluded and the members are 
usually like-minded countries. This self-selection at the outset of international 
negotiations may distinguish this process and its outcomes from other kinds of 
negotiation.278 
Upon closer examination, the second part of the U-shape (the increasing trend at 
the right-end tail) reveals the unique feature of international agreements. It shows that 
countries that enter the negotiation stage usually do so as a cohesive group, and existing 
asymmetries are overcome or resolved even before the agreement-making stage. As 
Downs and Rocke (1998) argued, we analysts tend to observe only a truncated sample of 
                                                 
278 International relations scholars began to pay attention to the fact that countries self-select into 
international agreements. Some works in this area attempt to take into account this selection issue and 
various statistical methods have been employed and their relative benefits are currently debated (See for 
instance Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005; Baier and Bergstrand 2005). I plan to address this selection issue 
in my future research.  
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countries that have entered agreements. Agreements between countries facing a high 
level asymmetry may have been screened out of the international agreement sample pool, 
and what we observe is a rather cohesive group of countries in which the sheer number of 
participants does not complicate the development of monitoring systems. This raises an 
interesting research question about non-cases (i.e. cases that did not enter the agreement 
phase)279 and pre-agreement bargaining. 
The U-shape and the potentially positive effect of the increasing number of 
participants is in stark contrast to the finding of a mound-shape reported in Agrawal and 
Goyal (2001) with respect to the establishment of monitoring systems in Indian villages. 
The authors found that as the number of villagers increased, the probability of having 
meetings and allocating a larger budget for monitoring at first increases but then 
decreases.280  
Taken together, the empirical results presented in this dissertation’s three 
empirical chapters convey the same message: that the more heterogeneous compliance 
environments are among member states in an international agreement, the less likely it is 
that an international monitoring institution will emerge. At the same time, the evidence 
collected here suggests subtle differences across our three issue areas. For instance, 
fisheries agreements are formed exclusively between countries with similarly structured 
fishing industries (i.e. similar size of fishing industry). Arms control and regional trade 
agreements, for their part, are not usually based on such similarities.  
In addition to adding a new research question, the evidence also produces a 
challenge to the application of existing theories to the design of international agreements. 
International agreements do not conform to what traditional collective action theory 
would predict. Larger groups of countries are more likely than smaller groups to institute 
some kind of international monitoring mechanism.  This point prompts us to deepen our 
study of what leads countries to initiate agreements. In sum, the empirical investigation 
of the theoretical model put forward in this dissertation provides us with some confirming 
evidence, while also leaving us with some puzzles to solve in the future. 
                                                 
279 See Dimitrov et al. (forthcoming) for conceptualization of non-cases in international cooperation. 
280 Agrawal and Goyal 2001, p.84 
161 
 
Although the proposed deductive theory is proven to be useful in understanding 
the design of monitoring institutions, the inductive process of looking at the cases 
suggests that other dynamics are also in action. Specifically, I find that the determinants 
of institutional patterns states utilize to manage information in international cooperation 
are not restricted to the strategic concerns I highlighted in my theory. As recent studies on 
policy diffusion281 suggest, emulation has occurred among similar sets of regional trade 
agreements. The emulation was not just a copy of previous agreements but reflected the 
consideration of reputation costs or the expectation of future relations with other 
countries outside of the specific agreement. In the case of the fisheries agreements, the 
question of nested and overlapping monitoring systems arises. In the arms control case, 
the effect of systemic factors282 as well as strategic interactions was strongly felt on the 
design of monitoring institutions.   
This research therefore answers the questions about how states design monitoring 
institutions, but simultaneously leaves other questions for further research. I show 
theoretically and empirically that strategic interactions and uncertainty about each others’ 
compliance environments influence the design of monitoring institutions. Although I 
uncovered the common structure, empirical details also revealed the need to study 
emulation dynamics, nested institutions, and systemic changes, in conjunction with the 




Negotiating Strategies while Building Compliance Environments 
 
 
Monitoring institutions are systems designed to collect compliance-related 
information, including information about compliance behaviors and compliance 
environments – political and economic conditions that could contribute to compliance 
with international obligations. In recent years, international monitoring institutions have 
played an increasingly important role in peacekeeping operations, environmental 
management, and enforcement of human rights. The goal of this memo is to provide 
                                                 
281 Simmons et al. 2006. 
282 Characteristics of international system 
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recommendations to the various parties involved in negotiations to create politically 
viable and potentially effective monitoring institutions.  
The policy suggestions are based on the theoretical argument and empirical 
evidence presented in previous chapters. The theory suggested the potential obstacles to 
building a centralized monitoring system when member countries’ compliance 
environments differ. The difficulty however does not mean impossibility. The theoretical 
mechanism has provided a positive analysis as to how distributive conflicts arise from 
disparate compliance environments. By thinking about the ways to alter some theoretical 
elements that are subject to manipulation,283 we can reach some meaningful policy 
suggestions. 
This memo is addressed first and foremost to the policymakers involved in 
international negotiations to establish monitoring bodies, and secondly to the 
representatives of international organizations, both existing and future. The 
recommendations are conveniently divided into negotiation phases (before negotiation, 
during negotiation and after negotiation) to facilitate timely implementation.  
 
Memo to Negotiating Parties 
 
You are negotiating to create a monitoring system for a specific international 
agreement. Table 6.2 lays out for you the available monitoring options, including (1) the 
diplomatic track, providing for consultation among the involved; (2) agreement-specific 
political institutions, such as intergovernmental bodies; and (3) international third parties, 
with or without binding clauses. These options fall on a spectrum, with the latter systems 
showing greater centralization and having a higher level of autonomous authority and 
informational capacity with resources to collect and analyze information about 
compliance. Hybrid systems and gradations of functions are also possible. The 
weaknesses and strengths of each mechanism will be discussed within the context of the 
following recommendations. 
                                                 
283 This process involves relaxing the model assumption about variables being exogenous but thinking 
about what determines those variables. 
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International third parties are known to operate effectively as information 
providers, thereby promoting cooperation.284 Nevertheless, attempts to build such 
mechanisms are often met with resistance for various political reasons. This policy memo 
identifies such obstacles and offers suggestions for defusing and resolving potential 
conflicts. Although decentralized monitoring is desirable under certain circumstances—
where compliance is purely local and where incentives to hide compliance information 
are not strong285—most current compliance problems inevitably involve state control and 
an international third-party mechanism is essential in promoting compliance.  
Table 6.2 Available Monitoring Options 
 
Options Corresponding institutional 
arrangements 
Examples Weaknesses and Strengths 
Diplomatic 
track 
Inquiry points (contacts 











Barriers to Trade) 
 
Human rights reporting 
under six major human 
rights agreements286; 
WTO policy review 
mechanism; IAEA 
Safeguards system  
Effective when information 
is cross-checked; usual 
voluntary reporting may 
omit relevant new 







Intergovernmental bodies Intergovernmental 
bodies in regional trade 
agreements 
 




in arms control 
agreements 
Facilitate diplomatic 





Standing courts or inspection 
bodies 
European Court of 
Human Rights 
 
East African Court of 
Justice 
Improve cooperative 
benefits if adequate 
monitoring capacity is given. 
However, the establishment 
could face oppositions: 
                                                 
284 Keohane and Axelrod 1985 
285 See Ostrom 1990 for the study of decentralized monitoring systems in the context of common pool 
resources.  
286 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 






Binding rulings may create 
opposition from countries 
with unfavorable compliance 
environments; combination 
of binding-ness and flexible 
mechanisms can create 
opposition from countries 




Recommendation 1: Before negotiation, identify compliance environments. 
 
Assess your own political and economic conditions and those of others that may 
potentially affect compliance with the goals of the international agreement. These 
conditions establish your “compliance environments.” A checklist for assessing 
compliance environments includes, but is not limited to, 1) the lobbying strength of 
sensitive sectors in your own country and potential partner(s) that are potentially 
vulnerable to the terms of the agreement (e.g. the agricultural sector, the steel industry in 
the case of trade agreements, and so forth), and 2) national capacity to monitor 
compliance (e.g. surveillance technology, military control in case of security 
agreements). After identifying compliance environments, try to aggregate and summarize 
the differences between your own compliance environment and your partners.’ 
 
Recommendation 2: Before starting negotiations, understand that negotiating 
positions regarding monitoring systems can stem from the assessment of compliance 
environments. 
 
Large differences in compliance environments between you and your partners are 
likely to hinder the development of efficient third-party monitoring on the international 
level. For example, note the possibility that your negotiating partner with a sensitive 
sector may be reluctant to establish a dispute settlement mechanism because of the 
binding conditions a third party may impose and the corresponding political costs. If 
safeguards are established to allow political escapes, this reluctance may be lessened. By 
sacrificing depth of cooperation in this way, you may achieve the desirable goal of a 
more centralized monitoring system.  
165 
 
If negotiations involve partners with unfavorable compliance environments, you 
may expect negotiations to be delayed, and it may be beneficial to start with a diplomatic 
monitoring system, such as an intergovernmental body composed of government 
bureaucrats. Seize every opportunity to push for the establishment of specialized working 
groups or committees (e.g. expert bodies in human rights agreements, scientific advisory 
bodies in environmental agreements, and technical review committees in trade 
agreements) to enhance the informational capacity of the international body.  
 
Recommendation 3: After identifying compliance environments and before 
negotiation, make efforts to improve them.  
 
If you are a party with an unfavorable compliance environment, make strenuous 
efforts to monitor yourself. These efforts will signal to the other party that you are 
determined to increase the level of your commitment and to avoid violations of treaty 
goals. For instance, by setting up national bodies empowered to resolve conflicts between 
your government and your country’s sensitive sectors,287 you can reassure your 
negotiating partner that your government will exert some level of control over the 
compliance behavior of those private entities, thus making your compliance environment 
more transparent.  
Some cases may inevitably involve political decisions to violate treaty obligations 
due to particular interest group pressure or economic hardships. To prevent those 
situations, it is prudent to encourage the development of counter-groups in domestic 
politics, respecting different balancing forces.  
 
Recommendation 4:  At the proposal-making stage, weigh the available options for 
monitoring systems in consideration of other legal provisions and offer a system that 
demonstrates your commitment.  
 
Recall that in general your options include global-level institutions, the diplomatic 
track, or agreement-specific institutions, and that you may add specific features to each 
institution. Your proposal depends on compliance environments, your own and your 
                                                 
287 These solutions have been actually suggested in several bilateral regional trade agreements, including 
the case of Chile-ROK FTA. 
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partners.’ If your domestic compliance environment is not favorable to the proposed 
commitments in the agreement, rather than proposing nothing, make a proposal to have a 
third party without binding conditions. Such a proposal will demonstrate the commitment 
of your country, without compromising too much in terms of possible future reputational 
loss from future violations. Alternatively, you can offer to establish intergovernmental 
bodies with specific informational functions, which may be more acceptable to the other 
party. This latter option to choose established diplomatic venues such as 
intergovernmental bodies can become a stepping-stone toward more advanced 
monitoring systems in the future.  
Likewise, if you are a party with a favorable compliance environment (e.g. with 
little domestic political pressure against international commitments), a third party system 
with binding conditions is a reasonable choice for you in order to pressure the other party 
to commit to the proposed goals of the treaty. As long as the mechanism sufficiently 
guarantees continuing cooperation during normal times, it will be acceptable to the other 
party. However, if you expect that the other party will frequently invoke flexible 
mechanisms to satisfy its domestic constituents, a third party system may not be an 
appealing option to you.  
 
Table 6.3 Summary of Suggestions depending upon Compliance Environments 
 
 Relatively favorable domestic 
compliance environments 




Thoroughly assess your and your 
partners’ compliance environments 
Monitor yourself , for example, by 
establishing conflict resolution bodies 
Proposal-making 
during Negotiation 
Propose a third party with adequate 
capability of dealing risks of 
monitoring 
Propose intergovernmental bodies or third 
parties without binding conditions 
Acceptance Range of 
Monitoring Options 
Accept binding conditions if the 
disparity in compliance 
environments is not large. 
 
Reject binding conditions if the 
disparity is large and when you 
have to guarantee many escape 
clauses 
Accept binding conditions if flexible 
mechanisms are guaranteed. 
 
Remember that monitoring systems operate in conjunction with other provisions 
in the treaty. Enforcement systems (namely, the possibly binding power of third party 
recommendations) and decision-making processes are particularly relevant to monitoring 
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decisions. The negotiation over monitoring systems is often made difficult exactly for the 
reason that monitoring decisions are made in relation to these other provisions. When 
monitoring systems are established, a decision should be reached without delay regarding 
the binding or non-binding character of third party recommendations, a decision that, 
again, will largely hinge upon the level of asymmetry and imbalance in compliance 
environments among potential members.  
Flexible mechanisms also affect the positions of negotiating parties regarding 
monitoring systems. Flexible mechanisms such as escape clauses in trade agreements or 
reservation clauses in human rights agreements allow states to retain a degree of policy 
discretion and therefore create distributional conflicts over the choice of monitoring 
systems. If a country with an unfavorable environment pushes for too many flexible 
mechanisms under binding conditions, other countries with favorable compliance 
environments are likely to oppose the idea of having third parties because they might 
have to allow many cases of flexible mechanisms. 
 
Recommendation 5: During negotiation, recognize your preconceptions and work 
against them to leave room for persuasion. In other words, be open to evidence that 
your prior beliefs might need updating. 
 
Do not assume that the other party does not want rule-based mechanisms. 
Conventional wisdom holds that powerful countries do not want to relinquish their policy 
discretion to international organizations. Although this is true to some extent, there is no 
a priori reason to think that powerful parties do not want rule-based mechanisms. The 
United States eventually accepted the dispute settlement mechanism under the global 
trade system, illustrating that powerful countries also favor creating international 
organizations that can dependably promote compliance.  
During negotiation, try to play up the potential benefits of third party monitoring 
bodies. In doing so, try to address the concerns expressed by domestic opposition groups 
in the powerful country. If there are concerns about the technology or informational 
capability of third parties, form a coalition with other like-minded countries or form a 
working group to air and then resolve the difference in views. Since more powerful 
countries have bargaining leverage, their concerns should be addressed in such a way as 
168 
 
to avoid unanticipated conflicts during negotiation. Do not be discouraged by the 
powerful party’s initial rejection of third party monitoring mechanisms, but continue to 
play up the potential benefits. 
 
Recommendation 6: Improve the proposed system and re-shape the expectations.  
 
Propose ways to improve the third party mechanisms, since expectations about 
how the monitoring institution will perform can influence the decision of the other party. 
For example, if critics emphasize the inadequacy of third party monitoring because of its 
potential inability to detect violations sufficiently, provide scientific evidence to the 
contrary and suggest improvements to that body. Outright rejection of potential 
monitoring or surveillance systems often stems from political arguments and carries 
political overtones, as illustrated by the debates within the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC). The adoption of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) has been 
stalled for ten years due to the divergent negotiating positions of pro-whaling and anti-
whaling countries. In such cases of heated disputes, the involvement of a neutral 
scientific body becomes essential to settle the debates over scientific uncertainty and to 
defuse and refocus ossified political conflicts.  
Another way to improve the proposed system is to reduce the likelihood of errors. 
Two risks exist in performing monitoring functions: failing to spot violations and falsely 
accusing innocent countries. A well-functioning monitoring body requires sufficient 
resources to ensure a high level of success in spotting violations, with remaining 
resources devoted to reducing the risk of false accusations, thereby avoiding diplomatic 
wars. Unfortunately, however, broad support for both these goals is difficult to achieve 
among involved nation states, especially when state parties have different compliance 
environments. Your partners, if they have unfavorable compliance environments, will 
likely want to focus on reducing the risk of falsely accusing suspected countries, rather 
than on the risk of detection failure.  
The key to bridging this gap is for you to devote sufficient resources to reducing 
the kind of error that all parties can immediately agree needs to be addressed, thereby 
building support for reducing the other kind of error. This has been the experience of the 
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International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which started by introducing a 
comprehensive safeguards system that allowed basic and regular inspections, and then 
gradually focused on the reduction of detection errors by strengthening its safeguards 
system and adopting Additional Protocols.288 This gradual approach will help build 
confidence and improve the overall system.  
Another way to re-shape the expectations is to encourage different voices in 
domestic political arena. International relations scholars, such as Raustiala (2004) and 
Dai (2005), give specific examples where domestic environmental groups pushed 
forward the agenda of establishing international monitoring institutions, in their 
respective case studies on the NAAEC289 and LRTAP.290 This solution may be less 
feasible in international security issues but highly applicable to other issues. The 
existence of such domestic groups works in favor of national delegations when they want 
international monitoring as those groups could counter-act the opposition in domestic 
politics.  
All the proposed recommendations are geared toward improving the international 
monitoring systems when they are needed. The goal is to satisfy national interests while 
seeking better global governance. Negotiators should not lose sight of the big picture in 
formulating national positions and implementing the recommendations. 
 
                                                 
288 For the IAEA safeguards system, see 
http://www.iaea.org/worldatom/Programmes/Safeguards/safeg_system.pdf  
289 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was born during the NAFTA 
negotiation. 
290 According to Dai, the terms of the Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) were highly 
influenced by the domestic environmental groups. 
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Memo to International Organizations 
 
This memo is mainly addressed to officials and representatives in existing 
international organizations who are increasingly involved in the negotiation of new 
monitoring bodies. For example, international organizations, especially the United 
Nations, often participate in constructing other international institutions, as in the case of 
the Montreal and Kyoto Protocols, which were concluded under the aegis of the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). As officials and representatives in existing 
international organizations, you may therefore in the future find yourself in a position to 
play a more active and shaping role during the negotiation of new monitoring bodies. 
This memo may also be relevant to bureaucrats in newly established monitoring bodies 
who see a need to improve existing monitoring mechanisms and arrangements. 
 
Recommendation 1: Prior to negotiation, expect moderate opposition from the state 
parties.  
 
Differences among member countries’ political and economic conditions (which 
can be conveniently termed “compliance environments”) can lead to divergent proposals 
with respect to monitoring systems. When disparities in compliance environments are not 
large, parties will not have much difficulty accepting third parties into the agreement. 
However, when the disparities are large, divergent negotiating positions regarding 
monitoring systems are to be expected. Parties with favorable compliance environments 
may not accept third parties because they feel they will have to allow too many escape 
clauses to the party with unfavorable compliance environments. The parties with 
unfavorable compliance environments, on the other hand, have incentives to accept such 
centralized monitoring systems only if they are guaranteed flexible mechanisms such as 
escape clauses. They are, however, generally averse to such systems when they foresee 
losing reputation because they expect frequent violations during the implementation 
stage. Given such differences in negotiating positions among parties when the disparities 
are large, international organizations can still play a crucial role by highlighting the 
potential benefits of working with international institutions and joining international 
agreements, as well as by moderating negotiating proposals. The following 
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recommendations can help existing international organizations to highlight the potential 
benefits of strong monitoring mechanisms within the framework of international 
agreements.  
 
Recommendation 2: During negotiation, seek to broaden networks with other 
international organizations.  
 
Expanding the knowledge base through networks that include other international 
organizations is an effective method currently practiced by many existing international 
organizations. For example, the TRAFFIC network (the wildlife trade monitoring 
network) is heralded as a successful example of pooling environmental data to strengthen 
implementation of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES). By establishing networks with other international institutions and promoting 
inter-agency cooperation, organizations benefit in three ways. First and foremost, the 
network can facilitate information flow while avoiding excessive information overlap. 
Second, creating a system where information can be cross-checked means more reliable 
information. Third, new organizations can create positive mission creep within the 
parameters of the authority delegated by the state parties.  
 
Recommendation 3: Find ways to engage non-governmental organizations, but also 
be wary of their potentially negative effects.  
 
Engaging non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is the principal method of 
gaining more leverage over information about compliance and expanding informational 
capacity. NGO involvement is rarely sufficient, by itself, to monitor compliance but will 
be particularly necessary when your organization does not have broad global reach. The 
relevant NGOs will function as fire alarms and thus provide ways for cheap and effective 
monitoring. However, be aware that NGOs often advocate partisan views, since most of 
them have advocacy roles. It is important to engage with a number of NGOs with a 
variety of views in order to avoid opposition from state parties. Member states, 
particularly democratic countries, are mindful of public opinion, and therefore, they may 
oppose the idea of expanding knowledge bases perceived to be biased. Recall the recent 
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Abu Ghraib scandal where intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the 
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had to be cautious about making their 
information public for financial and political reasons, in addition to reasons pertaining to 
the ICRC’s own internal policy of neutrality and discretion. In contrast, NGOs such as 
Amnesty International published their explicit opinions, some of which were not readily 
accepted by the United States government.  
In sum, expect moderate opposition regarding NGO involvement and strive to 
establish systems that engage organizations with sufficiently diverse views to avoid such 
accusations of bias and opposition. How the information is eventually used affects future 
decisions to establish monitoring systems, and in this regard, NGO involvement should 
be carefully considered. Currently, NGOs participate as observers in many treaties, and 
expanding knowledge bases by including more NGO participation should be conditioned 
upon the potentially divergent views of monitoring institutions held by negotiating 
parties, views stemming from political and economic systems that in turn affect 
compliance. If you expect negotiating parties to hold dramatically divergent views, try 
harder to bring in a broader spectrum of views from NGOs. 
 
Recommendation 4: Learn about potential risks in monitoring.  
 
As representatives of international organizations, it is important for you to be 
aware of the potential failures and misfires of monitoring systems. Two risks exist in 
performing monitoring functions: failing to spot violations and falsely accusing innocent 
countries. The kinds of risks the organization is willing to take influence the form 
monitoring institutions will take. In general, a sufficient level of success in spotting 
violations is necessary to have legitimacy as a monitoring body, and remaining resources 
can be spent on reducing the risk of false accusations to avoid diplomatic wars. 
Nominally, every organization has to focus primarily on deterring violations; however, it 
is not easy in practice to draw on a consensus on this point among involved nation states, 
especially when state parties have different compliance environments. Depending on the 
compliance environments they are in, some countries may want to focus on reducing the 
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risk of falsely accusing suspected countries, while others may want to focus on reducing 
the risk of detection failure.  
Also note the tradeoff between two types of errors. Reducing one type of 
monitoring error may actually increase another type of error. Focusing on deterring 
violations can make the system hypersensitive and thereby increase the risk of false 
accusations. Similarly, avoiding false accusations can increase the risk of detection 
failures. A delicate balance may have to be struck depending on the demands of the 
states, although the general rule should be followed of focusing primarily on deterrence.   
 
Recommendation 5: Find ways to bolster accountability and legitimacy.  
 
Gaining legitimacy should be one of the primary goals for any international 
organizations: by forming appropriate expectations regarding their role and by creating 
positive mission creep, international organizations can develop into efficient and reliable 
information collectors and providers. Eventually, they will be able to gain further support 
from member states for expanding their informational roles. This sought-after legitimacy 
is likely to come from implementing the above recommendations. For example, building 
networks with other international organizations can enhance the use of information by 
providing opportunities for double-checking. Recently, many international organizations 
have streamlined their reporting procedures and adopted a uniform format to facilitate 
reporting by state parties. Although this effort is laudable, data voluntarily reported by 
countries may contain inconsistent or incomplete information, and therefore, establishing 
networks with other international organizations can provide more reliable information.  
Accountability can also come from establishing an oversight body that can 
operate as an internal audit system, similar to the World Bank Inspection Panel. The 
Panel takes requests from various parties be affected by Bank projects, including NGOs, 
governments and private citizens, and investigates problems and addresses concerns 
about the Bank’s projects when necessary. The suggested measures to enhance legitimacy 
and accountability are essential in the management stage, but such considerations will aid 
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International third parties are difficult to establish, despite their potential benefits 
in terms of promoting transparency with respect to compliance environments. Both 
international negotiators and potential third parties should recognize that member 
countries’ political and economic differences regarding compliance can negatively affect 
their choice of monitoring mechanisms. It is therefore essential for negotiators as much as 
possible to de-politicize their negotiations over monitoring systems. It is essential to 
recognize potential differences before negotiation and improve understanding of each 
others’ compliance environments by eliminating domestic obstacles to compliance. 
Existing international organizations, likewise, should focus their efforts on improving 
their informational capacity to the extent possible by building informational networks 
with NGOs and setting up internal audit systems. Managing information based on these 






From Design to Practice:  
How Monitoring Institutions Actually Work 
 
This dissertation thus far has focused on statutory aspects of monitoring 
institutions. Adding to the analysis of de jure aspects of monitoring arrangements, this 
section studies their de facto aspects through evidence of actual practices. By looking at 
how monitoring institutions operate, we can get a better sense of the purpose of their 
design, while also learning about how monitoring institutions further cooperation. We 
can also examine how and when political conflicts obstruct the workings of existing 
arrangements. Since a systematic study of the effectiveness of monitoring institutions lies 
beyond the scope of this dissertation,291 my approach here will be illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. Accordingly, this section provides cases from three issue areas illustrating 
how monitoring institutions judge different kinds of violations (e.g. as involuntary or as 
undeterrable defections292) and how states respond after such judgments are made.  
I first identify the scope of involuntary or undeterrable defections in each issue 
area and excavate some cases that involve those kinds of defection. Cases echo the same 
theme explored throughout this dissertation—that countries try to utilize international 
organizations to further cooperation but face distributional conflicts due to the various 
kinds of defections that hamper commitments to international obligations. Through these 
particular cases, then, I intend to show that distributional conflicts continue play a 
decisive role in the adoption of monitoring agreements as well as in the operation of the 
international bodies that do the monitoring. I also discuss other theoretical elements such 
as the nature of commitment problems and the respective positions of involved actors 
regarding monitoring arrangments. 
                                                 
291 International relations scholars recently embarked on the efforts to assess the effect of international 
agreements or institutions (see Ringquist and Kostadinova 2005 for the case of the 1985 Helsinki Protocol, 
and Tomz, Goldstein and Rivers 2007 for the effect of WTO) and it may be too early to tell the effect of 
specific institutional arrangements like monitoring systems.  
292 As discussed in Chapter 2, these violations abstractly refer to cases where the cost of compliance is large 
and reciprocity does not work. These cases can arise either 1) when private parties within a country 
willfully violate international agreements, thereby causing involuntary defections on the part of a state; or 
2) when the cost of compliance is prohibitively high due to domestic political demands for protectionism. 
The first category consists of “involuntary” violations and the second consists of “undeterrable” violations.   
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In this section, I primarily look at the workings of global institutions. Note that 
monitoring institutions come in different forms and operate at different levels, from 
global to regional to bilateral to domestic. The co-existence of these levels may result in 
countries having more leeway to select an appropriate and/or advantageous forum when 
disputes occur. Added levels may operate as complementary systems. For instance, if two 
countries fail to achieve resolution through bilateral consultation, then regional or global 
monitoring bodies embodied in regional or global trade agreements can take up the issue 
for review. Future research will look at how different levels of institutional arrangements 
interact, which could provide us with a more comprehensive view of how monitoring 
institutions work in international politics.293 
 
How International Monitoring Institutions Operate regarding International Trade 
 
Systematic evidence has yet to be produced regarding the workings of the global 
trade regime, not to mention the workings of separate regional trade regimes. The World 
Trade Organization (WTO) has several sub-bodies that monitor the implementation of 
global trade regulations, including the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM) and the 
Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM). The TPRM is for regular reviews of domestic 
implementations (e.g. changes in legislation) and the DSM for disputes brought by 
complainant countries. Technically, the TPRM and DSB are separate processes but they 
work as complementary institutions for monitoring purposes. TPRM examines the 
trading practices of each WTO member whereas DSM focuses on the legal compatibility 
or compliance with WTO rules when suspected violations occur.  
The primary goal of TPRM is to enhance transparency. All WTO members are 
subject to review on a regular, periodic basis294 and the review is based on reports 
submitted by each party regarding the details of domestic trade policy 
                                                 
293  This investigation also addresses some aspects of forum shopping literature that is currently developing 
in the field of international organizations. See Davis 2007 and Busch 2007. 
294 The review is held every two years for the four members with the greatest share of world trade 
(currently the European Community, the United States, Japan and Canada), every four years for the next 16 
members (ranked in terms of their share of world trade), and every six years for other members, with the 
possibility of a longer term period for the least-developed countries. 
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implementations.295 The TPRM is essentially a preventive mechanism to avoid 
unnecessary retaliations before they occur by reviewing member nations’ trade policies. 
This is particularly important in the case of policies that may cause undeterrable 
violations when protectionist actions will yield large temporary political benefits to a 
particular party. The Review Mechanism was only established in 1989 and it is too early 
to judge the workings of TPRM, but the basic operating logic is to enhance transparency 
and thereby increase the power of preventive measures. 
The institutional effectiveness of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has also not 
yet been determined. Looking at all fifty cases that reached the Appellate Body (AB), 
Garrett and Smith (2001) assess compliance records of disputants and conclude that the 
overall record of compliance is not impressive. They report that it takes one year on 
average for countries to comply with decisions of the AB. If we add to this the 15-month 
period it takes on average to reach a decision, we see that countries get to reap the 
benefits of protectionist measures for almost 2.5 years. The cases that reach the AB stage 
are likely to be highly controversial and attract public attention, in many cases generating 
a public diplomatic contest. Therefore, some countries resort to a post-adjudicative 
bargaining process to get a “reasonable period of time” to adjust their policies. The 
adverse consequences of procedural tactics of this kind can be damaging to the principle 
of free trade embodied in WTO rules.  
Potential cases of undeterrable violations occur frequently in international trade. 
Politicians often find it difficult to cooperate due to protectionist demands from domestic 
groups; these politicians then face temporary incentives to impose protectionist measures 
to pander to groups with political clout. In this situation, politicians may resort to 
economic policies that fall in the so-called “grey areas,” such as anti-dumping policies, or 
countervailing duties or safeguards, thereby walking the fine line between compliance 
and non-compliance. International law generally relies on the good will of countries to 
comply with international obligations, and the spirit of the law hinges on the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. However, the letter of the law can allow some deviations to 
accommodate the politics of member states. 
                                                 
295 The notifications include the details of any new anti-dumping or countervailing legislation, new 
technical standards affecting trade, changes to regulations affecting trade in services, and laws or 
regulations concerning the Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) agreement. 
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The WTO steps in and issues its rulings in such controversial cases that activate 
the dispute settlement mechanism. The DSB judges a particular case based on relevant 
legal criteria and often looks into administrative procedures. For instance, in dispute 
cases that involve safeguards, the DSB weighs the fact that one of the requirements of 
safeguards measures is “unforeseen developments.” In the case of the 2003 steel case,296 
for example, the appellate body concluded that the US failed to prove the need for 
safeguard measures, and one of the evidentiary documents submitted consisted of 
administrative opinions. While the law requires that there be a sudden and significant 
increase in imports,297 the United States government failed to prove that this was the case. 
In its ruling, the WTO panel found that the inconsistent and irreconcilable conclusions of 
three U.S. International Trade Commission Commissioners formed the basis for President 
Bush’s determination.298  
Less well known, the WTO also has a follow-up procedure called compliance 
panel besides the panel and appellate procedures. The goal of the compliance panel is to 
monitor whether nations found in violation have worked toward lifting protectionist 
measures. The process however is not automatic. Any party that has issues about 
implementation progress can request for the establishment of the Compliance Panel. Thus 
far, among 331 total cases requested for consultation, only 10 cases reached up to the 
Compliance Panel stage.299  
Various cases of trade relations provide mixed evidence about the overall effect of 
international monitoring arrangements. All the tactical delays within the dispute 
settlement process hurt the spirit of the WTO rules. High-profile cases not only nullify 
the effect of the DSB but also undermine the very basis of monitoring institutions. The 
systematic and scholarly evidence needed to investigate this field is still being gathered. 
The existing literature focuses heavily on policy outcomes—whether trade volume 
                                                 
296 United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS248, 249, 
250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 258, 259/AB/R, adopted 10 December, 2003. 
297 See the case of Argentina—Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear.  
298 Trachtman 2003.  
299 The cases include high profile ones such as US-FSC (Foreign Sales Corporation), Canada-Dairy and 
EC-Banana. Horn and Mavroidis 2005. WTO Dispute Settlement Database The dataset is accessible at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20804376~
pagePK:64214825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html Horn, Hendrik and Petros Mavroidis 2006. 
“The WTO Dispute Settlement System 1995-2004: Some Descriptive Statistics”   
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increases or not300—instead of on the various behavioral implications of what institutions 
did to change countries’ behaviors. Further research on behavioral changes influenced by 
monitoring institutions will include issues such as 1) when and why countries resort to 
dispute settlement rather than negotiation and 2) when and why countries restrain 
themselves from imposing retaliatory and protectionist measures. 
 
How International Monitoring Institutions Operate  
regarding International Fisheries 
 
Global environmental cooperation depends on the collection and sharing of 
reliable scientific evidence, given the inherent uncertainty that exists about the true state 
of the world. Resource management issues such as fisheries management are no 
exception to this rule. Judgments about the current status of the world’s fish populations 
and about future risks also, in turn, condition judgments about what measures need to be 
taken. Global institutions that monitor fisheries include the UN Fisheries and Aquaculture 
Department (FAO), the Coordinating Working Party of Fisheries Statistics (CWP) and 
the Fishery Resources Monitoring System (FIRMS/FIGIS). In collaboration with those 
global institutions, regional fisheries management organizations (RFMO) provide 
monitoring tools for fisheries management.301 
Monitoring institutions that oversee fisheries include scientific bodies that provide 
advice for management and conservation, as well as regulatory bodies such as 
commissions that set management policies for matters such as total allowable catches 
(TAC) or catch allocation schemes. Adding to the scholarship that discusses fisheries 
management bodies,302 this section attempts to assess the role of fisheries monitoring 
bodies in the 1995 Turbot War. Conflicts are the instances where people expect not much 
significant role for international institutions, but I intend to show how countries involved 
in the Turbot War recognized the benefits of having monitoring institutions. I also discuss 
                                                 
300 The most recent debate on the effect of GATT was between Rose 2004 and Tomz, Rivers and Goldstein 
2006.  
301 A list of RFMOs can be found at http://www.fao.org/fi/website/FISearch.do?dom=rfb  
302 Exemplary works include Kaye 1979 and Peterson 2001.  
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how the involved parties re-designed the existing institutions to take into account their 
distributional concerns.  
The theory of asymmetric compliance environments presented in Chapter 2 
accounts for the preferences of concerned parties in utilizing international monitoring 
bodies. When a party is guaranteed flexibility mechanisms, it may be willing to submit 
itself to international monitoring or adjudication. Flexibility mechanisms have this effect 
because they grant the accused party the opportunity to demonstrate its compliance and 
thereby avoid unnecessary punishments. On the other hand, when a party expects 
commitment problems from other countries, then this party may not want to rely on 
international bodies because the informational benefit of having such bodies distinguish 
compliance from non-compliance disappears at the margin. The cost of allowing 
occasional violations, following the decision of a particular monitoring body, looms large 
when one of the parties has obvious commitment problems.  
The Turbot War is a nice case to illustrate the relationship between commitment 
problems and the propensity of countries to accept international monitoring bodies when 
three conditions exist. The long duration of the Turbot War (1960-1996) allows us to 
compare different levels of commitment problems during both pre-dispute and actual 
dispute stages. When commitment problems were not an issue and fish stocks were 
abundant, during the 1970s, the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) 
provided sharing arrangements to the relevant parties. When the commitment problem 
became prominent and when one party (Canada) started to expect violations by its 
counterpart (the EU), it preemptively took measures to opt out of the international body 
by filing a reservation. Canada also took measures not to be subject to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with regard to conservation measures. 
Finally, it was able to arrange new monitoring mechanisms under the framework of 
NAFO as a result of negotiation with the EU.  
The dispute started when Canada fired upon and seized a Spanish ship, the Estai, 
just outside of the Canadian EEZ, in March 1995. This was at a time when both Canada 
and the EU were noticing the depletion of fish stocks in the Northwest Atlantic. The 
dispute was as a result of an action by a small Spanish trawler – frequent cause of private 
violations that may be difficult to deter and often not attributable to state. Earlier, in May 
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1994, Canada enacted its own conservation measure, authorizing the Coastguard to seize 
any vessel suspected of illegal fishing. The Estai was using illegal nets that would not 
allow young fish to escape. At this time, Europeans were also dissatisfied with the catch 
allocation arrangements assigned by NAFO. In the aftermath of the seizure of the Estai, 
Canadian politicians benefited from a surge in public support. Opinion polls showed that 
the tough action was backed by 9 out of 10 Canadians interviewed.303  
Recognizing the need for further action, Canada and the EU decided to strengthen 
NAFO’s inspection system with measures such as verification of gear and catch records, 
and satellite surveillance; they also introduced regulatory measures such as fines and 
restrictions on fishing nets.304 The parties therefore established assurance mechanisms 
that would give each party some degree of confidence regarding the compliance of the 
other party. We should note that this bargaining outcome was part of the larger bargain to 
find a solution to long-standing distributional conflicts between Canada and the European 
Union. Before the dispute, the EU was not happy about the allocation scheme by NAFO 
that assigned to the EU only 12.5% of the 27,000-ton allotment, compared with almost 
60% assigned to Canada. The EU therefore had decided to act unilaterally. As a result of 
the bargain after the dispute, the EU was able to triple the size of its allocation305 by 
agreeing to the new monitoring scheme. As discussed in the theory chapter, a trade-off 
exists between monitoring arrangements and enforcement schemes: some concession in 
the area of enforcement may be necessary to ensure commitment to a monitoring scheme. 
In this case, Canada made concessions regarding it allocation amount in order to establish 
a new inspection scheme within the framework of NAFO. 
Another international body that played a role in this dispute was the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ). The Court decided to review the case because of the optional 
clause Canada filed before the dispute. Canada had filed a reservation to the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ that excluded cases involving conservation measures. The 
reservation conveniently came two days before the parliament passed the 1994 Coastal 
Fisheries Protection Act that authorized the seizure of any illegal foreign vessel.  
                                                 





The Turbot War case shows that design factors continuously influence the 
implementation of monitoring institutions. NAFO operated as a management body for 
two decades, laying out sharing arrangements among member parties. However, this 
management power stopped working when the tragedy of the declining fish stocks got 
worse. When distributional conflicts became serious, countries resorted to unilateral 
measures rather than take a multilateral approach.  
When Canada, the EU, and the United States concluded the NAFO agreement in 
1969, there was no looming problem of overfishing. The relationship among these parties 
was rather friendly. This is consistent with the theoretical expectation that rather 
homogeneous fishing industry structures that did not generate much competition were 
amenable to the establishment of international monitoring bodies. For a while, the sharing 
arrangement crafted by NAFO was accepted by all members.  
Circumstances changed in the mid-1980s. Canada, politically hurt by its declining 
fishing industry in Nova Scotia in particular, took domestic measures to prevent other 
countries from fishing in its EEZ waters. Once commitment problems loomed large, the 
countries’ propensity to accept the NAFO arrangement declined. At this point, the 
Canadian government even went so far as to submit a declaration to limit its exposure to 
compulsory jurisdiction in issues of conservation. As mentioned, the timing was such that 
the reservation came two days before the parliament passed the Coastal Fisheries 
Protection Act that authorized the seizure of any illegal foreign vessel. According to the 
theoretical expectation, the expectation that serious EU violations were forthcoming put 
Canada in a position to reject any use of an international body.  
At this point, NAFO was weak due to its lack of any dispute settlement 
mechanism, and the ICJ could not take up the case because of the jurisdictional 
exemption filed by Canada. This case illustrates how commitment problems can reduce 
the propensity of countries to turn to international bodies for adjudication or information-
sharing purposes. The Turbot War case nicely shows that NAFO was a useful tool for 
members during the 1970s, but when the dispute over violations erupted, member 
countries shied away from engaging with international bodies, whether NAFO or the ICJ. 
The monitoring institution was strengthened after the Turbot War when both parties 
adjusted allocation schemes to alleviate commitment problems. Canada could agree to 
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having a stronger monitoring scheme under NAFO primarily to deter future violations of 
EU fishermen; from the perspective of EU, the primary benefit was to increase its catch 
allocation while agreeing to such arrangement. It could also prevent future instances of 
such conflicts. 
The general conclusion from this case is that the design of monitoring institutions 
may change over time depending on the political atmosphere (in this case, the political 
incentives of Canadian politicians), environmental factors (i.e. depletion of fish stocks), 
and bargaining deals the parties could strike (i.e. adjustment to catch allocation scheme) 
to reach the conclusion of having a stronger monitoring scheme. The exercise and 
effectiveness of monitoring institutions therefore ultimately hinge upon the acceptance of 
involved actors and their surrounding political circumstances. 
 
How International Monitoring Institutions Operate regarding Arms Control 
 
Undeterrable violations in the area of security issues are not as prevalent as in 
other areas due to the terrifying consequences involved. At the same time, the collection 
of information in this area, and the corresponding judgments about possible violations, 
are made more difficult by virtue of the highly secretive nature of most security matters. 
In the realm of security, compared to other areas, the threshold for tolerating violations is 
also much lower because of the huge dangers that violations entail. In security matters, 
the overlap between cooperation and compliance is greater than it is in trade matters, 
where compliance with legal rules may not necessarily mean cooperation. As a result, not 
many flexible mechanisms are allowed relative to the other issue areas of environment or 
trade. 
Just as fisheries management started with the collection of scientific evidence 
geared toward conserving resources, arms control agreements emerge in the context of a 
continuous activity of monitoring. The interpretation of collected information is 
ultimately political and the process of collecting information is also subject to political 
decisions made by inspectors and inspectees. The case of IAEA inspections between 
2002 and 2007 of suspected Iranian nuclear program sites is a case in point. In the 
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following paragraphs, using the case of Iran, I will describe the working of IAEA306 and 
how the Agency verifies compliance and involves the UN Security Council to formulate 
policy responses to potentially undeterrable violations. In the process of collecting 
evidence on Iranian compliance, the IAEA deferred its judgment to the UNSC as to 
whether Iranian violations happened in the context of overriding domestic political 
incentives—with the rationale that, if this were the case, punishments for Iran in the form 
of sanctions might be prohibitively costly. This consideration was reflected on the fact 
that Russia and China were reluctant to the idea of imposing tough sanctions on Iran. 
Although the IAEA provided the basic facts about the Iranian compliance with the NPT 
and safeguards agreements, the ultimate political judgment was within the Security 
Council. 
The Iranian case illustrates why reaching a judgment on compliance requires 
basic information collection activities as well as final political decision. The first step is 
to collect objective evidence to determine whether compliance has occurred or not. The 
IAEA’s job was to verify the existence of an Iranian nuclear program by visiting 
particular sites and cross-validating reports from the Iranian government. As international 
security issues usually pose high risks to other countries, the final judgment on 
compliance critically depends on the facts gathered on the ground. The second step of 
determining a violation is to identify and categorize the kinds of violations before the 
appropriate policy response can be devised. Iranian violation of NPT may be undeterrable 
but no violations are essentially or absolutely undeterrable. The determination depends on 
how involved countries, in this case permanent members within the Security Council, 
view the violation and issue political decision. If a punishment response entails 
prohibitive costs, violations may go unpunished. After the IAEA gathers the basic facts, 
the Security Council steps in to determine what policy responses are necessary. 
Detailed account of the Iranian case shows this two-step process of monitoring 
and policy decisions. Suspicions regarding a secret Iranian nuclear program first appeared 
in 2002. In 2006, Iran was clearly in violation of the terms of various safeguards 
agreements by virtue of removing IAEA seals at enrichment-related locations.307 
                                                 
306 The politics of designing the IAEA inspection system has been discussed in Chapter 5. 
307 IAEA Press release 2006/02 “Iran begins removal of IAEA seals at enrichment-related locations” 
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However, whether Tehran was in violation of NPT has been difficult to ascertain.  As 
discussed in Chapter 5, many actions involved in the development of nuclear weapons 
fall into a grey area where violations are hard to prove. Uranium enrichment can occur 
even during the use of peaceful nuclear energy; the use of heavy-water reactors 
contributes to the enrichment of uranium. Since the IAEA did not have access to non-
declared materials, it could not confirm compliance. 
Iran was subject to a comprehensive safeguards agreement but had not signed the 
additional protocol that covers undeclared materials.308 The fact that the IAEA has 
established systems for monitoring nuclear weapons does not necessarily mean that these 
systems are going to be accepted by the inspectees in every instance. NPT members have 
designed the verification program such that the inspectors need permission to enter 
nuclear sites. Countries first have to grant the IAEA rights of access and authority for 
verification. Iran refused to grant rights to all potential nuclear sites. 
Despite the limitation that the inspectors could not review undeclared materials or 
visit undesignated sites, the IAEA’s mandate was to investigate the nature of the Iranian 
nuclear program.309 While Iran refused to suspend its program, the IAEA had been 
working as an information clearinghouse to deal with the Iranian case. The IAEA has 
asked for relevant documents but Iran had provided the agency with false information 
regarding its centrifuge procurement efforts.310 The IAEA, even after three years of 
inspection, could not confirm whether Iran was developing nuclear weapons or not. Since 
Iran broke the seals, the IAEA could not verify the nature of the Iranian nuclear program 
and, beyond its defiant attitude toward the IAEA, Tehran’s exact intentions remained 
unclear. 
The Agency does not have direct enforcement power but can refer matters to the 
Security Council. Not all the judgments circulated within the IAEA go to the Security 
Council, but only those that are approved by the General Council of the Agency. The 
IAEA makes its final decisions about adopting resolutions at its General Conference by a 
two-thirds majority vote, based on the recommendations and draft resolutions submitted 
by the Board of Directors. With a two-thirds majority approval from the Board, IAEA 
                                                 
308 IAEA 2002. 
309 Iran had several nuclear sites including Arak, Natanz, Pars Trash and Farayand Technique. 
310 Kerr 2006. 
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resolutions go to the Security Council. In October 2005, the Board passed its resolution 
on Iran containing the accusation that Iran had breached international nuclear safeguards 
and engaged in suspicious nuclear activities, “giving rise to questions that are within the 
competence of the Security Council.”311 The resolution, however, failed to reach the 
UNSC because the vote was twenty-two in favor, with one against and twelve 
abstentions.312 The EU pushed for the agenda but faced opposition from Russia, China, 
and some Nonaligned Movement countries on the Board. At that time, Iran had 
threatened to restart uranium enrichment and stop admitting snap IAEA inspections if the 
resolution were adopted. The Agency had given several verdicts on the nature of the 
Iranian nuclear program, but none of these cleared Iran of suspicion. In 2003 and 
February 2007, after inspecting declared nuclear materials, the Agency announced 
finding no proof of any weapons program. The IAEA consistently announced that “the 
Agency is not yet in a position to conclude that there are no undeclared nuclear materials 
or activities in Iran.”313 The Agency meant that it could not confirm Iranian compliance, 
but it did not directly say that Iran was non-compliant. The connection between the IAEA 
and UNSC also illustrates the related problem of determining non-compliance when the 
formulation of policy seems to be difficult. 
How did the UNSC react to this situation where Iran was not fully cooperating 
with IAEA inspections? The UNSC thus far has imposed two sanctions. The first 
sanction in December 2006 mandated that UN members not supply Iran with any 
equipment or technology that could help its uranium enrichment.314 The second sanction 
in March 2007 sought to target the elite Revolutionary Guard by banning dealings with 
the state Bank Sepah and 28 other Iranian organizations.315 The sanctions, however, 
remain weak, mainly because China and Russia oppose the imposition of strong 
sanctions. Iranian efforts to develop nuclear weapons have not been deterred so far and 
                                                 
311 Lagenbach et al. 2005. 
312 The twenty-two countries who voted “in favor” were Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, 
Ecuador, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, 
Singapore, Slovakia, South Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States; the 12 states who 
abstained were Algeria, Brazil, China, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Tunisia, 
Vietnam, and Yemen; the one state that voted against was Venezuela. The voting record is from Legenbach 
et al. 2005. 
313 This appeared in August and September resolutions of 2005. 
314 Resolution 1737. 
315 Resolution 1747. 
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are proving to be undeterrable in the absence of tougher levels or a wider scope of 
economic sanctions.  
The case of IAEA inspections of the Iranian nuclear program conveys a complex 
picture of monitoring compliance. International organizations use their expertise to verify 
compliance but their activities are essentially political. The information collection 
activity of the IAEA vis-à-vis Iran was contingent upon the safeguard agreements with 
Iran that limited the Agency’s authority to oversee undeclared materials. Even after three 
years, the IAEA did not arrive at a definitive final judgment, and the resolution it passed 
was overshadowed by the distributional conflicts among the members of its Board and 
the members of the Security Council. NPT members saw the benefit of the IAEA and 
created the institution, but its operation has been limited by bilateral safeguard 
agreements and the policy decisions of the UNSC.  
The preceding examination of three issue areas—WTO rulings, the Turbot War, 
and the inspection of the Iranian nuclear program—turns up the same theme that was 
highlighted earlier in this dissertation: states create international organizations and 
delegate authority to a greater or lesser degree, but the constraints that affected the design 
of these institutions continue to limit their effectiveness. On the one hand, we observe 
evidence of institutional effectiveness of monitoring mechanisms. For instance, the 
development and history of NAFO monitoring illustrate that international organizations 
have helped avert unnecessary and counterproductive retaliation and spiraling disputes. 
In the case of Turbot War, Canada and Spain were able to agree to monitoring 
mechanisms by adjusting catch allocations. On the other hand, the institutional effect of 
monitoring bodies continues to be an object of study, as examined by the mixed record of 
effectiveness of global trade institutions. Scholars are not settled with the question of 
whether the WTO has contributed to the increase in trade flows, let alone the institutional 
effectiveness of an institution as a whole. International monitoring institutions, such as 
the dispute settlement body of the WTO and the IAEA, have faced a number of instances 
of non-compliance; whether their efforts to bring about behavioral changes can be called 






Technical Supplement to Chapter II 
I characterize the equilibrium in each scenario (incomplete information, reporting mechanism and 
verification equilibrium) and present equilibrium-supporting conditions while calculating the equilibrium 
payoffs. These characterizations form the basis for the proofs for lemmas, propositions and corollaries. 
 




Let Vi be the continuation value of this incomplete information game for player i.
316 Then STATE 1 
gets a cooperation payoff of 1 in addition to the continuation value in later rounds under Normal Times 
with probability of 1-ε. In Difficult Times, which occurs with probability ε, STATE 1 would gain 2α by 
cheating but only get zero in the subsequent round because of STATE 2’s retaliatory action and the 
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Patience Level to Support Equilibrium 
 
To obtain the patience level (delta)317 of both players under the incomplete information case, I 
check the condition where STATE 1 is better off cooperating than defecting under Normal Times. 
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equilibrium supporting δ is calculated as,  
                                                 
316 The continuation value is the total utility expected in later rounds, calculated from an equilibrium. For 
its use in iterated games, see Morrow (1989; 262) 
317 Delta is the discount factor that measures how much a player values future. In international relations 
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Note that the required patience level of S1 is lower in the incomplete information case than in the 








1 . In contrast, the required patience level for STATE 2 became higher 
given the asymmetric information. The uncertainty about the sources of non-compliance requires more 




I verbally sketch the reporting equilibrium and then outline the logic more formally. To obtain 
equilibrium of this reporting mechanism, the key question to ask is whether an honest communicative 
equilibrium exists where STATE 1 sends an honest signal to STATE 2. The answer is negative because this 
game approximates a cheap talk game. By all accounts, STATE 1 should send the signal ‘d’ if a defection 
occurs in Difficult Times. It is never in his interest to send the signal ‘n’ when Normal Times actually 
happens. STATE 1 might have an incentive to play D and opportunistically reap the benefit of α and then 
send his dishonest signal ‘b’ to mislead STATE 2. STATE 1 does not gain by sending signal ‘n’ when a 
violation occurs in Normal Times: he is better off sending ‘d’ regardless of the situation.  
This characteristic of cheap talk becomes clearer when I examine the response of STATE 2. An 
appropriate question here is whether STATE 2 would be able to deter such opportunistic defection with a 
punishment mechanism. Recall that in the incomplete information case, STATE 2 enters the punishment 
phase every time defection occurs. Now suppose that under reporting mechanism, in contrast, STATE 2 may 
decide to punish probabilistically. Assume that STATE 2 wants to play D (and punish STATE 1 one period) 
with the probability of p and play C (go back to cooperation regardless) with the probability 1-p. Could 
STATE 2 be able to assign such probabilities enough to deter STATE 1 from lying and sending the signal ‘d’ 
when the actual situation was Normal Times? It turns out that the probabilistic use of punishment cannot 
make an equilibrium strategy because STATE 1 will always send the signal ‘d’ to avoid punishment. To 
summarize, the honest reporting mechanism cannot be supported as equilibrium, and therefore, STATE 2 will 
not condition his strategy upon STATE 1’s signal.  
Consequently, STATE 1 sends the same signal ‘d’ all along and STATE 2 does not have any reason to 
believe the signal and condition his strategy on that signal. Regardless of honesty entailed in the signal, 
STATE 2 has to retaliate if a defection occurs. Therefore, learning from the signal does not occur as the 
signal is not informative about STATE 1’s defection environment.  
Now I write the logic more formally. Assume that STATE 2 punishes probabilistically. If STATE 2 
receives the signal ‘n,’ he will punish with probability ‘p.’ In addition, STATE 2 will punish with probability 
‘q’ for signal ‘d,’ such that p > q. p > q means that the probability of punishment given signal ‘a’ is larger 
than the probability of punishment given the signal ‘b.’ This should be the case because STATE 2 should 
punish opportunistic violation but may forgive undeterrable violations to restore cooperation after defection 
and to sustain future cooperation. Let’s first check which signal STATE 1 wants to send given the Normal 
Times, by comparing expected utility for sending ‘n’ and ‘d,’ that is, )(&)( 11 NduNnu  and 
)(&)( 11 DduDnu . 
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Likewise, under Difficult Times, STATE 1 is better off sending ‘d.’ 
 
The ex ante expected utilities for STATE 1 and STATE 2 then are the same as in the incomplete information 
game, because the signals do not communicate any information; neither player changes its strategy as a 
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If the punishment period is to be only round only, additional conditions specified under incomplete 
information equilibrium should also be satisfied. 
 
The Role of Costly Signals 
 
Cheap talk is not the only means of communication, as Austen-Smith and Banks (2000) 
demonstrated. If an informed party is willing to impose costs, informative equilibrium could be created. 
Critical questions are whether such costly signal equilibrium is plausible and how much cost would be 
enough to convince the other party of its situation. This section demonstrates how costly signals, unlike 
under reporting mechanism, generate a cooperative equilibrium by informing S2 (uninformed party) of 
S1’s (informed party that knows the source of non-compliance) honesty/dishonesty. I assume that the cost 
is attached to the signal and perfectly observable. It is paid when S1 sends a signal, which comes right after 
a defection occurs and right before both players make next move.318 Costly signals can be thought of as 
diplomatic efforts or costly policy changes on the part of a violator. 
In what follows, I show how costly signals create an honest communicative equilibrium in the 
context of undistinguishable sources of non-compliance. The key problem in cheap talk (i.e. reporting 
mechanism) was that S2 could not figure out which situation, A or B, occurred. It was because S1 always 
sent ‘b’ regardless of the true situation. S2 therefore has no choice but to punish indiscriminately.  
Now, suppose there are two types of S1, honest and dishonest types. S2 has prior beliefs about 
those types. I assume the following and check for the existence of equilibrium. Prior beliefs about honest 
types are 0)(,0)(,1)(,1)( ==== AbpBapAapBbp  while S2’s prior beliefs about dishonest 
types are 1)(,0)(,0)(,1)( ==== AbpBapAapBbp .319 In other words, S2 believes that honest 
types send the signal true to the situation while dishonest types send signal ‘b’ regardless of the situation.320 
The key question for S2 then is how to distinguish between the two types {honest, dishonest}. The task is 
especially difficult when S2 receives the signal b. It is because the signal could be true coming from the 
honest types but at the same time, it could be from dishonest S1 who tries to avoid punishment by lying. 
Meanwhile, the question for honest type S1 is how to distinguish himself from dishonest types and avoid 
unnecessary punishments.  
                                                 
318 Thus, the sequence still retains the sequence of simultaneous move, not alternating move, since the 
actors get to move at every opportunity (Axelrod, 2000). 
319 This restrictive assumption about prior belief eliminates the possibility of semi-separating equilibrium. 
The more reasonable assumption would be to assign different probability for a type that faces Situation A 
(probability of p) and the other type that faces Situation B (probability of 1-p) randomly drawn by Nature. 
That way, conventional signaling of costly signal would work with three different types of equilibria: 
pooling, separating and semi-separating. I am currently working on this possibility.  
320 The prior beliefs are common to S1 as well as to S2.  
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Honest types of S1 would be able to distinguish themselves by paying some costs when signaling. 
They will send ‘a’ in A and ‘b’ in B. When sending ‘b,’ honest types could distinguish themselves by 
paying direct costs to avoid punishment from S2.321 Dishonest types would send ‘b’ regardless of the 
condition and does not pay the cost. In response, S2 could now condition his action upon his observation of 
the costs attached to the signals. If S2 observes costs from S1, he could conclude that it is facing honest 
type of S1. Otherwise, he will think that he is facing a dishonest type and punish indiscriminately 
regardless of the source of violation.  
In thinking about costly signals, the concept of subgame perfection does not work since beliefs are 
involved. Since S2 has to update his belief at every subgame coupled with his strategy, I use the concept of 
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). To construct PBE and find the conditions that support the costly 
signal communication, first, S2’s belief should be sequentially rational, and the beliefs are updated 




































for dishonest type who does not pay the cost.  
Under cheap talk, signal ‘b’ was meaningless informing S2 of the source of non-compliance. Now 
with costly signals, S2 can update its belief upon observing the costly signal, depending on the cost paid by 
S1. 
How large should the cost be to support the separating equilibrium? ‘c*’ should be large enough to 
make dishonest types not to resort to the cost. In other words, it should be the case that dishonest types 
cannot afford the cost to imitate honest types. If a defection occurs in Situation B, dishonest types should 
not be willing to pay the cost. In equilibrium, upon observing the cost ‘c’ less than the threshold c* and 
signal ‘b,’ S2 updates its belief and thinks that S1 is a dishonest type with the probabilityε . The expected 
utility of not paying the cost and taking the punishment should exceed that of paying the cost and being 
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Also, it should be worthwhile for honest type S1 to pay the cost to convince S2 to return to cooperation. 
That is, the expected utility of paying the cost should be greater than that of not paying after a defection in 













                                                 
321 Possible alternatives for modeling costly signals are 1) audience cost paid over time as opposed to one-
time payment, and 2) penalty for lying (e.g. cost for b given Situation A is larger than that of b given 
Situation B). I design the costly signal as sincere efforts/gestures on the sender’s part to make the receiver 
believe its non-compliance situation.   
322 Morrow, 1994, p.164 
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The cost should be then, 11 )1()1( VcV δδδεδ −<<− . It is the range of the cost within which 
S2 would be able to determine S1’s type as an honest one. If the cost is smaller than 1)1( Vδεδ − , S2 
thinks that S1 is a dishonest type and updates its belief to ε . 
To summarize, there could be a communicative equilibrium with costly signals, where S2 could 
separate honest and dishonest types. Strategy and belief pairs for separating communicative equilibrium are 
written as follows:  
 
Example of Costly Signal Equilibrium Strategies 
Actor  Strategy & Signal 
S1 • Honest type S1 plays C in A, D in B, and sends honest signals (that is, ‘a’ given A 
and ‘b’ given B). Sending ‘b’ honest type S1 attaches the cost ‘c’ of 
1)1( Vδεδ − , the lowest pay possible to distinguish himself from dishonest types. 
• Dishonest type S1 plays C in A, plays D in B, and sends ‘b’ and does not incur any 
cost. It sends c=0. 
S2 Play C. If a defection occurs, punishes S1 one period if ‘c’ is not observed. Forgo the single 
punishment period if ‘c’ is observed where 11 )1()1( VcV δδδεδ −<<− , maintaining 
the belief for honest types (which is unity). If ‘c’is not observed, update the belief from 1 to 
ε for dishonest types.  
 
Pooling equilibrium could also occur but trivial to discuss. If ‘c’ is greater than the threshold, 1)1( Vδδ − , 
even honest types tell a lie and send signal ‘b’ all the time. Accordingly, S2 does not update its belief and 
equilibrium remains the same as in the incomplete information case. Similarly, if ‘c’ is too small (i.e., 
1)1( Vc δεδ −< ), no updating occurs on S2’s part and it has to resort to indiscriminate punishment. 
 




I first obtain equilibrium payoffs and then other additional conditions to support equilibrium with 
the involvement of a verification agency. Following the equilibrium strategy, the ex ante expected payoff 
for STATE 1 is  
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=V , he gets 
benefits from the agency since the presence of independent information prevents STATE 2 from imposing 
unnecessary punishment on STATE 1.  
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=V . The expected utility with the participation of the verification agency is again found 
to be greater.323  
 
As in other scenarios, it should be the case that S1 should be willing to play C instead of D when 
the Normal Times is given. That is, )()( 11 NDEUNCEU >  
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Patience Level to Support Verification Equilibrium 
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Proof of Lemma 1 (relative importance of two types of verification accuracy, q and r) 
 
To see the relative effects of q and r on players’ equilibrium discount factors, we take the first 
derivatives with respect to q and r. Substantively, the derivatives indicate the rate at which patience level is 











                                                 
















































The negative first derivatives indicate that the increase in either type of verification accuracy 























The comparison of two negative partial derivatives shows the decreasing rate of change of the 
patience level with respect to r and q. Two interpretations follow given the larger decreasing rate with 
respect to q than to r. First, *δ is more sensitive to the change in q than that in r. This means that the 
equilibrium in order to be stable requires a certain level of q. A small drop in q could dramatically increase 
the required level of patience for cooperation. Second, increasing q is a more effective way of lowering the 
threshold patience level, producing a more inclusive treaty with more diverse set of member countries. I 
conclude that increasing q is more effective than increasing r in inducing cooperation. This is because q can 
easily raise the effectiveness of the monitoring agency by letting a violator suffer through the punishment 
phase. In contrast, r operates merely to eliminate unnecessary punishments, and therefore elicits less 
patience compared to q. ▮  
 
Proof of Remark 1 (trade-off in monitoring accuracy)  
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Proof Proposition 1 (distributional conflicts due to shocks, ε)  
 
Recall the definition of verification gains (Definition 1). Following the definition, the verification gain for 






























































To see the marginal effect of shocks on the size of verification gains, check the first order condition of the 
gains for each player.  
 
























VG  , exists. The distributional conflicts that inhibit the establishment of an international 
monitoring system occur when the flexibility level ε exceeds the threshold ε*.  This is because 









List of Regional Trade Agreements in the Sample 
 
Signature 
Year Agreement Name Alternate Name 
1957 EC  
1960 CACM Central American Common Market 
1960 EFTA1 Stockholm Convention 
1964 UDEAC Central African Customs and Economic Union 
1965 CARIFTA Caribbean Free Trade Association; Dickenon Bay Agreement 
1967 EAC1 Abuja Treaty; Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
1969 CAN 
Andean Pact; Codification of the Andean Subregional Integration 
Agreement; Andean Community; Cartagena Agreement 
1969 SACU1 Southern African Customs Union 
1973 CARICOM Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community; Treaty of Chaguaramas 
1973 CEAO West African Economic Community 
1973 Manor River Union  
1975 ECOWAS1 Economic Community of West African States 
1975 Bangkok Agt  
1976 CEPGL 
Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs; Economic Community 
of the Countries of the Great Lakes 
1978 PATCRA Papua New Guinea-Australia Trade and Commercial Relations Agreement 
1980 SPARTECA South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement 
1981 OECS Organization of East Caribbean States 
1981 PTA Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa  
1981 GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 
1983 CER Closer Economic Relations: ANZCERTA 
1983 ECCAS 
Economic Community of Central African States; Communauté Économique 
des États d'Afrique Centrale (CEEAC) 
1984 LAIA Latin American Integration Association; ALADI; Treaty of Montevideo 
1985 Dominican Republic - Panama  
1985 United States — Israel  
1986 Panama - El Salvador  
1991 Chile - Central America  
1991 MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 
1991 India - Nepal  
1992 EEA European Economic Area 
1992 EFTA2  
1992 CEFTA Central European FTA 
1992 AFTA ASEAN FTA 
1992 Armenia - Russian Federation  
1993 Chile - Bolivia  
1993 Chile - Venezuela  
1993 Chile - Colombia  
1993 NAFTA North American FTA 
1993 Czech Republic - Slovakia  
1993 Armenia - Moldova  
1993 Baltic FTA / BAFTA  
1993 ECOWAS2  
1994 Romania - Moldova  
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1994 Mexico - Bolivia  
1994 Group of Three  
1994 WAEMU/UEMOA West African Economic and Monetary Union 
1994 Kyrgyz Republic — Kazakhstan  
1994 
Kyrgyz Republic — Russian 
Federation 
 
1994 Kyrgyz Republic — Armenia 
1994 Mexico — Costa Rica  
1994 COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
1994 Hungary - Slovenia  
1994 CIS Commonwealth of Independent States; Minsk Agreement 
1994 Armenia - Ukraine  
1994 Georgia —  Russian Federation  
1994 MSG Melanesian Spearhead Group 
1995 Kyrgyz Republic — Ukraine  
1995 Kyrgyz Republic — Moldova  
1995 Armenia - Turkmenistan  
1995 Estonia - Ukraine  
1995 Georgia —  Armenia  
1996 Estonia - Czech Republic  
1996 Canada — Chile  
1996 Czech Republic - Lithuania  
1996 Czech Republic - Israel  
1996 Israel — Turkey  
1996 Estonia - Slovenia  
1996 Kyrgyz Republic — Uzbekistan  
1996 Canada — Israel  
1996 Israel - Slovakia  
1996 Czech Republic - Latvia  
1996 Estonia - Slovakia  
1996 Georgia —  Azerbaijan  
1996 SADC Southern African Development Community  
1996 Georgia —  Turkmenistan  
1997 Georgia —  Kazakhstan  
1997 Croatia - Slovenia  
1997 Romania — Turkey  
1997 Croatia - Macedonia  
1997 Czech Republic - Turkey  
1997 Israel - Poland  
1997 SAPTA 
South Asian Preferential Trade Arrangement; SAARC Preferential Trading 
Agreement 
1997 Estonia - Turkey  
1998 Chile - Peru  
1998 Chile — Mexico  
1998 Hungary - Lithuania  
1998 Hungary - Israel  
1998 Hungary - Turkey  
1998 Estonia - Hungary  
1998 India - Sri Lanka  
1998 Bulgaria — Turkey  
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1998 Turkey - Latvia  
1999 EAC2 African Economic Community 
1999 Chile - El Salvador  
1999 
Bulgaria — Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
 
1999 Hungary - Latvia 
1999 Armenia - Kazakhstan  
1999 
Turkey — Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
 
1999 Egypt - Jordan 
2000 Mexico — Israel  
2000 EAEC Eurasian Economic Community 
2000 United States —  Jordan  
2001 Croatia - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
2001 Canada — Costa Rica 
2001 CARICOM2 Treaty establishing the Caribbean Community; Treaty of Chaguaramas 
2001 Bulgaria - Israel  
2002 Albania - Croatia  
2002 
FYROM - Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
 
2002 Turkey - Bosnia and Herzegovina 
2002 Croatia - Albania 
2002 Albania - FYROM  
2002 Turkey - Croatia  
2002 SACU2  
2003 India - Thailand  
2003 Albania - Serbia Montenegro  
2003 Republic of Korea - Chile  
2003 Albania - Romania  
2003 United States —  Chile  
2003 Albania - Bosnia and Herzegovina  
2003 Albania - Bulgaria 
2003 China - Macao, China  
2003 ECO Economic Cooperation Organization Trade Agreement (ECOTA) 
2003 Albania - Moldova  
2004 United States - Australia  
2004 Japan - Mexico  
2004 Turkey - Tunisia  
2004 Bulgaria - Serbia and Montenegro  
2004 Thailand - Australia 




List of Regional Fisheries Agreements in the Sample 
 
Signature 
Year Treaty Name 
1946 Convention For The Regulation Of The Meshes Of Fishing Nets And The Size Limits Of Fish 
1946 International Convention For The Regulation Of Whaling 
1948 Agreement For The Establishment Of The Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission 
1949 International Convention For The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
1949 Convention For The Establishment Of An Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
1949 Agreement For The Establishment Of A General Fisheries Commission For The Mediterranean 
1952 
Exchange Of Notes Constituting An Agreement Between The United States of America, Canada And Japan Relating To 
Scientific Investigations Of The Fur Seals In The North Pacific Ocean 
1952 
Agreement Concerning Measures For The Protection Of The Stocks Of Deep Sea Prawns (Pandalus Borealis), European 
Lobsters (Homarus Vulgaris), Norway Lobsters (Nephrops Norvegicus) And Crabs (Cancer Pagurus) 
1952 International Convention For The High Seas Fisheries Of The North Pacific Ocean 
1952 
Convention On The Organization Of The Permanent Commission Of The Conference On The Exploitation And 
Conservation Of The Maritime Resources Of The South Pacific 
1952 
Agreement Supplementary To The Declaration Of Sovereignty Over The Maritime Zone Of Two Hundred Miles To The 
Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1954 Agreement Relating To The Issue Of Permits For The Exploitation Of The Maritime Resources Of The South Pacific 
1954 Agreement Relating To Penalties Under The Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1954 
Agreement Relating To Measures Of Supervision And Control In The Maritime Zones Of The Signatory Countries To The 
Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1954 Agreement Relating To A Special Marine Frontier Zone Under The Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1954 Regulations Governing Whaling In The Waters Of The South Pacific 
1955 
Agreement relating to the International Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Seas Fishery signed at The Hague 
on 6 May 1882 
1956 Convention On The Canalization Of The Mosel 
1957 Interim Convention On Conservation Of North Pacific Fur Seals 
1958 Convention Concerning Fishing In The Waters Of The Danube 
1959 Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Convention 
1959 Convention Concerning Fishing In The Black Sea 
1962 Agreement Concerning Cooperation In Marine Fishing 
1962 Agreement On The Protection Of The Salmon In The Baltic Sea 
1963 Act Regarding Navigation And Economic Cooperation Between The States Of The Niger Basin 
1963 Agreement Concerning An International Observer Scheme For Factory Ships Engaged In Pelagic Whaling In The Antarctic 
1964 European Fisheries Convention 
1964 
Agreement as to transitional rights between Ireland, Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of France, the 
Netherlands, Spain and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
1966 Agreement Relating To The International Legal Personality Of The Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1966 International Convention For The Conservation Of Atlantic Tunas 
1966 Agreement On Reciprocal Access To Fishing In The Skagerrak And The Kattegat 
1967 Convention On The Conduct Of Fishing Operations In The North Atlantic 
1967 
Exchange of letters constituting an agreement between Denmark and the European Community concerning concessions 
from the European Economic Community on herring 
1967 Agreement Establishing The Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center 
1970 Agreement On The Regulation Of North Pacific Whaling 
1971 Agreement On The Regulation Of North Pacific Whaling 
1972 
Agreement Between The Governments Of Iceland, Norway And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The 
Regulation Of The Fishing Of The Atlanto-Scandian Herring 
1972 
Agreement Between The Government Of Canada, The Government Of The Republic Of Iceland And The Government Of 
The Kingdom Of Norway Concerning An International Observer Scheme For Land-Based Whaling Stations In The North 
Atlantic Area 




Agreement Between The Government Of The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics, Iceland And Norway Concerning The 
Regulation Of Fishing Of The Atlanto-Scandian Herring 
1973 Convention On Fishing And Conservation Of The Living Resources In The Baltic Sea And Belts 
1973 Arrangement Relating To Fisheries In Waters Surrounding The Faroe Island 
1974 
Agreement Between The United Kingdom, Norway And The Union Of Soviet Socialist Republics On The Regulation Of 
The Fishing Of North-East Arctic (Arcto-Norwegian) Cod 
1977 Agreement For The Establishment Of An Organization To Manage And Develop The Kagera River Basin 
1978 Convention On Future Multilateral Cooperation In The Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 
1979 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention 
1979 Agreement Incorporating Colombia Into The System Of The Permanent Commission Of The South Pacific 
1980 Convention On The Conservation Of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
1980 Convention On Future Multilateral Cooperation In Northeast Atlantic Fisheries 
1980 Convention Creating The Niger Basin Authority 
1982 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation In The Management Of Fisheries Of Common Interest 
1982 Convention For The Conservation Of Salmon In The North Atlantic Ocean 
1982 Constitutional Agreement Of The Latin American Organization For Fisheries Development 
1983 Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishing Agreement 
1984 Convention Concerning The Regional Development Of Fisheries In The Gulf Of Guinea 
1985 Convention For The Establishment Of A Sub-Regional Commission On Fisheries 
1985 
Agreement For The Establishment Of The Intergovernmental Organization For Marketing Information And Technical 
Advisory Services For Fishery Products In The Asia And Pacific Region 
1987 
Treaty On Fisheries Between The Governments Of Certain Pacific Island States And The Government Of The United States 
of America 
1987 Agreement Establishing The Economic Community Of Cattle, Meat And Fishing Resources In UDEAC 
1988 Agreement On The Network Of Aquaculture Centres In Asia And The Pacific 
1989 Agreement Creating The Eastern Pacific Tuna Fishing Organization 
1989 Convention For The Prohibition Of Fishing With Long Driftnets In The South Pacific 
1990 
Arrangement Implementing The Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Minimum Terms And Conditions Of Access To The 
Fisheries Zones Of The Parties 
1990 
Second Arrangement Implementing The Nauru Agreement Setting Forth Additional Terms And Conditions Of Access To 
The Fisheries Zones Of The Parties 
1991 Agreement On The Conservation Of Seals In The Wadden Sea 
1991 Western Indian Ocean Tuna Organization Convention 
1991 Convention On Fisheries Cooperation Among African States Bordering The Atlantic Ocean 
1991 
Agreement For The Establishment Of The Intergovernmental Organization For Marketing Information And Cooperation 
Services For Fishery Products In Africa 
1991 
Agreement Establishing Common Fisheries Surveillance Zones Of Participating Member States Of The Organisation Of 
Eastern Caribbean States 
1992 Convention For The Conservation Of Anadromous Stocks In The North Pacific Ocean 
1992 Agreement On The Conservation Of Small Cetaceans Of The Baltic And North Seas 
1992 La Jolla Agreement On The Reduction Of Dolphin Mortality In The Eastern Pacific Ocean 
1992 Niue Treaty On Cooperation In Fisheries Surveillance And Law Enforcement In The South Pacific Region 
1992 Arrangement For The Management Of Western Pacific Purse Seining Fishery 
1993 
Agreement To Constitute The International Center For Living Aquatic Resources Management As An International 
Organization 
1993 Convention For The Conservation Of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
1993 
Extension To The Treaty On Fisheries Between The Governments Of Certain Pacific Island States And The Government Of 
The United States of America 
1993 Constitution Of The Centre For Marketing Information And Advisory Services For Fishery Products In The Arab Region 
1993 
Convention Under The Sub-Regional Commission On Fisheries On Cooperation In The Exercise Of The Rights Of 
Maritime Pursuit 
1993 
Agreement To Promote Compliance With International Conservation And Management Measures By Fishing Vessels On 
The High Seas 
1993 Agreement For The Establishment Of The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
1994 




1994 Convention On The Conservation And Management Of Pollock Resources In The Central Bering Sea 
1994 Convention For The Establishment Of The Lake Victoria Fisheries Organization 
1994 Federated States Of Micronesia Arrangement For Regional Fisheries Access 
1996 Agreement On The Conservation Of Cetaceans Of The Black Sea, Mediterranean Sea And Contiguous Atlantic Area 
1996 Inter-American Convention For The Protection And Conservation Of Sea Turtles 
1996 Convention Regulating Fishing Activity Within The Waters Of The Member States 
1998 
Agreement Of Cooperation For The Conservation Of The Marine Turtles In The Caribbean Coast Of Costa Rica, Nicaragua 
And Panama (Tripartite Agreement) 
1998 Agreement On The International Dolphin Conservation Program 
1998 
Agreement Between Iceland, Greenland/Denmark, And Norway About The Capelin Stock In The Area Between Greenland, 
Iceland, And Jan Mayen 
1999 Agreement Between Iceland, Norway And Russia Concerning Certain Aspects Of Cooperation In The Area Of Fisheries 
1999 Agreement For The Establishment Of The Regional Commission For Fisheries 
2000 
Agreement for the Establishment of the International Organisation for the Development of Fisheries in Eastern and Central 
Europe (eurofish) 
2000 Framework Agreement For The Conservation Of The Living Marine Resources Of The High Seas Of The South Pacific 
2000 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean 
2001 Convention On The Conservation And Management Of Fishery Resources In The South East Atlantic Ocean 
2002 
Second Extension To The Treaty On Fisheries Between The Governments Of Certain Pacific Island States And The 
Government Of The United States of America 
2003 
Convention For The Strengthening Of The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission Established By The 1949 










Agreement Name Alternate Name/Subtitle 
1959 Antarctic Treaty  
1963 
Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the 
Atmosphere, Outer Space and Underwater 
Limited (Partial) Test Ban Treaty 
1963 Hot Line Agreement  
1967 Latin American Nuclear Free-Zone Treaty Treaty of Tlatelolco 
1967 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in 
the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the 
Moon and other Celestial Bodies 
Outer Space Treaty 
1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT 
1970 Zangger Committee  
1971 
Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak 
of Nuclear War between the United States of America and 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
Accidents Measures Agreement 
1971 Hot Line Modernization Agreement 
Agreement Between The United States of America and 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures To 
Improve the U.S.A.-USSR Direct Communications Link 
(With Annex, Supplementing and Modifying the 
Memorandum of Understanding With Annex, of June 20, 
1963) 
1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty 
Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear 
Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the 
Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof 
1971 Accidents Measures Agreement  
1972 
Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems  
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) 
1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I)  
SALT I; Interim Agreement… on Certain Measures with 
Respect to Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms; 
Vladivostock accord 
1972 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction  
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) 
1972 
Agreement..on the Prevention of Incidents on and over 
the High Seas 
Incidents at Sea Agreement 
1973 Agreement..on the Prevention of Nuclear War  
1974 Threshold Test Ban Treaty TTBT 
1975 CSCE Confidence-Building Measures Helsinki Final Act 
1975 Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) London Club 
1976 




Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other 
Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques  
Environmental Modification Agreement 
1979 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) SALT II 
1980 
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material 
Nuclear Material Convention 
1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) 
The Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the 
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be 




1984 Hot Line Expansion Agreement 
Agreement Between The United States of America and 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics To Expand the 
U.S.-USSR Direct Communications Link 
1985 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (SPNFZ) Treaty of Rarotonga 
1985 Australia Group (AG)  
1986 
Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence 
and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in 
Europe  
Confidence and Security-Building Measures [OSCE] 
1987 
Treaty…on Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and 
Shorter-Range Missiles 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
1987 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Guidelines MTCR 
1987 Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers  
1988 
Agreement between the United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of 
Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and 
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles  
Ballistic Missile Launch Notification Agreement 
1989 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe CFE 
1989 Wyoming MOU Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange 
1990 Charter of Paris for a New Europe subtitle: a new era of democracy, peace and unity 
1990 Treaty on Open Skies  
1990 Bilateral Destruction Agreement [BDA]  
1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) START I 
1993 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on 
their Destruction  
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
1993 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty II (START II) START II 
1993 
US-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead 
Attribution and Heavy Bomber Data 
 
1994 Vienna Document 1994 
Vienna Document 1994 of the Negotiations on 
Confidence- and Security-Building Measures 
1994 Mutual Detargeting Moscow Declaration 
1995 Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty of Bangkok 
1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty Treaty of Pelindaba 
1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty CTBT 
1996 Wassenaar Arrangement 
The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for 
Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and 
Technologies 
1997 Mutual Reduction of Military Forces in the Border Areas  
2000 
Joint Statement concerning management and disposition 
of weapon-grade plutonium designated as no longer 
required for defense purposes and related cooperation 
Fissile Material Disposition 
2000 Notifications of Missile Launches  
2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty SORT 
 Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) 
Establishment of a Joint Warning Center for the Exchange 





Example of Treaty Lineage in Arms Control Agreements  
 
Note: Within arms control agreements, some clusters of agreements share similar 
characteristics. The lineage of nuclear weapons treaties, many of them the offshoots of 













NSG, Zangger Committee 
South Pacific, Africa, Latin 
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